The role of concepts in Kant's account of aesthetic experience by Smith, SD
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role of Concepts in Kant's Account of Aesthetic 
Experience 
by 
Simon David Smith 
 
UCL 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I, Simon David Smith, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been 
indicated in the thesis. 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The thesis begins by exploring Kant's account of cognition as it is presented within 
the Critique of Pure Reason, particularly with reference to the conceptualist/non-
conceptualist debate as it has developed over recent years. I argue that there is an 
important non-conceptualist position within Kant's account that concerns the unity 
of space and time as non-conceptual intuitive wholes. This argument will be used in 
discussing and exploring Kant's account of both aesthetic receptivity and aesthetic 
creativity as presented within the Critique of Judgement. My exploration of this third 
Critique will begin by looking at Kant's account of the harmony of the faculties and 
how we should understand the sense in which our aesthetic response is a non-
conceptually determined one. The same concern will apply to an analysis of Kant's 
account of the mathematical sublime, and in the later stages of this discussion we 
will find an interesting relation between Kant's account of the role of infinity (space 
and time as unified wholes), and our earlier argument concerning space and time as 
formal intuitive wholes. After this focus upon the conditions of aesthetic receptivity 
my focus shifts towards aesthetic creativity as presented in Kant's account of fine art 
and genius. The main focus here will be with Kant's remark that art, in order to be 
art, must seem like nature. I will argue that this statement must be understood in 
two interdependent ways, where the first element concerns the formal construction 
of a representation so that it looks like nature in the sense of being a unified and 
readable representation. I will argue that artistic creativity at this level is the 
precondition of the second sense in which art must seem like nature, which concerns 
the content of a representation, and that a non-conceptual intuitional base is essential 
to this end. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In recent years a body of literature has developed surrounding Kant's account of the 
role of concepts, as contained within his first Critique, the Critique of Pure Reason 
(CPR). The issue concerns the extent to which concepts can be said to be operative in 
constructing the kind of objective and apperceptive experience that is peculiar to 
human beings. A non-conceptualist sees Kant as arguing that there is an element of 
experience that is not governed by the application of concepts to certain sensory 
data, so that there is an important element of experience that is not under the 
auspices of the understanding (what Kant calls the faculty of concepts). The 
conceptualist on the other hand, argues that for Kant there is no meaningful or 
important experience that is not at some stage under the guidance of concepts. This 
debate, between conceptualism and non-conceptualism in the first Critique, is a large 
debate on its own terms, and will be important to the direction of our overall thesis1. 
However, our concern with this debate and its prominence within the first Critique, 
is not predominantly for its own sake, but with how it relates to our overall concern, 
which, as the title indicates, is the role of concepts in Kant's account of aesthetic 
experience2. 
 
The overall thesis of this paper is twofold, although these two theses are related and 
interdependent. The more general thesis, or argument, is that in order to adequately 
                                                          
1 For a good and recent overview of the subject and how Kantian conceptualism and non-
conceptualism relates, and is relevant to, contemporary conceptualist/non-conceptualist debates in 
the Philosophy of Mind, see Kant and Non-Conceptualism, Ed. by Dietmar Hiedemann (2012). 
2 It is important to point out at this early stage that Kant has a broader sense of 'aesthetic' than is 
typically understood by the term, where in this broader sense an aesthetic response or occurrence is 
just one which involves the faculty of intuition (sensibility) and which thereby has the intuitions of 
space and time as its base (or possibility) (CPR B33-37). An aesthetic experience here is just a 
spatiotemporal perceptual experience. In the more specific sense an aesthetic experience is one 
concerned with a particular kind of response (a non-cognitive one) to both nature and art, and is 
therefore the sense as it typically occurs in common discourse. This latter kind of aesthetic experience 
is Kant's concern in his the first part of his third Critique the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgement, 
and is the kind of experience we mean with when we say that we will be investigating the role of 
concepts in Kant's account of aesthetic experience. It is important to signal however that an important 
part of our task is to explore what Kant understands by aesthetic experience in the broader sense so 
that we can better understand what he means by an aesthetic experience in the more specific, 
common, sense. 
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understand Kant's account of aesthetic experience (and the role of concepts in 
determining this experience) we need to firstly understand the role of concepts in 
Kant's account of the role of cognition, and this is why we are concerned with the 
conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate. In the first part of the Critique of Judgement 
(CJ) Kant presents his account of how aesthetic experience (our experience of beauty) 
is determined or generated, and this is his account of the harmony of the faculties. 
Kant here argues that in order for us to have an aesthetic experience, the 
understanding (as the faculty of concepts) and the imagination (as the faculty of 
intuitions, sensory data) must stand in a relation of 'free play' towards each other, so 
that the understanding isn't concerned with determining the sensory element with 
regard to determinate, objective cognition (which would be an empirically 
determining experience), but rather with reflecting upon what Kant calls the 
purposivity of the intuition as such for the faculty of concepts as such. We will come 
to the details of this in our fourth chapter, but the essential point is that Kant calls his 
account of aesthetic experience a non-cognitive one, insofar as with an aesthetic 
judgement we are not concerned with objective cognition but just with reflecting 
upon the intuition with regard to its purposivity for judgement. Because of the 
emphasis on the non-cognitive element, there is clearly a sense in which aesthetic 
judgements are non-conceptual. However, although we may be able to defend a 
kind of non-conceptualism within Kant's account of aesthetic experience, this doesn't 
mean that a non-conceptualism can be predicated of Kant's account of cognition 
more generally. The complexity here concerns the way the intuitional (sensory) data 
that is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience is itself ordered, and whether 
concepts are in some sense already in operation before the intuition can even be 
presented to the understanding (as the faculty of concepts). Depending upon how 
one reads Kant's account of the emergence of cognition within the first Critique 
(which is the subject of our first two chapters), and how one reads his account of 
reflective judgement as it is presented within the third Critique (which is the subject 
of our third and fourth chapters), will determine how one understands Kant's 
account of the harmony of the faculties and the extent to which this account is a non-
cognitive (or non-conceptual) one. Because our fifth chapter is concerned with the 
experience of the sublime (which for Kant is a species of aesthetic experience and 
within the third Critique comes after his discussion of beauty), our discussion of the 
role of concepts in Kant's account of cognition and how this stands in relation to our 
experience of beauty, will help us to interpret this element of Kant's account as well. 
In our sixth and seventh chapters the focus of this paper shifts from Kant's account 
of the possibility of aesthetic receptivity (having an aesthetic experience) to the 
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possibility of aesthetic creativity and what it means to create a work of art. An 
important element of Kant's account of fine art generally is his statement that fine art 
is only art to the extent that it seems like nature. What Kant means here is uncertain 
insofar as there are conflicting elements to his argument. I will argue that this must 
be understood in two senses, where the first element concerns the formal 
construction of a representation, and looking like nature in the sense of being a 
unified and readable representation, and where the second sense concerns using 
symbols to communicate so that the art work speaks as nature itself speaks to us. 
Again, the details of this account will be dealt with within our sixth and seventh 
chapters, but what is important with reference to our thesis is that our 
understanding of the way in which the understanding as the faculty of concepts 
relates to the faculty of intuitions in aesthetic responsiveness will help us to 
understand these different components of aesthetic creativity. As far as the 
conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate goes, we will also find that there is a new 
kind of non-conceptualism within Kant's account of aesthetic creativity and the role 
of aesthetic ideas. An aesthetic idea is what might be called the content of an artistic 
representation insofar as it has something to communicate, and the non-
conceptualism here is grounded in the fact that for Kant this content is conceptually, 
or discursively, transcendent; so that no concept, or linguistic expression is adequate 
to the representation itself. Insofar as the content is here nevertheless an intellectual 
one, this suggests that concepts themselves are not the bounds of our intellectual life 
and that an intuitional, symbolic content can serve to express deeper meaning than 
we are otherwise capable of (through concepts). 
 
Our second and what we may call our more specific thesis, emerges from our initial 
analysis of the role of concepts in the first Critique. It turns out that Kant's 
development of the idea of an intuitional faculty, in contrast to the understanding as 
a conceptual faculty, provides room for developing an argument whereby space and 
time, as what Kant calls formal wholes, are non-conceptual constructs generated in 
intuition that make all subsequent cognition possible. How these spatiotemporal 
formal intuitions as non-conceptual entities are generated and make subsequent, 
higher level cognition possible, will be the subject of our second chapter. But our 
argument with reference to our thesis is that we are maintaining that there is a 
definite non-conceptualist position within Kant's account that is important in 
understanding his account of cognition. This is not only important for the 
conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate as it stands, but for our subsequent 
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arguments and chapters which are concerned with the possibility of aesthetic 
creativity. The importance of space and time as formal wholes which are in no way 
governed through the application of concepts is, I will argue, key to understanding 
how drawing, for instance, as an intuitive activity is possible. Of course as the pre-
condition of any cognition whatsoever, space and time as formal wholes are the 
basis of all intuitive activity, not just particular ones. But as I will go on to argue, 
there are certain activities whose character expose a uniquely and predominantly 
spatiotemporal element of our cognitive make up. Drawing I will argue is one of 
these activities, and the importance of drawing for Kant is apparent when he states 
that, 
All form of the objects of the senses (of the outer as well as, mediately, the 
inner) is either shape or play: in the latter case, either play of shapes (in 
space, mime and dance), or mere play of sensations (in time). The charm of 
colours or of the agreeable tones of instruments can be added, but drawing in 
the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the 
pure judgement of taste. (CJ 5:225) 
Our thesis regarding the non-conceptuality of space and time as formal wholes 
however is not only important for coming to understand how certain activities are 
possible, but will be key in helping us understand, in Chapter's 6 and 7, Kant's 
remark in the third Critique that art is only art when it seems like nature. This is 
because looking like nature is in one sense concerned with the formal constraints 
governing the representation, whereby the artistic production must be successfully 
ordered so that it looks like a product of nature in its purposivity for judgement. 
Because drawing is concerned with attaining a successful formal arrangement on a 
two-dimensional surface, then it is concerned with making art seem like nature in its 
purposivity for judgement. Consequently the aptitude for making art seem like 
nature is in part accounted for through our possessing the non-conceptual formal 
wholes of space and time. 
In addition to the application of our more specific thesis to these arguments, there is 
also an interesting connection between the unity of space and time as formal wholes 
as presented in the deduction of the first Critique and the mathematical sublime as 
Kant discusses it in the third Critique. In Kant's account of the mathematical sublime 
he argues that integral to this experience of the sublime is a sense of the infinite as a 
whole, where through this sense we are transferred from the phenomenal frustration 
of failing to comprehend what is before us (insofar as it is vast and not capable of 
being taken up in a single view), to the pleasure of locating a noumenal substratum 
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that is infinity comprehended as a whole. The details of Kant's argument here are 
complex, and will be the subject of Chapter 5. But with reference to our thesis, 
insofar as space and time are grasped as infinite wholes (noumenal substrate), then, I 
will argue, there is a sense in which space and time as non-conceptual formal wholes 
are the basis of this experience. 
Thus both of our theses work together in exploring the sense in which the faculty of 
intuition and the faculty of the understanding (concepts) are operative not only in 
aesthetic receptivity, but also in aesthetic creativity, and the sense in which there can 
be a meaningful non-conceptualism located within Kant's account of aesthetic 
experience. 
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Chapter 1  
Synthesis and Representational Content 
 
 
With this chapter we will begin our investigation of the role of concepts in Kant's 
account of cognition, as it is presented within the Critique of Pure Reason. Central to 
this investigation is exploring Kant's account of representational content and what it 
means for a representation to stand before us, and this is because representational 
content is itself importantly connected with the function of concepts in generating 
this content. This is further connected with what it means, for Kant, for a cognitive 
content to be meaningful in its putting us into an interactive relationship with an 
objective world of experience. As was mentioned in our introduction, a non-
conceptualist is someone who reads the first Critique as maintaining the position that 
there is a level of representational content that is engaged with the world prior to the 
operation of any concepts upon this content, and we will examine to see if this is 
really a plausible position given the text of the Critique itself.  
 
Synthesis 
Fundamental to Kant’s account of representations is his account of synthesis, as that 
act which enables a representation to stand before us in the first place, as unified 
data. Kant’s initial definition of this function states that ‘By synthesis in the most 
general sense[…] I understand the action of putting different representations 
together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition' 
(A77/B103). It becomes subsequently clear that Kant’s account of synthesis is 
intimately bound up with his account of the imagination, and further on in the first 
Critique Kant is explicit in assigning the synthesising function to the imagination; 
since every appearance contains a manifold, thus different perceptions by 
themselves are encountered dispersed and separate in the mind, a 
combination of them, which they cannot have in sense itself, is therefore 
necessary. There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in 
us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon 
perceptions I call apprehension. (CPR A120)  
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This is the role of synthesis in relation to the imagination as it stands in the A-
deduction of the first Critique, where it appears that the functioning of the 
imagination is clearly apart from the operations of the understanding (as the faculty 
of unifying through concepts). By the time of the B-deduction however, it appears 
that Kant’s thoughts on the issue of synthesis had changed, with the role of the 
imagination being assigned a less prominent role, and where the role of the 
understanding in generating all synthesis had come to the fore. This indeed appears 
to be the case at the opening of the B-deduction, where Kant writes; 
All combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a 
combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the 
first case of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the 
understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis in 
order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent 
nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it 
ourselves. (CPR B130) 
This statement certainly suggests that from the outset there is no room for any 
meaningful intuitional content that is not under the auspices of the understanding, 
insofar as the understanding is defined as a faculty of concepts, or a faculty of 
judgement (A126). This change as to how synthesis is generated is also tellingly 
revealed in the oft-cited passage of A78/B102, where, as the passage stands in both 
editions, Kant writes, 
Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the 
imagination, of a blind though indispensible function of the soul, without 
which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even 
conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to 
understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the 
proper sense. (CPR A78/B102) 
Because this is how the passage stands in the B-deduction it may well be thought to 
resuscitate the autonomy of the imagination in relation to synthesis apart from the 
understanding, especially since the synthesis delivered by the imagination needs to 
be brought to concepts, where this is a further action of the understanding. However, 
in Kant’s copy of his first edition, the clause which states that the synthesising 
function is the operation ‘of a blind though indispensible function of the soul’ is 
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replaced with ‘of a function of the understanding’, thus testifying to the idea of a 
monopoly of the understanding in delivering synthesis.3 
However, the role of the understanding in its synthesising function at the earliest 
representational level is arguably always a feature of the initial argument of the 
Critique, and it may be thought that although Kant equivocated between a 
synthesising function independent of the understanding, this was never really on the 
cards, as it were, and that writers such as Heidegger were really just mistaken in 
seeing the A-deduction as supporting a more important role for the imagination in 
its independence from the understanding4. Thus at (A79/B104-5) Kant writes that, 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations 
in an intuition, which expressed generally is called the pure concept of 
understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of 
the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a 
judgement into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a 
transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic 
unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are 
called the pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori. 
(CPR A79/B104-5) 
What Kant is here telling us is that although it is the function of the logical form of 
judgement to be operative in the formation of determinate concepts for their use in 
judgement, they also have a prior function whereby they are responsible for unifying 
(synthesising) representations through their particular forms. Although certain 
writers who support Kantian non-conceptualism point to passages whereby the 
possibility of non-conceptualism seems to be closed down, notably the passage at 
(A50-51/B74-75) which stipulates the empty thoughts/blind intuitions constraint, 
only to argue that this closing down is merely apparent, the above passage seems to 
me to be a greater challenge to the non-conceptualist argument. For Kant is here 
stating that intuitions are only formed in the first place because of an act of the 
understanding, where representational data is synthesised at what might be called a 
                                                          
3 Although it may be thought that Kant wasn’t committed to this change, whereby the imagination 
operates under the understanding as opposed to being  a blind ‘function of the soul’, as this 
emendation didn’t make its way into the second edition, Rudolf Makkreel points out that ‘[s]ince this 
statement occurs in a preliminary section of the Analytic that Kant did not revise, its retention in the 
second edition cannot be explained as an oversight on Kant’s part.’ (Makkreel (1990): 28-9). 
4 Heidegger considered Kant, in the B-deduction, to have privileged pure reason over transcendental 
imagination, thereby 'intellectualising' the transcendental deduction, so that the supremacy of reason 
in its practical use is affirmed. (Heidegger (1990): §31)  
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sortal level. Kant later calls such pure concepts of the understanding the ancestral 
registry of the understanding (or primitive or ancestral concepts) in contrast to universal 
representations, where the latter are only generated because of the particular 
organisational capacity operative at the primitive or basic level (A81/B107). 
Consequently, defenders of Kantian non-conceptualism must be conscious of this 
primary function of the categories in generating the data of sense. 
A satisfactory non-conceptualist account then, in terms of finding a important place 
within the genesis of cognition, if it is to stand any chance of success, must find an 
argument to the effect that although the synthesis that brings unity to the intuition 
(as Kant accounts for it in the above quoted passage) is performed through what we 
have called sortal concepts, this isn’t all that is to be said, and that we can trace this 
genesis further back in locating an important role for a non-conceptual content. In 
Chapter 2 I will, following the arguments of Wayne Waxman and Béatrice 
Longuenesse, argue that Kant himself is explicitly arguing for a synthesis that takes 
place through the imagination and that yet precedes the category. This synthesis is 
the synthesis of space and time (which are our pure forms of intuition) as formal 
intuitions; a synthesis which subsequently enables all the manifold of sense to be 
ordered as spatiotemporal. Although not synthesised through the category this 
synthesis is a synthesis which belongs to the understanding, as it is a synthesis 
generated through the unity of apperception, which is what Kant calls the first action 
of the understanding5. The details of this account will be dealt with in the second 
chapter, but in this chapter I will argue that although our argument of the second 
chapter is of key importance in both being able to fully appreciate Kant’s account of 
the genesis of cognition and in providing room for an important non-conceptualist 
position, this isn’t all the non-conceptualist has to go on, and that there is an 
important earlier synthesis that must take place even before the unity of 
apperception acts upon the spatial and temporal in sense generating the formal 
intuition. Already the paradoxical nature of this claim stands out however, as we 
have already seen that Kant states that all synthesis is an act of the understanding. 
Nevertheless I believe that there is an important argument, albeit a highly 
underdeveloped one, for a kind of synthetic unity (and as we will see later in this 
chapter there is a better reason for calling the representational content delivered at 
this earliest stage a synthesis of representations), where this is a pre-conceptual unity 
that  is delivered with our forms of intuition, where what this content contains isn’t 
                                                          
5 In the deduction Kant writes that ‘the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which 
one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental 
philosophy; indeed this faculty is the understanding itself.' (B133-4n) 
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yet the formal intuition of the deduction. I believe that we need to locate this initial 
synthesis if we are to make sense of the idea that the synthetic unity of apperception 
acts upon some material, material which of itself cannot be unified through the 
understanding, and a passage in the A-deduction, which clearly indicates that it 
would be a mistake to see the A-deduction as not having an important account of the 
autonomy of sensibility, already supports this argument (of a gap between the unity 
of apperception as activity and what this activity acts upon), for Kant writes here 
that, 
The productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the 
reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. The principle of the 
necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to 
apperception [emphasis] is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, 
especially that of experience. (CPR A118) 
Although Kant slightly prior to this had remarked that ‘the unity of the manifold in 
a subject is synthetic; pure apperception therefore yields a principle of the synthetic 
unity of the manifold in all possible intuition [emphasis]’ (A116), we will be arguing 
that the unity of apperception (which is that unity that must be in place in order for 
something to count as a representation to me, to be anything for me, and constitutes 
the consciousness of an ‘I’ through its relation to the data of sense) cannot in fact be 
the first stage of representational content. In addition I believe we also need to locate 
this initial stage of apprehension  in order to makes sense of Kant’s account of 
animal representation, as underdeveloped as it may be. Animals do not unify data 
through the unity of apperception and hence don’t possess self-consciousness, but 
they do, for Kant, possess a consciousness, and they are engaged in interacting with 
the world. In order for this to be possible certain apprehensional abilities are 
required, and if the understanding were to monopolise upon all data capable of 
being apprehended, then we could not make sense of animal activity. Likewise if the 
understanding ran a monopoly in our cognitive sphere then I believe Kant would 
have no account of an emergence of cognition from a non-cognitive ground. 
 
Threefold Synthesis 
The remark just considered, at (A118), is explicit in assigning the synthesis generated 
prior to apperception to the activity of the (productive) imagination, and the 
contention that Kant may be assigning a unifying role to imagination prior to 
apperception is reflected especially in Kant’s account in the A-edition of what is 
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called the threefold synthesis. Here it is sometimes thought, especially amongst 
those writers who read Kant as upholding a non-conceptualist position, that this 
stage of the A-deduction offers important material in support of this position6. At 
this stage of the A-deduction Kant distinguishes between ‘three original sources 
(capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of 
all experience’, which, as Lucy Allais points out, ‘only the third [of which], the 
synthesis of recognition in a concept, explicitly involves concepts’ and where the 
first two, the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction ‘are attributed to 
imagination’ (Allais (2009): 396). So initially, as with the remark at A118, it may 
appear that Kant is concerned with a non-conceptual synthesis. However in the two 
sections immediately prior to the ‘The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding’ (the threefold synthesis) Kant appears to present a difficult obstacle 
to any non-conceptualist reading of Kant, which is largely a problem to do with the 
meaningfulness of a representation, or of representational content. The trouble for a 
non-conceptualist is that even if a role for representational content is located at the 
pre-unity of apperception level, it is apparent by Kant’s remarks at various stages in 
the first Critique, that any pre-categorical unity is, as Kant refers to it, nothing to us. 
In the two sections prior to the threefold synthesis Kant is concerned with asking 
how it is possible for there to be a transcendental deduction of the categories, given 
that unlike space and time, they ‘do not represent the conditions under which objects 
are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without 
necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding’ (A89/B122). 
Objects couldn’t appear to us were it not that our sensibility contained the pure 
intuitions of space and time, whereas objects can appear to us without necessarily 
being conditioned by the categories. Again, this may initially appear to provide an 
argument in support of a non-conceptualist reading of Kant, since it is clear that the 
categories aren’t so despotic, as it were, as to be the conditions upon which any 
experience whatsoever is possible, and that therefore there may be a kind of 
synthesis of experience which is possible prior to or independent of 
conceptualization. However, Kant’s account of what this experience would be 
appears to preclude the possibility that it could be any meaningful, contentful 
experience, for he goes on to write that, 
                                                          
6 Lucy Allais for instance, a defender of Kantian non-conceptualism ("Kant, Non-Conceptual Content 
and the Representation of Space"), sees the threefold synthesis as in some capacity making room for a 
non-conceptualist position (Allais (2009):396,396n). Sarah Gibbons, In Kant's Theory of Imagination 
(1994), also reads Kant's account of the threefold synthesis as making room for a pre-conceptual 
synthesis, although she states that the threefold synthesis is misleadingly presented in appearing to 
argue that all synthesis is ultimately conceptual. (Gibbons (1994): 32-6). 
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Appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would 
not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything 
would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances 
nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus 
correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would 
therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. 
Appearances would nonetheless offer objects for our intuition, for intuition 
by no means requires the functions of thinking. (CPR A90/B123) 
So apart from the synthesising function of the understanding, even though 
appearances would still offer objects for us at the intuitional level, these intuitions 
would not be anything to us ('without significance'). Kant’s overall point in these 
sections leading up to the second section of the transcendental deduction is that if 
we are going to be able to ground the categories as subjective conditions of thinking 
on objective a priori, not inductive or empirically based grounds, then this is not 
because an object is only possible as appearance because of them, but because ‘they 
must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience (whether of 
the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking), and that ‘[c]oncepts that 
supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for 
that reason’ (A94/B126). So although the possibility of experience at all levels isn’t 
conditional upon the application of the categories to intuition, for ‘intuition by no 
means requires the functions of thinking’, it is nevertheless clear that Kant is 
operating with a strong notion of cognitive significance, which means a contentful, 
unified experience, rather than a ‘confused’ one. What is important however is that 
Kant maintains that what we are presented with before the activity of the 
understanding finds operation, are intuitions, and that although Kant equivocates 
throughout the Critique as to whether the intuition is only possible as a 
representational content as delivered by the understanding, there are times when it 
doesn’t have this stronger sense.  
 
Stages of Synthesis 
It is a contentious issue however, as to whether the threefold synthesis actually 
allows for even an intuitional togetherness which isn’t dependent for this 
togetherness upon the understanding. The first stage of this synthesis is called ‘On 
the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition’, where Kant had earlier told us that 
this stage of synthesis is concerned with ‘the synopsis of the manifold a priori 
through sense’: 
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Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession 
of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no 
representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. Now in order 
for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the 
representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then take 
together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of 
apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure 
provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed contained 
in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis. (CPR A99) 
It is apparent that a synthesis in apprehension must be the first stage in the 
generation of any representation, as it is this synthesis that unifies data as being 
‘contained in one moment’, and it is reasonable to suppose that this is true of both 
human and animal psychology. The manifold of sense, as what Kant in the following 
paragraph calls ‘original receptivity’, by itself cannot contain a unity, and this first 
unifying act, by ‘distinguishing the time in the succession of impressions’ enables 
representational points in time to be apprehended as separate and contained. 
Because there is no reference to the concept or understanding as providing this 
unity, it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that this synthesis is a specific pre-
conceptual unifying activity that belongs to sense itself, as the first act in the genesis 
of cognition. The problem with this account however and with the threefold 
synthesis in general is that although Kant may initially leave room for a pre-
conceptual synthesis, the possibility of this synthesis in the subsequent stages of his 
argument appears to be closed down. 
The second stage synthesis is ‘the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination’, and 
this synthesis states that without collecting the moments generated in apprehension 
into a further unity there would be no representational content at all. Thus, to use 
Kant’s examples, in drawing a line in thought, or thinking of the progression of one 
point in time to the next I have a series of temporally unique apprehended moments. 
But if I failed to connect these progressive apprehensions, so that the previous 
moment was lost as soon as I apprehended the next, there would be no unity in the 
temporal series, so that ‘no whole representation… not even the purest and most 
fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise’ (A102). It is thereby 
apparent that the synthesis of apprehension can go nowhere in terms of synthesis 
over time without the synthesis of reproduction, and with reference to this Kant 
writes that, 
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The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably combined with the 
synthesis of reproduction. And since the former constitutes the 
transcendental ground of the possibility of all cognition in general (not only 
of empirical cognition, but also of pure a priori cognition), the reproductive 
synthesis of the imagination belongs among the transcendental actions of the 
mind, and with respect to this we will also call this faculty the transcendental 
faculty of the imagination. (CPR A102) 
Again, as with the first stage of synthesis, no reference is made to the fact that this 
unifying activity must be performed through either the concept or the activity of the 
understanding. The third stage of synthesis however is the ‘the synthesis of the 
recognition in the concept’, and the role of the concept in unifying apprehensional 
data comes to the fore in a way which shows that this is Kant’s primary concern in 
showing the possibility of cognition. 
The trouble with this section however, is that it appears to indicate that the first two 
syntheses, especially the synthesis of reproduction, are only possible through this 
third stage synthesis, and Kant states that, 
If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were 
successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the 
generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the 
other, and consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept 
consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis. (CPR A103) 
Here, the synthesis of reproduction is apparent, in that there is a synthesis of 
temporally distinct units which follow upon each other in time. But this remark goes 
beyond the second stage synthesis in stating that this synthesis is a synthesis 
through the concept, which Kant subsequently refers to as the unity of a rule. So it 
appears that the second stage synthesis isn’t part of a process whereby it has its own 
function and then is brought to a subsequent synthesis through the concept, but that 
this synthesis is already part of the synthesis through the concept insofar as it 
reproduces in accordance with a rule. This reading is supported by what Rudolf 
Makkreel calls a presuppositional reading of the threefold synthesis, which contrasts 
with what he again calls a cumulative reading. The latter would see the threefold 
synthesis as a linear account where the synthesis of apprehension would be 
regarded as a ‘gathering synthesis, the synthesis of imaginative reproduction as an 
associative synthesis, and the synthesis of recognition as a connecting or unifying 
synthesis’ and where ‘[e]ach synthesis then would be slightly more specific than its 
predecessor’ (Makkreel (1990): 27). The presuppositional reading however, which is 
a reading Makkreel supports, sees each synthesis as reciprocally determinable and 
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not necessarily operating in a linear fashion. This reading has as its strength in what 
we have already noted: that Kant appears to be explicit in collapsing the synthesis of 
reproduction into the synthesis of recognition. Since the synthesis of apprehension is 
‘inseparably combined’ with this second synthesis there is also reason to suppose 
that it too collapses into the third synthesis. Makkreel also sees Kant as running two 
sequences in specifying which synthesis is the basis for the other. Makkreel’s idea 
seems to be that whereas on the one hand, at (A119), Kant states that the synthesis of 
apprehension is the basis the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, which is 
in turn the basis of the recognition in the concept, on the other hand, at (A125), Kant 
reverses this order, so that there are in effect two sequences, which ‘[t]aken together 
indicate a circular process’, so that ‘[t]he sequence beginning with apprehension 
provides the necessary content of experience, whereas the other, beginning with 
recognition provides its formal unity’ (Makkreel (1990): 28). Because of Kant’s 
subsequent emphasis upon the categories as the grounds of all synthesis Makkreel 
concludes that, 
When apprehension, imaginative reproduction, and recognition within the 
overall view of synthesis developed in the Critique of Pure Reason are 
discussed, the sequence must begin with the synthesis of recognition. 
Ultimately all synthesis is a function of the understanding and its categories. 
This is the conclusion that Kant arrives at in the Objective [B-] Deduction. 
(Makkreel (1990): 28) 
However, although Makkreel's reading has conviction, I believe it is mistaken to see 
all synthesis as a function of the understanding and its categories. For one thing, as 
will be discussed in the second Chapter, Kant is explicit in locating a pre-categorical 
synthesis within the B-deduction which is the synthesis generated in the formal 
intuition. Although this is a synthesis delivered by the understanding in an original 
act of synthetic unity, it is not arrived at through the function of the categories. 
Another point is that although Kant may at various stages reverse the order of his 
account so that the reciprocity and dependence of the syntheses is emphasised, this 
doesn’t necessarily indicate that there cannot be apprehensional content of any kind 
apart from the concept of the understanding, but just that cognition of the object is 
only possible through the application of the third stage synthesis to all the manifold7. 
                                                          
7 This is the sense in which Allais sees the threefold synthesis as making room for a pre-conceptual 
synthesis, writing, 'notice that Kant does not say that the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction 
would be impossible, or would fail to result in representational content, but that they would be in vain 
(vergeblich), and I take it that we can read this as saying that they would be in vain with respect to 
objectively valid cognition or empirical knowledge of objects.' (Allais (2009): 396n) 
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This focus on cognition is clearly Kant’s overarching concern where it is taken to 
indicate what is characteristic of human cognition in experiencing a world with 
objective content. Thus at (A105) Kant states that, 
Hence we say that we cognise the object if we have effected synthetic unity in 
the manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have 
been produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule that 
makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and a concept in 
which this manifold is united possible. (CPR A105) 
So cognition is not possible without the unification through the concept, where this 
cognition is taken in a stronger sense than just anything that consists in 
representational content, which even animals possess, and so in this sense cannot be 
said to cognize (as we will subsequently discuss). Béatrice Longuenesse also argues 
that it is a mistake to read the first two stages of the threefold synthesis as having 
only application insofar as they are seen as part of the broader synthesising function 
of the understanding (through the concept), writing that, 
it is plausible to think that a great number of our representations involve acts 
of mere apprehension and reproductive associations of the same type as[…] 
animals are capable of, [and that] among our conscious representations there 
are some we just apprehend without reproducing them, or reproduce 
without subjecting them to the rules of synthesis that allow them to be 
reflected under concepts – that is, to be thought. And indeed, all the opening 
sentence of section 16 states is that it must be possible for the ‘I think’ to 
accompany all my representations, not that it must actually accompany them. 
In other words, all of my representations must be such that that it is possible 
to combine them[…] within the framework of the “unity of synthesis” of the 
manifold of my intuition, and to become conscious of such a combination. 
(Longuenesse (1998): 66) 
For Longuenesse then, apprehension and reproduction can occur without 
necessarily being brought under recognition in a concept, and she points out that for 
Kant there are even non-conscious states which do not even reach the stage of 
apprehension (such as ‘the individual notes of a chord struck in the course of 
musical improvisation’ (Longuenesse (1998) (65))8. Longuenesse sees the recognition 
in a concept as only needing to be present in objective cognition, writing that, 
I think that what Kant wants to say is that acts of 
apprehension/reproduction/recognition lead to empirical concepts and thus 
                                                          
8 Longuenesse’s argument for this comes from Kant’s examples in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View (§5). 
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to knowledge of objects – are acts of relating appearances to phenomena – only if 
one and the same act, unifying our representations, is at work throughout 
this process. (Longuenesse (1998): 51-2) 
In addition, it is apparent within Kant’s account of the synthesis of recognition in the 
concept that there must be an important gap between what the concept operates on 
and this operation itself, and this is already apparent at the beginning of Kant’s 
account of this synthesis where he states regarding the word ‘concept’ that ‘it is this 
one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and 
then also reproduced, into one representation’ (A103). Thus the manifold is already 
apprehended and reproduced before being unified through the concept, and this 
supports a cumulative rather than presuppositional reading. More indicative 
however is the fact that Kant at various stages in the A-deduction states that the 
unity of apperception is possible only on the pre-supposition of some already 
existing data in which it is in relation to in generating cognition. This is to reaffirm 
our argument based on Kant’s passage at A118 that Kant appears to allow for a 
synthesising function through the imagination, and Kant states at A119 that ‘The 
unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the 
understanding’. The gap between apperception as an activity and what this activity 
is in application to is apparent further on where Kant writes, 
Apperception… must be added to the pure imagination in order to make its 
function intellectual. For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although 
exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible, for it combines the 
manifold only as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape of a triangle. (CPR 
A124) 
It is apparent from this remark that there is a synthesis which precedes that 
synthesis arrived at through apperception, where this synthesis is a spatiotemporal 
one, where in this case shape is made representable. We know that for any 
representation to stand before us it must be contained in a moment, and therefore 
taken up through the synthesis of apprehension. It is certain however that this 
representation (the shape of a triangle), at this earliest stage of cognition isn’t a 
representation of a triangle as a triangle, and is as it were just spatial data. It is only 
through the unity of the rule that the triangle can become a triangle for us, and Kant 
was again clear about this earlier at (A105), where he states that ‘we think of a 
triangle as an object by being conscious of the composition of three straight lines in 
accordance with a rule according to which such an intuition can always be 
exhibited’. It is the role of the imagination to bring the ‘manifold as it appears’ to the 
unity of apperception, and this is again indicates that there is purely sensible data 
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which, although not anything to us, is nevertheless a content, and Kant states that 
without this function of the imagination sensibility, ‘would to be sure yield 
appearances but no objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would be no 
experience’ (A124). Apart from the unifying function of apperception our 
representations cannot be ones of cognition, in that they cannot be representations 
that belong to the unity of consciousness through which they would thereby become 
representations to me. In this sense this earliest synthesis cannot be said to be an 
actual experience, for as Kant accounts for it, 
Actual experience, which consists in the apprehension, the association (the 
reproduction), and finally the recognition of the appearances, contains in the 
last and highest (of the merely empirical elements of experience) concepts 
that make possible the formal unity of experience and with it all objective 
validity (truth) of empirical cognition. (CPR A124-5) 
And in a Reflexion from the Metaphysic Nachlaβ Kant writes that, 
We cognise an object only through predicates we express or think of it. Prior 
to this those representations we find in us can be counted only as materials, 
not as cognition. (Refl. 4634, Ak. XVII. 616.)9 
Thus in order to appreciate Kant’s account of apperception and the unifying function 
it generates through the category, it is important to make room for a pre-
apperceptive unity, which as we have seen, must itself be a unity of a kind, which is 
that unity generated through the initial synthesis of apprehension10. Contrary to 
Makkreel, and in agreement with Allais and Longuenesse, we have also seen that 
this makes room for a cumulative reading of the threefold synthesis, or at least a 
reading of it that doesn’t see the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of 
reproduction as redundant or meaningless without the subsequent synthesis 
through the concept. Without a data which the unity of apperception is in 
application to, it is difficult to understand Kant’s account of the genesis of cognition. 
For the unity of apperception, as a function of the understanding, would have to act 
upon raw sense data, and Kant’s distinction between the data of sense, sensibility 
and the understanding would become redundant, for sensibility would just be 
                                                          
9 All translated Akademie references such as this are taken from Longuenesse's Kant and the Capacity to 
Judge (See bibliography for details). 
10 Further support for this idea can be found in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation where he writes, ‘in the 
case of sensible things and phenomena, that which precedes the logical use of the understanding is 
called appearance, while the reflective cognition, which arises when several appearances are 
compared by the understanding, is called experience’. (Dissertation 2:394). I take the experience of the 
Inaugural Dissertation to be the actual experience of the Critique. 
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collapsed into sense data, which doesn’t have any representational unity. Such unity 
would then first be generated through apperception, and it would be mysterious to 
find that data was generated in such a way. The question that remains is whether 
this pre-apperceptive content that can account for the representation of space (as 
shape), and which we have good reason to suspect animals operate with, not 
possessing higher functions of the understanding, is to be allocated to the function of 
the imagination for its genesis. The solution to this however is difficult, for on the one 
hand Kant - such as in the passage at A118 where he states that ‘the principle of the 
necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to 
apperception [emphasis] is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, 
especially that of experience’ - appears to assign the imagination the role of 
generating the unity of apprehension, which also seems to be borne out in the 
threefold synthesis itself. On the other hand, as we have just seen, Kant allocates to 
imagination the role of mediating between sensibility and the unity of apperception 
(the understanding), whilst at the same time stating that the imagination itself is a 
faculty belonging to the understanding. This later role appears to be the role of the 
imagination as it is presented in the B-deduction where it is presented as, 
an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, merely 
determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance 
with the unity of apperception [and that therefore] the imagination is to this 
extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of 
intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on 
sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all 
others) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us. (CPR B151-2) 
Unlike sense, Kant is telling us, Imagination is active and determines the manifold 
through the unity of apperception in accordance with categories. There is no 
argument to the effect that the imagination provides an initial sensible unity which is 
then to be determined. Nevertheless, insofar as a unity prior to apperception must be 
one of apprehension, insofar as it contains a representational unity (of moments), it 
is also an imaginative unity, for Kant in the A-deduction states that ‘There is thus an 
active faculty of the synthesis of [the] manifold in us, which we call imagination, and 
whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension’ (A120). 
Longuenesse also sees Kant as giving a pre-conceptual role to the imagination such 
as that argued for here, but in which he is only ‘marginally interested’, writing that, 
To speak of an “appropriation” of imagination by understanding means that 
there is also an activity of imagination that is not appropriated by 
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understanding, or even that many different degrees of “appropriation” or 
interaction between the laws of imagination and the laws of understanding 
may occur.[... Imagination] belongs to sensibility or receptivity, and as such 
obeys rules of passive association. These rules govern a great deal of our 
representational combinations and hence a great deal of our behaviour as 
living beings. But Kant is only marginally interested in this merely 
sensible/associative/fictional ability of imagination. More important to him is 
the manner in which it is appropriated by the requirements of 
understanding. This appropriation is the source of all objective 
representation. (Longuenesse (1998): 207-08) 
Consequently, although ambiguities remain within Kant's account, the pre-
apperceptive unity that we have set out to demonstrate is operative in order to 
understand how something can be presented to, or ‘appropriated’ by the 
understanding, may, with a reasonable degree of textual plausibility, be allocated to 
a function of the imagination. 
 
Levels of Representation in the Jäsche Logic 
The emptiness, for Kant, of a representation that is not generated through an act of 
the understanding upon the data of sense, is very visibly apparent in his remark at 
the closing stages of the B-deduction, where he states that, 
all synthesis, through which even perception itself, becomes possible, stands 
under the categories, and since experience is cognition through connected 
perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and 
are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience. (CPR B161) 
Such a statement, again, appears to foreclose the possibility of generating any 
meaningful representational content at a pre-conceptual level. This is true in a very 
strong sense since what is discounted from being possible without a synthesis 
through the category of the understanding is nothing less than perception itself, 
which is typically understood as a basic acquaintance with the world at a sensory 
level. It may be wondered, given his remarks at various other stages of the 
deduction, such as the remark that ‘appearances can be given without the function of 
the understanding’, whether Kant really meant to put forward such a strong 
conceptualist position. However, as Hanna Ginsborg has pointed out in "Was Kant a 
Nonconceptualist" (2008), Kant’s aim in the deduction is to show that the pure 
concepts of the understanding have application to the objects given to us through 
experience, and that ‘the idea that understanding is required for perceptual synthesis 
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seems to be an essential part of achieving this aim’ (Ginsborg (2008): 69). Ginsborg 
supports her claim with various passages of the deduction such as Kant’s remark at 
§21 that he will show ‘from the way in which empirical intuition is given in 
sensibility that its unity is none other than that which the category prescribes to the 
manifold of a given intuition in general’, and that only by explaining ‘the a priori 
validity of the category in regard to all objects of our senses’ will ‘the aim of the 
deduction be fully attained’. I believe it is correct to see Kant as thereby showing the 
necessity of a perceptual synthesis as taking place through the category in order to 
generate an intuitive content that acquaints us with a world, so that on the face of 
things there appears to be little room for a non-conceptualist position which would 
aim establish a place for a meaningful synthesis, in the sense of acquainting us with 
a world, prior to the operation of the understanding. Ginsborg argues further that a 
successful non-conceptualist account needs to see this non-conceptual content as a 
delivery of the imagination, and that this is precisely what the non-conceptualist 
cannot do, for Ginsborg maintains that the function of the imagination is unable to 
operate without the understanding, as what in effect provides the rule of its 
synthesis (Ginsborg (2008) 69-70). This account appears to agree with the threefold 
synthesis insofar as it seemed that any synthesis arrived at through apprehension 
could not be generated without the function of a rule, which was the third stage 
synthesis through the concept.  
We can see however that we are in disagreement with Ginsborg on this latter issue 
in that we have argued that there is a content delivered through sense, which we 
have, albeit somewhat tentatively, ascribed to the imagination. The full account of 
this disagreement with Ginsborg will be fully borne out in Chapter 2, where I argue 
in agreement with certain other writers, that there is a pre-conceptual synthesis that 
generates the formal intuitions of space and time and that is arrived at through the 
imagination apart from the concept of the understanding. For the present purposes 
and for the relevance of this chapter however, it is sufficient to point out what has 
already been stated; that Kant states that there must be a kind of synthetic unity 
priori to apperception which makes this subsequent operation possible. The function 
of apperception must act upon some data and this is the data of an initial receptivity 
which even animals can be said to be acquainted with. We have also ascribed this 
synthesis to a function of the imagination, and further support for this position can 
be found in the schematism chapter where Kant states that ‘The synthesis of 
representations rests on the imagination, but their synthetic unity (which is requisite 
for judgement), on the unity of apperception’ (A155/B194). Here Kant is explicit in 
assigning a synthesis of representations to a function of the imagination where this isn’t 
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yet the synthetic unity delivered through apperception. This role of imagination is 
further evident in an interesting remark in the B-deduction where immediately prior 
to stating that all perception as synthesised data depends upon the categories Kant 
writes that, 
Now that which connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, 
which depends on understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis 
and on sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension (CPR B165) 
Although imagination delivers a certain kind of unity (as intellectual) through the 
understanding, there is nevertheless a 'manifoldness of apprehension' generated 
through the function of the imagination that appears to correspond to the synthesis 
of representations just noted. 
Contra Ginsborg then, it does appear that Kant makes room for a kind of synthesis at 
a sensible level where this is delivered through the imagination. My primary concern 
with Ginsborg’s argument however, which is crucial to her overall refutation of a 
non-conceptualist reading of Kant11, is her argument that perceptual synthesis is 
only possible through the understanding and that consequently there is no real 
possibility of a meaningful non-conceptualist position in Kant. I do agree with 
Ginsborg that without the function of the category in generating intuitional content, 
there is little or nothing that is characteristic of human perceptual content present in 
a representation, but I believe her account of the nature of perception as Kant 
construes it is one-sided. The reason we maintain this is that the first Critique isn’t 
the only place where perception, or the nature of perception is discussed, and in the 
Jäsche Logic Kant presents an account of the levels of mental representational content, 
where perception isn’t allocated a unification through the understanding. These 
levels of mental representation are as follows; 
The first degree of cognition is: to represent something; 
The second: to represent something with consciousness, or to perceive; 
The third: to be acquainted with something , or to represent something in 
comparison with other things, both as to sameness and as to difference 
The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e. to cognize 
it. Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them. 
                                                          
11 Ginsborg however, although refuting the kind of non-conceptualism we are here discussing, does 
want to make room within her conceptualist account for certain non-conceptualist considerations, by 
arguing that the understanding can normatively guide representational content without this being a 
function of the categories. See section II of her 'Was Kant a Nonconceptualist?' (2008). 
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The fifth: to understand something, i.e., to cognize something through the 
understanding by means of concepts, or to conceive… 
The sixth: to cognize something through reason, or to have insight into it. With 
few things do we get this far. (JL 64-5) 
Here we can see that what is characteristic of human mental representation doesn’t 
come about until the fourth stage and that there is nevertheless a representational 
content prior to this stage. This representational content is also capable of being 
perceived (second stage), where this is a representational content accompanied with 
consciousness. Acquaintance (third stage) is representational content that is able to 
stand in comparison with other things both as to sameness and difference, and this 
acquaintance must thereby be subject to something like the apprehension and 
reproduction of the threefold synthesis.  So although Ginsborg is right in arguing 
that perception as it is outlined in the first Critique must be subject to a function of 
the understanding in order to guarantee the aim of the deduction, which is to show 
that pure concepts have application to the data of sense, this isn’t all that is to be said 
for Kant’s account of perception, as we must see Kant in the first Critique as having a 
certain kind of perception in mind. This kind of perception is a perception of objects 
as objects (or things as things), where we have contentful, object directed, intentional 
representations. This perception would come closer to what Kant in his levels of 
mental representations calls cognition (level 4), or actual experience as we accounted 
for it earlier. In the schematism Kant makes it apparent that when referring to 
perception he is using the term in a cognitively rich sense, writing, 
Experience is an empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an 
object through perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, which is 
not itself contained in perception but contains the synthetic unity of the 
manifold of perception in one consciousness, which constitutes what is 
essential in a cognition of objects of the senses, i.e., of experience (not merely 
of the intuition of sensation of the senses (emphasis)). (CPR A176/B218) 
 In the Jäsche Logic however, the kind of perception (level 2) Kant seems to have in 
mind would be a basic perceptual acquaintance with the world, which animals and 
infants can be said to possess and which determines a basic cognitive orientation at a 
spatial level. Although intuitions without concepts are blind in the sense that they 
wouldn’t provide us with actual experience, they are not blind in that a certain 
intuitive content is possible, and animals are not blind when navigating their 
environment. These two accounts of perception then, map on, as it were, to the 
different roles or functions that Kant assigns to the imagination. On the one hand 
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there is a synthesis of representations which aren’t yet representations of a dog or 
triangle but just 'third level' acquaintances with things where we compare 
representations both as to sameness and as to difference, and which even animals 
possess. As imagistic it, as belonging to sensibility, is what is capable of being 
brought to apperception. On the other hand there is the function of the imagination 
as Kant accounts for it in the schematism, where the concept is required in order to 
determine sensible content through the imagination, and regarding this function 
Kant writes, 
The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and 
signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes 
in space. Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach 
[the universality of] the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related 
immediately to the schema of the imagination, as rule for the determination 
of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept. The concept of 
a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify 
the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any 
singular shape that experience offers me or any possible image than I can 
exhibit in concreto. (CPR A141/B180) 
As a mediating representation between intuitions and concepts the schema is able to 
determine appearances as images of objects and generate representations as 
cognitions (‘the schema of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole 
conditions for providing them with a relation to objects, thus with significance’ 
(A146/B185)). Clearly this function of the imagination, which is the predominant one 
in the Critique, corresponds to its conceptual role, and is what Ginsborg takes to be 
characteristic of the imagination in its predominant function. Ginsborg's 
concentration on Kant’s account of cognition as outlined in the first Critique 
however, limits her view of perception and imagination to Kant’s overarching 
concern there, which is, as of course Ginsborg recognizes, to ground the possibility 
of the synthetic cognition through the function of the understanding. In looking to 
the Jäsche logic however we have seen that it is possible to generate a richer 
conception of how Kant understands the genesis of cognition for animal and human 
beings. 
 
So although an autonomy of the imagination is rescued from the contention that the 
imagination cannot be a faculty where non-conceptual content is operative (as it isn’t 
at all levels under the auspices of the understanding), it remains to be settled 
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whether this level of mental representation at the pre-conceptual level can offer any 
argument for the non-conceptualist in the sense of its being a cognitive state which is 
in some way importantly operative in our overall interaction with the world. I want 
to argue that the answer to this is in a way yes and no. I want to argue yes, there is a 
meaningful role for non-conceptual content at this earliest stage of cognition insofar 
as, as we have seen, it is this initial receptivity that acquaints us with the world 
(although not as a world) and which acts as the data upon which the understanding 
finds its application. On the other hand I want to argue that this account of initial 
receptivity isn’t enough to secure an account of meaningful non-conceptual content 
since, as we have seen, on Kant’s own account this representational content is empty, 
or without significance. It must be pointed out at this stage however, that Kant’s 
own dismissal of any significance of representational content prior to the operation 
of the understanding isn’t something that cannot and should not go unchallenged. In 
the first Critique Kant clearly had his focus on the genesis of synthetic cognition as 
determining an objective world of law governed experience, so that anything not 
contributing to this end, which emphatically demands the function of the 
understanding and the concept of the understanding, was found to be without 
significance. The role of non-conceptual data as operative in our basic cognitive 
acquaintance with the world is something that can be very meaningful just by 
making this acquaintance possible. Thus we need to separate what is meaningful to 
the critical enterprise as Kant conceived of it, and what is meaningful in a complete 
account of cognitive acquaintance. This subject will be discussed in later chapters 
where there is a more definite role for a non-conceptual content as making cognition 
possible. Becoming clearer as to what significance we can assign to the initial 
receptivity as accounted for in this chapter however, will be made more possible by 
turning to the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
 
Imagination and the Aesthetic 
Insofar as the pre-conceptual synthesis we are concerned with has nothing to do 
with concepts, or an interaction with the understanding, but the imagistic synthesis 
that the imagination is responsible for in generating an intuitive content, then we are 
concerned not with what is general and mediate (in the case of concepts mediated 
through the intuition) but with what is immediate and singular, which is the 
intuition that is delivered through the receptivity of sensibility. Our sensibility 
however is only receptive because it is made up of pure forms of sensibility, which 
are space and time. Thus it is going to be the spatial and temporal elements of our 
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cognition (Time and Space are[…] two sources of cognition (A38/B55)) that can 
account for any meaningful cognitive orientation at a pre-conceptual level, and Kant 
states that there is this pre-conceptual representation when he writes, 
Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking 
something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form 
of intuition. (CPR B67) 
The form of intuition contrasts with the formal intuition, the latter of which, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, is a unity generated through the understanding. 
Regarding the form of intuition Kant writes at the beginning of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic that, ‘I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its 
matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain 
relations (Verhältnis) I call the form of appearance’ (B34/A20). Form always has a 
matter, and it is the form that enables the matter to be taken up, or present in the 
first place, according to a certain unity or structure. The unification here though (the 
representation which is the intuition which Kant has told us at (B67) precedes 
thinking) isn’t the unity of the formal intuition, which is the unity of space and time 
as pure intuitions, as the representation of space and time, but nevertheless a matter. 
The question is how does this matter stand before us? We know that it is nothing to 
us, and what Kant calls ‘less than a dream’ (after all dreams do represent objects as 
objects), but in what sense nothing to us? It is nothing to us because it isn’t a 
meaningful experience where we are in cognitive relation to a world or environment 
and where our representations aren’t brought under the ‘I’ that is generated through 
the first operations of the understanding on sensibility (through the unity 
apperception). Because there is no ‘I’ there is no self-conscious representation. As 
Lucy Allais points out however, Kant doesn’t always clearly distinguish 
consciousness from self-consciousness and that self-consciousness is ‘clearly his 
main concern in the argument of the deduction’ (Allais (2009): 402). The conditions 
of unity in self-consciousness are not the same as the conditions of unity in 
consciousness, and indeed, as we have seen, Kant’s second level of cognition in his 
levels of mental representations in the Jäsche logic states that it is ‘to represent 
something with consciousness, or to perceive’. So we grant a unity of representation 
at a conscious level (and Kant is willing to say animals have conscious states) which 
although nothing to us in any meaningful sense as far as cognition and unity of self 
goes, may not be nothing as far as basic cognitive orientation is concerned. 
Immediately prior to telling us that, ‘that which, as representation can precede any 
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act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the 
form of intuition’, Kant tells us, 
that everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition[…] contains 
nothing but mere relations, of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of 
places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is 
determined (moving forces)[…] It is not merely that the representations of 
outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, 
but also the time in which we place these representations, which itself 
precedes the consciousness of them in experience and grounds the way in 
which we place them in mind as a formal condition, already contains 
relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous 
with succession (of that which persists). (CPR B66-67) 
Here Kant states that there are representations of outer sense which make up our 
representational contents and which precede a consciousness of them in experience. 
To be conscious of something in experience is equivalent to the self-consciousness of 
the fourth level of representation in the Jäsche Logic. This pre-self-conscious 
representational content then grounds the way in which these representations 
subsequently become a formal condition of experience, which is a more determinate 
form of experience. Yet this pre-conscious representational content already contains 
relations of succession, simultaneity and persistence, although these relations are not 
yet experienced as simultaneity, succession, persistence, i.e. not yet cognized, or 
associated with self-consciousness, and this is co-extensive with Kant’s remark that 
we noted earlier (A124), that the intuition prior to apperception can acquaint us with 
the shape of figures in space, although this isn’t yet reflected as an experience of 
objects as spatial entities.  The formal intuition then is a more determinate form of 
experience which is only possible through a function of the understanding in 
application to the data of sense, i.e. the form of intuition. This intuitional state (form 
of intuition) therefore provides the brute spatiality that is requisite for standing in an 
interactive relation to an environment in the first place, and in the Prolegomena to any 
Future Metaphysics Kant writes that, 
The mere universal form of intuition called space is therefore certainly the 
substratum of all intuitions determinable upon particular objects, and, 
admittedly, the condition for the possibility and variety of those intuitions 
lies in this space; but the unity of the objects is determined solely through the 
understanding, and indeed according to conditions that reside in its own 
nature. (Prolegomena 4:322) 
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 A cat can be said to make a kind of perceptual judgement in leaping from one 
platform to the next and it is a spatial sense that enables them to do so12. Because the 
form of intuition delivers the spatiotemporal substratum that is the base of intuitive 
representational content, then it is fundamental to life that is spatiotemporally 
conditioned. 
 What remains unclear however is the extent to which space and time as not brought 
under the auspices of the understanding (the form of space and time) is involved, if 
at all, in an active human cognitive life.  Again this is not an issue Kant goes into any 
detail over, being concerned as he is with determinate forms of cognition. 
Consequently, although we have seen that there is room for an apprehensional 
content at a pre-conceptual level, a Kantian conceptualist can perhaps accept this 
without being much troubled. They may say that because there is nothing 
cognitively determinate about this account (in terms of our self-
conscious/apperceptive relation to the world), so that we just seem to be speculating 
about infant or animal states of mind, then there is nothing especially interesting in 
this account, so that Kant himself states that such pre-conceptual representational 
states are effectively nothing to us. So signaling the presence within Kant's account 
of what he calls the form of intuition isn't necessarily a significant challenge to a 
conceptualist reading of the first Critique.  However, as we will now go on to argue 
in our next chapter, although the form of intuition may not make possible a degree of 
intuitive content that can obviously count as providing for a meaningful cognitive 
engagement with the world, the next level of synthesis in Kant's account is a 
synthesis generated through the first act of the understanding in generating the 
formal intuitions of space and time. The spatiotemporal content located here is 
generated through the understanding, but not through the concept of the 
understanding, and therefore, I will argue, makes way for an important non-
conceptualism within Kant's account. 
 
  
                                                          
12 Kant however, makes no definite commitment to animals having the same a priori forms of inner 
sense, although he does write at the close of the B-edition of the Transcendental Aesthetic that ‘It is 
also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and time to the sensibility of human 
beings; it may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this 
regard (though we cannot decide this)' (B72). 
33 
 
Chapter 2 
Space and Time as Formal Intuitions 
 
 
In our previous chapter we argued that in order to make sense of the emergence of 
apperceptive cognition, we need to posit a pre-apperceptive intuitive content of 
some kind, which we called a representational content in accordance with certain 
elements of Kant's account (Kant spoke of a synthesis of representations prior to 
apperception (A155/B194)). We saw however, that this content is not considered 
especially important or interesting in governing our day to day lives, insofar as Kant 
calls it a representational 'material' of some kind, but not 'cognition' (Refl. 4634, Ak. 
XVII. 616.). Cognition in a stronger sense requires the subsequent activity of the 
understanding in generating the potentially self-conscious unity that is a condition 
of such cognition. Contrary to what we might expect however, this is not the end of 
the line for a non-conceptualist argument, for there turns out to be an additional 
non-conceptualist position presented in the deduction of the first Critique and that 
concerns the generation of space and time as formal intuitive wholes, which play an 
important part in governing our cognitive relation to the world. 
 
Concept and Synthesis 
Throughout the first chapter reference was made to the fact that it is integral to the 
first Critique that Kant is operating with two senses of concept – two ways in which 
concepts are operative in cognition. As was seen, Kant states that ‘The same function 
that gives unity to the different representations in a judgement also gives unity to 
the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which expressed 
generally is called the pure concept of understanding’ (A79/B105). The idea of the 
concept giving unity to the representation in an intuition is explicated under the 
heading of ‘On the synthesis of recognition in the concept’; 
If, in counting, I forget that the units which now hover before my senses were 
successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the 
generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the 
other, and consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept 
consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis. The word 
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“concept” itself could already lead us to this remark. For it is this one 
consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successfully intuited, 
and then also reproduced, into one representation. (CPR A103) 
Clearly, Kant’s use of the term "concept" here isn’t a typical one, and Béatrice 
Longuenesse recognizes the peculiarity of this role of the concept, stating that, 
This is a very unusual use of the term “concept”. It is clear that this “concept” 
is quite different from the “universal or reflected representation” defined in 
the Logic. Here, the concept is not a universal representation formed by the 
discursive acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, but the (clear or 
obscure) consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis, and moreover, of 
the synthesis of a whole. (Longuenesse (1998):46). 
The unity of an act of synthesis is, as a unitary consciousness, a function of the 
understanding that turns perceptions into experience, and this is the first application 
of the logical forms of judgement as outlined at (A70/B95) to the data of sense which 
generates the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories)13. This role of the 
concept is different from the discursive concept in that it is this initial act of seizing14 
or unifying the manifold that enables the representation to be reflected, insofar as 
this rule of synthesis is common to many sensible representations, under the 
discursive universal or reflected representation. 
This consciousness of the unity of synthesis, which is the concept in application to 
the data of sense, is what enables cognition to arise in the first place and Kant writes 
that ‘All cognition demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed be quite 
imperfect or obscure’ (A106). The categories are thus operative at a fundamental 
level and have an important relation to the unity of apperception, and in the B-
deduction, under the section (§20) heading ‘All sensible intuitions stand under the 
categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one 
consciousness’ Kant writes; 
That action of the understanding[...] through which the manifold of given 
representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an 
                                                          
13 This means that the categories originate in what Kant calls ‘original acquisition’, which is 
distinguished from innatism, which would see the categories as inherent, a priori, concepts in the 
mind. Only the logical functions are innate, and in this sense the understanding is a capacity to judge. 
The categories arise only when logical functions are brought into a relation with sensibility. See 
(Longuenesse (1998): 201-2) 
14 Longuenesse draws attention to the fact that in referring to the initial application of the concept 
Kant uses the German Begriff rather than the Latinate concept, where the former ‘carries the 
connotation of grasping, seizing.' (Longuenesse (1993): 46) 
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apperception in general, is the logical function of judgements[…] [T]he 
categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as 
the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them. Thus the 
manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under the categories. 
(CPR B143)  
We saw in Chapter 1 that although such a statement may appear to foreclose the 
possibility of any non-conceptualism whatsoever, insofar as it seems to suggest that 
everything I am sensibly presented with is under the categories, this isn’t in fact the 
case, and that when Kant is stating that intuition is necessarily determined by the 
pure concept of the understanding insofar as it is anything to me, it is precisely this 
latter clause that is important. Something can only be anything to me if it is brought 
under the unity of apperception, and the action of bringing a manifold under this 
unity of apperception belongs to the function of judging15. Thus although any 
representation of which I am conscious, qua my representation, is under the pure 
concept of the understanding, there are nevertheless, as we saw earlier, 
representations which are not so unified but nevertheless possess what might be 
called a unified content of some kind so that they mean something to the animal or 
human mind in allowing it to navigate an environment. This then may appear to 
bring to a close our investigation of the role of concepts in the first Critique, insofar as 
we have determined at what stage the pure concepts of the understanding come in 
to play – namely in unifying all intuition that stands under the unity of 
apperception. However, although this conclusion initially seems to be borne out by 
the text itself, there is an important additional pre-conceptual unity operative within 
our cognitive sphere and which is crucial in understanding Kant’s account of 
concept formation. 
 
The Formal Intuition 
At section §26 of the B-deduction we find Kant's contention that there is a pre-
conceptual unity which, although belonging to the understanding, nevertheless 
doesn’t take place by means of the category. In this section Kant begins to consider 
the possibility of prescribing laws to nature and the role of the categories in this 
prescription, and here we see Kant return to issues first raised in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. Here Kant wants to ask how the categories relate not to an intuition in 
                                                          
15 ‘A manifold that is contained in an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to the 
necessary unity of self-consciousness through the synthesis of the understanding, and this takes place 
by means of the category’. (B144) 
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general, but to space and time themselves, as the forms in which things are given to 
us, and Kant writes, 
We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition a priori in the 
representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of 
the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, 
since it can only occur in accordance with this form. But space and time are 
represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as 
intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the 
determination of the unity of this manifold in them. (CPR B160) 
In the footnote to this passage, Kant tells us what kind of unity is in question here; 
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains 
more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the 
manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive 
representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but 
the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed 
this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all 
concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not 
belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first 
become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines 
sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori 
intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the 
understanding. (CPR B161 n) 
Thus although Kant is arguing persistently throughout the deduction that there is no 
unity in the manifold without the application of the category, we see here that there 
is a qualification to this, and that there are pure synthetic unities determined by the 
understanding, but not by the concept in the primary or first sense of conceptual 
operation which is the use of the category in bringing unity to the manifold. The 
difficulty in appreciating, or recognising this element in Kant’s genesis of cognition 
is common, insofar as Kant tends to be focused on the seemingly conflicting claim 
that all unity of the manifold at any meaningful level is determined through the 
category. Indeed the pure intuitions of space and time play an especially important 
role insofar as in them a unity is generated that grounds all subsequent unity in the 
concept, and pure time is critical for the schematism chapter insofar as the pure 
intuition is, as sensible, homogenous with appearances, and yet as a universal, 
homogenous with the category (A138/B177). This difficulty of recognizing that there 
are pure non-conceptual intuitions of space and time is reflected in certain writers 
rejecting the idea that the intuition of space and time is apart from the concept, and 
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in maintaining that instead, the pure intuitions of space and time as wholes which 
make possible the representation of all their parts are in fact concepts of space and 
time. Lorne Falkenstein for instance sees an inconsistency in Kant’s use of intuition 
as meaning that which is unified through the concept and that which is not yet 
brought under the concept, and from her conclusion that, 'Kant’s views on the 
blindness of intuition and the necessity of intellectual synthesis for cognition[…] 
entail that even the perception of singular objects or mereological wholes must 
involve synthesis under the categories and so cannot be non-intellectual.' 
(Falkenstein (1995): 58), Falkenstein reaches the conclusion that space and time as 
wholes cannot be pre-conceptually unified intuitions but must be ‘concepts of the 
forms of intuition’. Heidegger, although arguing that the imagination has its own 
type of pre-conceptual unity, also seen the formal intuition as being determined by 
concepts16.  Another example of a reading of this ultimately conceptualist unity of 
space and time is presented by Michel Fichant and challenged by Béatrice 
Longuenesse, who takes Kant to mean what he says when he says that the unity in 
question does not belong to the concept of the understanding, writing that, “I do not 
agree with Fichant when he claims that the formal intuition of the footnote to §26 
[…] is a product of a derivative ‘acquisition’ in which ‘the pure concepts of the 
understanding play a part’. (Longuenesse (2005): 70)17. The question remains 
however, how can there be a synthetic unity that is determined by the 
understanding but which doesn’t belong to the concept of the understanding? As 
was mentioned in the first chapter, the only way this is possible is if the unity of 
apperception, as the first action of the understanding, is able to generate a spatial 
and temporal unity without this unity of apperception necessarily standing under 
the category. Although remarks throughout the B-deduction, as we have seen, may 
be thought to exclude such a possibility, so that the unity of apperception provides a 
unity only by means of the category, this cannot be the case if we are going to make 
sense of Kant’s remarks regarding the pre-conceptual unity of space and time as 
pure intuitions18.  
                                                          
16 Heidegger recognises Kant’s distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition, but argues 
that it is only the former that is pre-conceptually composed. See Heidegger's Phenomenological 
Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1997): §9. 
17 Longuenesse’s reference to Fichant is to his article ‘L’Espace est représenté comme une grandeur 
infinite donnée. La radicalite de l’Esthétique’ (1997). 
18 The text at (B160-61) is not Kant's only reference to the pre-conceptual unity in question, and 
Longuenesse cites a text in which Kant responds to criticisms by Eberhard, where Kant writes; ‘the 
formal intuition which is called space emerges as an originally acquired representation (the form of 
outer objects in general), the ground of which (as mere receptivity) is nevertheless innate and the 
38 
 
Synthetic and Analytic Unity 
In section §16 of the B-deduction Kant discusses what he calls the synthetic unity of 
apperception which he also variously calls pure, original or transcendental 
apperception: the latter term being used to ‘designate the possibility of a priori 
cognition from it’ (B132). After the preliminaries of §16 Kant goes on to outline the 
conditions that must be in place in order for thought to occur: 
The empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is by 
itself dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject. The latter 
relation therefore does not yet come about by my accompanying each 
representation with consciousness, but rather by my adding one 
representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis. Therefore 
it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the 
consciousness in these representations itself, i.e. the analytical unity of 
apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic 
one. (CPR B133-34) 
To this piece of text Kant appended the following footnote: 
The analytical unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as 
such, e.g., if I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature that 
(as a mark) can be encountered in anything, or that can be combined with 
other representations; therefore only by means of an antecedently conceived 
possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytical unity. A 
representation that is to be thought of as common to several must be 
regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it also have something 
different in themselves; consequently they must antecedently be conceived 
in synthetic unity with other (even if only possible representations) before I 
can think of the analytical unity of consciousness in it that makes it into a 
concept communis. And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest 
point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of 
logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy; indeed this faculty is the 
understanding itself. (CPR B133-34 n) 
The analytical unity of apperception is the representation of the thinkers own 
identity in relation to all sensible representations, and Kant is telling us that this is 
only possible on the presupposition of some synthetic unity. As Wayne Waxman 
points out however, the analytic unity of apperception is more than just the thinkers 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
acquisition of which long precedes determinate concepts of things that are in accordance with this 
form’ (Longuenesse (1998): 222). See Kant's (On a discovery (1790): 222-3) 
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identity to all sensible representations, it is also what allows a representation to 
become a universal and therefore function as a concept: ‘For Kant, the ability to 
represent one’s identity in relation to all the manifold (self-consciousness) and the 
capacity for universal representation (concepts) are one and the same (= analytic 
unity of apperception)’ (Waxman (1995): 827). Thus in attaching to any 
representation it enables that representation to be thought in connection with (as 
potential predicate or subject) any other. This combining activity, where concepts 
combine according to the form of judgement, depends upon a prior synthetic 
activity, and it is clear that Kant takes the synthetic unity to be the unity of given 
representations ‘in one consciousness’, and this is just to reiterate what Kant has 
already told us, that in order for any representation to be anything to me I must be 
able to combine a manifold of sensible intuition and be conscious of this synthesis. 
This is what the representation ‘I’ consists in, where this isn’t any awareness of any 
‘I’ ness, of any ‘I’ with a specific content , but where this ‘I’ is just what arises in the 
consciousness of the unity of the act of bring representations under apperception, 
and regarding this Kant writes; 
this I is no more an intuition than it is a concept of any object; rather, it is the 
mere form of consciousness, which accompanies both sorts of representations 
and which can elevate them to cognitions only insofar as something else is 
given in intuition, which provides the material for the representation of an 
object. (CPR A382) 
Although devoid of any content this representation is what enables the 
transformation of a representation into a universal. But how is this possible? We 
cited earlier Kant’s remark at the opening of §16 that the ‘I think’ must be able to 
accompany all my representations for otherwise these representations would be 
nothing to me, and we have noted that the synthetic unity of representations in one 
consciousness generates the representation of an I (however empty this 
representation maybe, as merely the form of consciousness) to which all 
representations necessarily stand in relation. The consequence of this, as Waxman 
points out, is that, 
The I think not only maintains an identity in relation to all the manifold, but 
also has a purview quite literally of universal scope. Nothing is thought in its 
representation save this universal relation to all the manifold as such; it is 
otherwise entirely devoid of content and determination. In consequence, 
however, any intuition of which I am conscious ipso facto partakes of the 
same universal scope which characterizes this consciousness of myself, and 
thereby acquires the form of a concept. (Waxman (1995): 830) 
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The I think, by bringing under it representations with universal scope thus 
represents the form of a concept (Kant also calls the I think ‘the vehicle of all 
concepts whatever’ (A341/B399)), and this is all that is required for universal 
representation, so that ‘any representation of which I am conscious, by this mere fact 
alone, participates in the form of my identity, and becomes itself a consciousness 
(representable as) standing in relation to, and so common to, every possible manifold 
apprehended in empirical consciousness’ (Waxman (1995): 831). Although every 
possible representation has universal scope, this doesn’t mean however, that each 
and every representation is common to every apprehended manifold, and again as 
Waxman points out, it is through the very fact that I think a representation that it 
acquires potential application to every apprehended manifold, not actual application. 
What this can account for is our ability to combine every possible representation 
with another whilst these judgements remain false. Thus we can think of red 
unicorns and ten legged humans who walk on walls, and we are able to do this 
(analytic unity of apperception) because any representation we have has potential 
universal scope by being under the synthetic unity of apperception, even though the 
conditions of experience are required in order to generate true judgements rather 
than false ones. 
The 'I think' then (as the form of consciousness which also acts as the form of a 
concept insofar as all representations must stand in relation to it to be anything to 
me) is just as important to the generation of the cognition of objects as the form of 
intuition which is the form of inner and outer sense. The concept communis that Kant 
refers to in section §16 is just the relation of the I think to all representations insofar 
as they thereby acquire universal scope. This merely logical consciousness is, 
what must be added to intuited representations to transform them into 
fodder for analysis in the first place. The I think is thus the form of thought in 
much the same sense that space and time are forms of intuition: a form that 
precedes and makes possible the matter of conception, just as space and time 
precede and make possible the matter of perception. (Waxman (1995): 833) 
Waxman's last remark here is crucial, for it helps us to see the intimate connection 
between the pure formal intuitions of space and time and the analytic unity of 
apperception. Pure space and time as intuitions are required in order for us to 
apprehend data of the senses as unified, and all spatial and temporal predicates are 
to be found in this spatial and temporal unity. Succession and juxtaposition 
experienced as such, for instance, are only possible on the ground that we possess 
pure a priori spatial and temporal relations, and this is what Kant effectively told us 
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in the aesthetic, although he was unable to tell us that this unity is generated 
through the action of the understanding on sensibility. And we learn at B136 that, 
Space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual 
representations along with the manifold that they contain in themselves (see 
the transcendental aesthetic), thus they are not mere concepts by means of 
which the same consciousness is contained in many representations, but 
rather are many representations that are contained in one and in the 
consciousness of it; they are thus found to be composite, and consequently the 
unity of consciousness, as synthetic and yet as original, is to be found in them 
[emphasis]. (CPR B136n) 
There is a therefore a particular kind of individuality belonging to space and time 
which we here learn consists in precisely that unity in space and time (original 
synthetic unity) which makes the analytic apperception (my identity in relation to all 
the manifold that comes before me) possible. Although any particular intuition, qua 
synthesised manifold, must be part of a conceptual generation, it is the unity of 
space and time as formal intuition that makes possible this synthesis, and is the 
ground of the possibility of their formation. By conforming to the unity of space and 
time, which any intuition must, any given data thereby conforms to an original 
synthetic unity which means that such data is capable of being intuited and of being 
synthesised in accordance with logical forms of judgement, thus acquiring (as 
brought under apperception) universal scope, so Waxman writes that, 
Appearances, simply in order to be given, must conform to pure intuition of 
space and time; but pure space and time turn out, on examination, to be the 
very a priori synthetic unity of the manifold necessary for the analytic unity 
of the I think. Hence in conforming to space and time, data of perception 
necessarily conform to conditions for possible thought as well. (Waxman 
(1995): 835) 
Space and time thus have a unity with which all data must agree to be possible at all 
as a representation, but by themselves have only singularity (‘this singularity of 
theirs is important in its application’ (B136n)) and do not yet embrace anything 
outside them, and in the In the Anthropology Kant makes apparent this condition of 
objective cognition when he writes, 
The pure intuitions of space and time belong to the first form of presentation 
[the original presentation of productive imagination]; all others presuppose 
an empirical intuition which, when it is combined with the concept of the 
object, thus becoming an empirical cognition, is called experience. 
(Anthropology §28, 167.) 
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In addition to this, the examples given shortly after Kant introduces the formal 
intuition of space and time in the first Critique, are provided to illustrate the sense in 
which the synthesis of representation presupposes space and time as formally 
unified, and with reference to space Kant writes, 
When, for instance, by apprehension of the manifold of a house I make the 
empirical intuition of it into a perception, the necessary unity of space and 
outer sensible intuition in general lies at the basis of my apprehension, and I 
draw as it were the outline of the house in conformity with this synthetic 
unity of the manifold in space. (CPR B162). 
Thus it is only upon meeting with objects that an external (and categorical) 
component arises19, and our identity in relation to these externals is, as Kant told us, 
only possible on the presupposition of a synthetic unity, so that consequently our 
representing objects as having a universal scope, a concept communis, is a kind of 
extension of this original synthetic unity.  This is what Waxman appears to mean 
when he states that ‘The analytic unity of apperception must be recognized as the 
universal correlate to the individuality of pure intuition’ and that consequently ‘the I 
is nothing more than the universal (analytic) expression of the same original unity of which 
space and time are the individual (synthetic) expression’ (Waxman (1995): 839)2021. 
 
Non-Conceptual Unity 
The unity of space and time as pre-categorical thus makes room for a an important 
non-conceptualist position within Kant’s account of the genesis of cognition, and 
Longuenesse, who essentially is in agreement with Waxman, points out that the 
synthesis in question is  generated by the imagination, and that this imaginative 
construct, ‘is not empirically given but on the contrary imagined, and as such, it is 
                                                          
19 Kant will subsequently go on to show, that the apprehension of the house and the further example 
of the apprehension of the freezing of water in time are possible through conforming, respectively, to 
the categories of quantity and causality. 
20 This passage continues: 'Hence, even if it is impossible to conceive pure space and time in their own 
right, the unity they create of all representations in one consciousness (that is one sensibility, synthetic 
unity of apperception) finds its complete and adequate intellectual expression via consciousness of 
our own identity in respect of all the manifold (it is in this sense, I believe that Kant spoke of a "pre-
established harmony" between sensibility and understanding).' (Waxman (1995): 839) 
21 Longuenesse makes more or less the same remark when she writes that, ‘the capacity to form 
judgements, “affecting sensibility”, generates the pure intuitions of space and time as the necessary 
intuitive counterpart to our discursive capacity to reflect universal concepts, concepts whose extension 
(the multiplicities of singular objects thought under them) is potentially unlimited.’ (Longuenesse 
(1998): 224) 
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the condition for any intuition of an object in space. The representation of space as 
one and as infinite, is a representation of the imagination’ (Longuenesse (2005): 73). 
If this is right, and I believe it must be since Kant himself states that ‘Space is merely 
the form of outer intuition (formal intuition), but not a real object that can be 
outwardly intuited’ (A429/B457n), then this is a further argument against Hanna 
Ginsborg’s contention that any argument for non-conceptuality within Kant’s 
account of the role of the imagination fails as everything the imagination synthesizes 
is brought under concepts. Again as Longuenesse points out, it is within this initial 
imaginative unity that a synthesis generating multiplicities occurs so as to make 
subsequent synthesis possible.22 
Kant’s argumentation regarding the importance of space and time as presented in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic is reiterated in the later stages of the deduction in order 
to provide a more complete account of how cognition, or thought, is possible. As 
already indicated, in the Aesthetic Kant had emphasised the importance of the 
representations of space and time in grounding cognition, where these pure 
representations were not yet able, as unities, to be attributed to an activity of the 
understanding, although this was subsequently made clear: 
Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions[...]In it alone is 
all actuality of appearance possible. The latter could all disappear, but time 
itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed. (CPR 
A31/B46) 
This a priori necessity also grounds the possibility of apodictic principles of 
relations of time, or axioms of time in general. It has only one dimension: 
different times are not simultaneous, but successive (just as different spaces 
are not successive but simultaneous)[…] These principles are valid as rules 
under which alone experiences are possible at all, and instruct us prior to 
them, not through it. (CPR A31/B47) 
The principles or rules of space and time therefore are only possible under the 
presupposition of spatial and temporal unities, or pure intuitions, and these rules or 
                                                          
22 For Longuenesse this figurative synthesis which generates the pure intuitions of space and time is 
what accounts for their being able to lead to concept formation: 'Within these formal intuitions [of 
space and time] are achieved the figurative synthesis generating the given multiplicities that are to be 
reflected under concepts according to the logical forms of our judgements. Not only do these 
intuitions precede ant determinate concept (whether empirical of mathematical), they also precede the 
universal concepts (the categories). For they are prior to (and a necessary condition of) each specific 
synthesis making possible reflection under one or the other of the logical forms of our judgements 
and thus, a fortiori, prior to the categories, “universal representations of synthesis.”' (Longuenesse 
(1998): 223) 
44 
 
principles make experience possible at all. Although in the first chapter we 
recognized that there must be room for a purely brute, albeit unified, spatiality at the 
most basic level of perceptual experience and which must be in place in order for 
animals to have the experiences they do, it is the formal intuitions of space and time 
and not the sheer form of space and time which provides the spatial temporal 
framework that makes representations in a stronger sense possible. These pure 
intuitions make each and every representation possible by enabling the 
representation to be put into space and time in the first place, and in conforming to 
this unity conform with the original synthetic unity of apperception. They are thus 
able to be my representations possessing universal scope and thereby capable of 
being further unified through analytical unity in order to make concepts possible.  
It thus becomes apparent that the functions of judgement and the categories are not 
primary in the generation of cognition and Waxman warns against identifying the 
unity of apperception with the logical functions: 
It is not strictly accurate[…] to identify the I think, as analytic unity of 
apperception, with particular logical functions Kant listed in his table[…] 
Kant seems to have deemed it a contingent feature of our understanding, a 
peculiarity of its constitution, that they, and not other logical functions, are 
forms of analytic unity [see B145-6].[…] This suggests that in Kant’s 
explanatory framework apperception stands on a higher plane of generality 
than logical functions, leaving open the possibility of apperceiving beings 
with a differently constituted understanding than ours[…] Accordingly, if we 
seek the primary meaning of concept and judgement in Kant’s theoretical 
framework, we must not utilize notions like affirmation/negation or 
subject/predicate form, since these may be as dependent on the constitution 
of our minds as vision of touch, or as echo-sonar is on the constitution of bat 
minds. (Waxman (1995): 834)23 
This reading is further borne out by the opening section (§15) of the B-deduction 
which, although not referenced by Waxman, has special importance for this 
                                                          
23 In a paper titled Apperception and the Individuality of Space and Time delivered in 2006 at the New 
England Colloquium in Early Modern Philosophy, Waxman succinctly states his position regarding 
the primacy and separateness of apperception from the categories and logical functions: 'Since my 
interpretation makes understanding, in its guise as a faculty of apperception, a condition of the 
possibility of the pure intuitions of space and time, it may be thought incompatible with Kant's 
express denial that concepts enter into the pure intuitions of space and time. In response I will argue 
that this objection draws its seeming force from the mistaken belief that the pure concepts of the 
understanding (the categories) are necessary, rather than merely sufficient, conditions for unity of 
apperception. There is ample textual evidence to show that apperception is the ground of the 
categories rather than vice versa, and that apperception is a more fundamental unity than that of 
either the categories or the logical forms of judgement'. (Waxman (2006): 3) 
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argument, and in addition provides support for the argument of our First Chapter. 
The relevance for the argument of our first chapter is with the opening sentence of 
this section, titled, ‘On the possibility of a combination in general’, where Kant 
writes: 
The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely 
sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity, and the form of this intuition can lie a 
priori in our faculty of representation without being anything other than the 
way in which the subject is affected. (CPR B129) 
As Kant goes on to indicate that this receptivity is not a unified one insofar as it is 
not actively combined by us, this can be taken to indicate that although it is the form 
of intuition that makes such representations possible, this is not yet anything to us 
insofar as what we a presented with is not in agreement with the formal intuitions of 
space and time. What immediately follows from this sentence is especially relevant 
to the argument presented in this chapter, so I quote it at length: 
Yet the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through 
the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of 
sensible intuition; for it as an act of the spontaneity of the power of 
representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in 
distinction from sensibility, all combination, whether we are conscious of it 
or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several 
concepts, and in the first case either of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an 
action of the understanding, which we designate with the general title 
synthesis in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can 
represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously 
combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination is the 
only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the 
subject itself, since it is an act of its self activity… But in addition to the 
concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, the concept of combination also 
carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is the 
representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of 
this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather by being 
added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of 
combination possible. This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination a 
priori,  is not the former category of unity (§ 10); for all the categories are grounded 
on logical functions in judgements, but in these combination, thus the unity of 
given concepts is already thought [emphasis]. The category therefore already 
presupposes combination. We must therefore seek this unity (as qualitative § 
12) someplace higher, namely in that which itself contains the ground of the 
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unity of different concepts in judgements, and hence of the possibility of the 
understanding, even in its logical use (CPR B129-131) 
Kant here is making the crucial point that the logical functions of judgement as 
means of combining the manifold into a unity is only possible through a pre-
categorical synthesis having first taken place by means of the understanding24. It 
becomes subsequently clear that this function of the understanding is the unity of 
apperception, and it is now apparent that the synthesis that must be in place in order 
for the combination through the concept to be possible is the same synthetic unity of 
apperception that pre-supposes the analytic unity of apperception that Kant refers to 
at B133 and B133-134n. What this synthetic unity combines, or acts upon is, as we 
have seen, the pure forms of space and time which in turn generates their formal 
intuitions. In telling us that this unity makes possible subsequent combination, 
through concepts, Kant is just telling us that all the data we synthesize must conform 
to a sensible unity which through its connection with the unity of apperception 
makes universal representation possible in the first place.  
However, although we have emphasised the importance of a pre-conceptual unity 
delivered by the understanding in allowing any representation to acquire the form 
of universality, we must remember that this isn’t yet arriving at a concept, and that 
representations must be in conformance with the logical forms of judgement before 
any conceptual content is generated. Thus an account of the analytic unity of 
apperception would be incomplete if we were to overlook this concept generating 
element (being brought under the logical form of judging), which is, as it were, the 
second condition that must be in place for any representation to become a concept, 
                                                          
24 Longuenesse essentially maintains this view when she writes, ‘as I understand Kant’s view, 
according to him the representation of space and time as infinite does not follow from the application 
of the categories of quantity. Rather, it is the precondition of any application of the categories of 
quantity. As such, it depends on the same act of the mind (the original effort to judge, applied to the 
pure forms of intuition) that generates the categories of quantity in their various applications’, and in 
support of this view writes; 
representing space and time as one (as intuitions) and as one whole within which all 
appearances ought to be situated and ordered, depends on the original effort of the mind 
that eventually makes it possible to synthesize particular manifolds under the guidance of 
the categories – and in the first place, the categories of quantity. This does not mean that the 
pure intuitions of space and time are themselves generated by a successive synthesis of 
homogenous units (space and time themselves cannot be measured). But they are the one 
formal whole within which any collection of homogenous units can be recognized, any 
spatiotemporal magnitude can be delimited , any arbitrary choice of unit can be made, or 
any measurement can be taken. (Longuenesse (2005): 47-8) 
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the first being that it can acquire the form of a universality by virtue of its being my 
representation. Both activities are so closely arranged so that it appears artificial to 
discuss them as though there were a clear gap between the two activities, and it is 
clear in the example Kant himself uses when discussing analytic unity of 
apperception - where he uses the example of red as a representation feature which 
‘as a characteristic mark can be met with in something or combined with other 
representations’ (B133n) - that the analytic unity of apperception will be attached to 
a conceptual content through this content having conformed with the logical form of 
judging. What it is important to emphasise though is that the difference in the 
activities is one of different kinds, and that one must be in place in order for the 
other to become possible. It is because of the spatial and temporal (aesthetic) unity 
with which all objects must agree, qua spatially and temporally located, that the 
object is even capable or acquiring conceptual content, and this is just what Kant 
means when he states that ‘the analytic unity of apperception is possible only on the 
presupposition of some such synthetic unity’ (B133). Although the spatial and 
temporal unity is ascribed to the understanding, as synthetic unity of apperception, 
it is because of its non-conceptual unity that it is able to allow for subsequent 
conceptual unity, and this is to emphasise the prerequisite of aesthetic for discursive 
representation. 
 
Spatiality and Temporality  
As a result of this analysis it is apparent that there is a further development within 
Kant's account for what we may call a meaningful non-conceptualism, and that this 
is going to be grounded in the aesthetic, as the sensible dimension of our cognition. 
In the first chapter we saw that there must be a brute spatiality which has unity of 
some kind in order to be a representation according to the first levels of 
representation as outlined in the Jäsche logic, and this must play some role in 
subsequent representational content. It must play this role because what it is to be 
presented with perceptual particulars is simply to be affected by objects where these 
objects stand in a spatial relation to us. To be sure this representational content is not 
anything to us just as the fence isn’t anything to the ox, although it nevertheless is 
part of the ox’s representational framework that determines its engagement. These 
spatial and temporal representations, as not being determined through a unity of 
space and time as a priori intuitions can play little role in our cognitive framework in 
terms of contributing to spatial and temporal relations as spatial and temporal 
(although as was argued, pure relationality is a feature of brute spatial 
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representation). So what we have are two different stages or elements of 
spatiotemporal perception. The first stage is that of our first chapter, which although 
not presenting a representational unity in the stronger sense that Kant typically 
means by unified representational content, is a content of some kind, where this isn’t 
just raw data, which would possess no unity and wouldn’t even put us or the animal 
in a relation to its environment as something it could navigate. These are primitive 
spatial and temporal representations which partake of the form of intuition, but not 
the formal intuition, and this reading is borne out by what was quoted earlier that, 
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains 
more than a mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the 
manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive 
representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but 
the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. (CPR B160 n) 
The formal intuition as a pre-categorical unity generated under the unity of 
apperception has a much greater determinate content than the spatial and temporal 
representations not yet acted upon by the understanding, and as Kant says, contain 
those a priori laws and principles which find their use in experience (Hence Kant's 
remarking that this singularity of space and time as unified wholes is 'important in 
its application'). So there are important consequences of this pre-categorical spatial 
unity for our experience, and this is importantly revealed in certain aspects of Kant's 
philosophy, where although in the genesis of cognition concepts are involved in 
making even perception possible (with the qualification of Chapter 1 as to how this 
perception is to be understood), there is nevertheless a unity of sensibility that is 
always present in a non-conceptually important way. This has important 
ramifications for further aspects of Kant's theory of cognition, and I believe that this 
is especially true of Kant's account of aesthetic experience (where by this we mean 
aesthetic experience in its usual sense of the term (i.e. beautiful nature and art)). In 
order to investigate this significance however we will turn to the Prolegomena to any 
Future Metaphysics and the Inaugural Dissertation, where this spatiotemporal 
autonomy comes to the fore and is important to explore for this reason.  
 
Space and Time in the Prolegomena and Dissertation 
In the official ‘First Part’ of the Prolegomena titled ‘How is pure mathematics possible?’ 
Kant is concerned with showing that space and time are forms of sensory intuition, 
as opposed to independently existing entities, and that it is because of this that we 
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are able generate mathematical and geometrical constructs and demonstrate their 
validity on a priori grounds. In section 13 Kant presents what he calls a ‘paradox’ for 
those who would see space and time as qualities attaching to things in themselves 
rather than our form of representation, which is the paradox presented by the 
phenomenon of what he calls incongruous counterparts. This phenomenon is where 
we are presented with two objects (counterparts) that are ‘fully the same (in all 
determinations belonging to magnitude and quality) in all the parts’ but that are 
different in that they are mirror images of each other so that there ‘is such a 
difference in outer relation that one cannot in any case be put in the place of the 
other’ (Prolegomena (4:285-6). Kant illustrates this phenomenon with reference to 
instances taken from ‘ordinary life’: 
What indeed can be more similar to, and in all parts more equal to, my hand 
or my ear than its image in the mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is 
seen in the mirror in the place of its original; for if the one was a right hand, 
then the other in the mirror is a left, and the image of the right ear is a left 
one, which can never take the place of the former. Now there are no inner 
differences here that any understanding could merely think; and yet the 
differences are inner as far as the senses teach, for the left hand cannot, after 
all, be enclosed within the same boundaries as the right (they cannot be made 
congruent), despite all reciprocal equality and similarity; one hand’s glove 
cannot be used on the other. (Prolegomena 4:286) 
Of perhaps equal importance, although frequently neglected, is Kant’s account of 
temporal orientation, that in the Inaugural Dissertation (where in a manner similar to 
the Transcendental Aesthetic he lays out the principles of space and time as 
intuitions) acts as the temporal counterpart to the spatial incongruence of 
counterparts; 
If you think of two years, you can only represent them to yourself as being in 
a determinate position in relation to each other; and if they should not 
immediately succeed each other, you can only represent them to yourself as 
joined to one another by some indeterminate time. But among different 
times, the time which is earlier and the time which is later cannot be defined 
in any way by any characteristic marks which can be conceived by the 
understanding, unless you are willing to involve yourself in a vicious circle. 
The mind only discerns the distinction between them by a singular intuition. 
Moreover, you conceive all actual things as situated in time, and not as 
contained under the general concept of time, as under a common 
characteristic mark. (Dissertation 2:399) 
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With the case of the incongruence of counterparts, in stating that there are no 
differences that the understanding could determine Kant means that no matter how 
we describe one hand (without making reference to spatial incongruence), what 
holds for one hand, descriptively by means of concepts, also holds for the other 
(assuming for a moment qualitatively identical hands), and that as a result the actual 
incongruence can only be made intelligible through a kind of sensory awareness that 
acts independent of the concept of the understanding. In the temporal case the 
orientation between earlier and later, can only be made representable by ‘the mind’ 
through pure temporal intuition, not through any ‘characteristic marks’ or concepts. 
Trying to explicate the phenomena by any characteristic marks involves us in a 
vicious circle because, I presume, we will never be able to explicate the phenomena 
without at some point needing to make reference to a ‘sense’ of earlier and/or later, 
as opposed to a conceptual explication of it. 
However, although Kant is arguing for an important autonomy on behalf of 
sensibility, a concern with this account is, again, with an ambiguity and complexity 
in Kant’s use of the term ‘concept’. It might well be maintained that although no 
concept determines the actual difference (incongruence) in question, there is 
nevertheless a role for the concept as active in generating the representation in the 
first place so that concepts are playing a role after all. What Kant would here be 
indicating is that concepts as reflected representations don’t dominate all cognitive 
activity, so that although there is an important role for the sensible, aesthetic aspect 
of our representations, this doesn't provide an argument for a strong non-
conceptualist position. 
The argument we are putting forward in this chapter however, is that although it is 
correct to see Kant as operating with two different senses of concept, where the first 
operation of the concept is what Kant calls the unity of the act that brings a synthesis 
to our representations in the first place, there is nevertheless an important pre-
conceptual role active in the genesis and function of cognition. It must be conceded 
however, that at the perceptual level there is a conceptual activity involved in 
generating the perception insofar as this perception is anything to me, and this to 
acknowledge that John McDowell is quite correct in maintaining that not only 
determinate perceptual representations involve the use of a concept, but that very 
indeterminate representations, thises or thats, also involve a use of the understanding 
in order for them even to become representational demonstratives25. Our point 
                                                          
25 McDowell in his 1997 Woodbridge Lectures states that ‘intuitions in the dominant Kantian 
sense are representations of thises (or thats); more fully of this-suches (or that-suches), which makes 
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however, is that although a conceptual activity governs our representational life 
insofar as we are perceptually aware, this isn’t to say that there cannot therefore be a 
non-conceptually determined aspect of our cognition which, in acting as a 
substratum of all cognition, has a presence within our representational cognitive 
sphere. This is just to affirm an autonomy of space and time as non-conceptual 
formal wholes, even though in unifying any given manifold concepts are present. It 
has perhaps been a mistake of the literature to see the conceptual/non-conceptual 
debate as thinking of the emergence of cognition as a kind of strictly linear stop/start 
process, where because there is a conceptual determination operating at the very 
beginning of a representational genesis, the possibility of a meaningful non-
conceptualism is effectively closed down, so that conceptualism is the only real 
option. It is instead perhaps more plausible so see Kant's overall account of this 
genesis as being more open so that certain faculties remain operative in their own 
unique way even though subsequent operations are requisite in performing a more 
exact function. Thus space and time as formal non-conceptual wholes are 
continuously present in an autonomous way even though their operation serves a 
further end through further involvement with the understanding in generating 
spatiotemporal perceptions. What may be thought to undermine this idea is Kant’s 
remark that intuitions without concepts are blind, and that the intuitional faculty is 
only operative, in any meaningful way, when the faculty of concepts (the 
understanding) is also in operation. It is instead the case however, that there is a 
complex interaction between the two components of cognition and that the intuitive 
element can and does retain a function that the understanding as a generator of 
concepts doesn’t have any concern with, which is just that element of ‘sense’ which 
underpins our sensing that two objects are incongruent, for instance. Although the 
perception of my hands is only possible through the operation of concepts upon the 
data of sense, the recognition of the incongruence of fit between the counterparts is 
purely a spatial sense.  In this second Chapter it has been shown that there is a pure 
spatial and temporal synthesis that although generated by the understanding, as 
synthetic unity of apperception, isn’t a synthesis generated through the concept, and 
it is this pre-conceptual unity as the fundament of all cognition, that accounts for 
there being a pure spatial and temporal sense that makes possible representational 
experience. What the examples of the Prolegomena and the Dissertation show is that  
these purely spatial and temporal intuitive components are the only features of our 
cognitive repertoire that can account for the existence of certain representational 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
it unavoidably clear that even though they are immediately of objects, such representations 
already involve the understanding’. (McDowell (1998): 460) 
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phenomena, where even though the perception of incongruence is through a 
cooperation with the understanding in making the experience of it possible, its 
unified spatiotemporal nature can only be accounted for because of a non-conceptual 
dimension within our cognitive sphere. 
 
Theoretical Applications - Aesthetic Creativity 
According to our thesis then, it turns out that the unities of space and time as formal 
intuitions, although in cooperation with the understanding in generating cognitions, 
nevertheless play an important role in accounting for the spatial and temporal 
aspects of this cognition, where this is apart from the operation of concepts. Clearly 
then the application of this thesis is broad, as it indicates that all experience insofar 
as it is sensible will have an important non-conceptual dimension, and this is 
because we have discounted a linear account of conceptualism, whereby the 
application of concepts at a very early stage in the genesis of cognition, which is 
above all true of Kant’s account, doesn’t thereby indicate that all subsequent 
experience need be thought of as conceptually determined in an absolute sense. 
However, what is more interesting and important for the application of this thesis is 
not so much the general significance of this thesis for day to day experience, but 
rather its application to particular instances or phenomena, where the non-
conceptual component plays a key determining role in making these phenomena 
possible, thereby accounting for their particular character. This is just what the 
examples from the Prolegomena and the Dissertation show - viz. that there are certain 
phenomena that can only be accounted for by, and thereby highlight, a certain 
spatiotemporal sense, which is apart from the operations of the understanding 
understood as the faculty of concepts. My concern in this section is with a particular 
element of aesthetic creativity (which as we will subsequently in later chapter's see is 
also important to Kant's aesthetic theory) which will highlight the special role that 
the unities of space and time have in within our cognitive sphere, and it is the talent 
or aptitude for drawing that is important here. 
With regard to the ability to draw, it is possible, and quite common, that one can 
draw primarily or exclusively through the application of concepts or conceptual 
rules. But this must be qualified by what was just stated, that the unities of space and 
time underpin all cognition and therefore make spatial and temporal relations 
possible, and that this is an important non-conceptual aspect of cognition. This aside, 
it is sometimes thought that the distinction between being able to draw well and not 
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being able to draw well comes down to a heightened spatial sense which is apart 
from the application of concepts or conceptual rules. There is no such thing however, 
as not being able to draw at all. As schematising beings we necessarily have a certain 
imagistic ability, which makes experience possible in the first place; and in 
possessing the schema for a dog I can portray this imagistically, in however a crude 
a manner, as a creature with four legs, a certain shape, ears of a certain character, 
and a tail. This schema already presupposes the concept however, and all 
(naturalistic at least) representation presupposes a schematising ability, just as much 
as the possession of concepts. Thus through being able to schematise we can make 
quite complex pictures full of figures and incident. It is also true that we can 
represent spatial relations just through our day to day experience with the world 
(cows in the foreground appear larger than the buildings behind them), and we can 
generate quite complex perspectival images through the use of perspectival rules 
and various other rules of thumb. I would maintain however that such spatial 
arrangements can be taught as conceptual rules (rules of thumb) by a teacher, and do 
not presuppose a certain gift or talent for intuiting spatial relations. 
However, in drawing well, or having a talent for drawing, it is not enough to 
conceptually grasp that in realistic representation there are certain rules that need to 
be obeyed. An aptitude for drawing consists in a further ability to place an object or 
set of objects in space and to do this convincingly and intuitively (apart from 
concepts) on a two dimensional surface. This talent consists in being able to ‘feel’ the 
space in which we place things, and this is where the important role of spatial 
orientation comes in, just as it does with the incongruence of counterparts. The 
difference between being able to draw moderately well and being an excellent 
draughtsman, in part comes down to this talent. In drawing very well one is able to 
feel, intuitively the sense of correctness or incorrectness of an items 
location/placement. Thus in drawing a building one wants to put it on a ground with 
solidity, with a feeling of space around it and in doing so literally projects three-
dimensionality into two-dimensionality (creating the illusion of space). Whilst it 
should be admitted that a lot of the desired effects in drawing can be created 
through the use of perspective rules and other further rules of thumb (and it is true 
that one gets an art education to learn many of these rules), the correct use of such 
rules by themselves are not sufficient, or even necessary, for a pictures qualifying for 
merit. For example, in drawing or painting a vase of flowers on a table I must be able 
to represent the flowers and table as sitting in a space, and we literally want to put 
the flowers into an environment. This involves feeling ones way around the object 
and its placement, and trying to translate this sense of spatiality so that the image 
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has conviction. Although a certain conceptual knowledge is requisite for this act of 
drawing (a knowledge that the vase is rounded for instance) a certain non-
conceptual sense of congruence and placement is requisite in being able to 
convincingly transcribe space. 
A further example of the sense for spatial congruence26 that is required by the 
talented draughtsman is to do with measuring. It is common to represent a person 
drawing by showing them with an arm extended in front with their thumb some 
way up the pencil, one eye closed and performing some kind of measurement on the 
object they are drawing. What is happening here is that person is determining a 
standard of measurement (a human head for example) and seeing how many of 
these heads the body’s length contains. Thus there may be six further heads in the 
rest of the body making for a total length of seven heads. The person drawing then 
puts down eight marks where one serves as the base upon which the person stands. 
The top segment receives the head. The person drawing again then uses their pencil 
as a measure and looks to see where the second head’s length lies on the body, 
which turns out to be from the top of the neck to the armpit. The second segment is 
thus filled and the process continues till the whole body is represented. This method 
can be used to draw any object, where one just has to determine a standard of 
measurement and apply it to the whole object. This is one way of drawing, and 
although beginners tend to use it, some continue to use it throughout their drawing 
practice. What is interesting is that one activity (drawing) can be undertaken in two 
very different ways. There is a different way of drawing that involves no such 
technique and which essentially involves just the ability to see the correctness of 
proportions where this is an intuitive grasp that cannot be taught but just developed 
through practice. Being able to draw in this intuitive way, where one draws a 
building or a figure in its correct proportions from the subject, is a further 
component in what makes up the talent for drawing. The thumb-and-pencil method 
employs what is essentially a conceptual substitute for the intuitive grasp that is the 
draughtsman’s art. Thus a necessary component of being able to draw well is being 
able to portray the relations and proportions directly that is independent of any 
measuring devices, and this depends on a sense of spatiality that is apart from the 
                                                          
26 I use 'spatial congruence' here to mean just the fittedness of a representation, as it seems to me the 
most appropriate term to use for what the draughtsman is trying to achieve in getting the placement 
right. Thus I am not referring here to the examples of the Prolegomena in using this term, although the 
relevance of these examples are of course related. 
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application of concepts, even though concepts are required for us to be presented with 
an object, as an object, in the first place27. 
The last example I would like to give in illustrating the particular talent for drawing 
(which again will become more relevant to the later chapters of our thesis), which I 
am arguing, depends upon an a priori spatial framework and a special non-
conceptual talent for navigating this framework, is the draughtsman’s sense of 
placement. This ability, as in the other two examples, requires the trial and error of 
experience before becoming fixed, but which cannot be taught by any rule and 
which must be felt through a spatial sense. In coming before his object the 
draughtsman begins at a point and works up the composition. The starting point is 
crucial, as it determines the overall composition in terms of what occupies the 
picture space. Knowing where to start in order to represent all that is desired 
requires a refined spatial sense of awareness, that beforehand knows how the 
composition will be best managed in generating the optimal pictorial unity or 
gestalt. It is not only knowing where to put the first marks on the surface, but also 
where one should position oneself in relation to the object (or vista), in order to 
obtain this gestalt28. As in the case of the incongruence of counterparts, no 
conceptual component accounts for our sense of spatial aptness or inaptness that is 
intuitively felt in constructing the pictorial representation. Because space as formal 
intuition generates the unity of representation that makes this sense of aptness 
possible, our spatial sense can here be said to be here apart from (or not concerned 
                                                          
27 It is true however that measuring devices were often employed by the greatest draughtsman as a 
kind of regulation. This regulation was often used to ensure exact reproduction of proportion and 
used as an ideal standard for the creation of figures. The artists of the renaissance were in particular 
fond of using measuring devices for accurate reproduction and for determining the ideal standard of 
human proportions and rules for their portrayal, and Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian man is the most 
famous instance for the presentation of rules of this kind, where there is a whole list of them. So 
although a great draughtsman may well be greatly concerned with rules for the portrayal of figures it 
nevertheless remains true that they must, in order to be skilled, be able to draw in the manner 
indicated, viz. through the intuitive grasp and portrayal of the correctness of proportions and 
relations. 
28 The one exception to this account is naive art, which makes a virtue, as it were, of drawing 
idiosyncratically, according to ones unlearned understanding and abilities (although this can of 
course be feigned). With naive art however, the criterion of evaluation is not the ability to draw well, 
but to draw according to ones unlearned ability yet with integrity. It is the honesty and the innocence 
of the portrayal, in addition to the ability to portray pictorial harmony (balancing colours, lights and 
darks, etc), that engages us and constitutes the pictures charm. This is to say then that skilled drawing 
isn’t a necessary condition for making a great work of art. A talent for drawing however, which is 
what I am here concerned with, does, as a necessary requirement, require the ability to grasp spatial 
location in the way I am arguing for. 
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with) the concept of the understanding, although, as stated, our intuitions are in 
cooperation with the understanding in generating the image in front of me. 
 
In summary, what we are arguing for is that a role be assigned to the formal 
intuitions of space and time in making a certain aspect of representational life 
possible. In truth though, because the spatiotemporal governs all representational 
content, then the formal intuitions of space and time, as a spatiotemporal 
substratum, are present in an important way in all representational experience. 
Because this element of cognitive unity underpins all experience then we might say 
that there is a non-conceptual element of cognition that pervades all intuitional 
experience, and not just particular phenomena. What we have aimed to demonstrate 
however is that there are particular occurrences that by themselves can only be 
accounted for through an intuitive sense of space and time that is itself the result of 
our having generated the formal intuitions of space and time in an original 
apperceptive act (synthetic unity of apperception). Thus just as with the recognition 
of incongruence, the ability to transcribe the spatial dimension onto a three-
dimensional surface requires a certain sense that is non-conceptually determined. If 
this was an exclusive ability that only a few persons were capable of then we would 
have good reason to doubt that a non-conceptual spatiotemporal sense is really what 
determines this ability, as this spatiotemporal sense is universal and not exclusive to 
a few. What we say however is that an ability to draw space is something that is 
learned through practice, so that anyone can learn to transcribe space. This can be 
learned in either of two ways however: either through conceptual measurement and 
construction (rules of perspective) or through learning to see the spatial construction 
and arrangement that is before us and representing it accordingly. Through practice 
progress in both methods is possible. What we are maintaining however is that 
drawing as a talent, has limits to what can be conceptually taught, and there remains 
an irredeemably spatial component that makes for the extra-conceptual component 
in pictorial construction. This is just the ability to see the space and to feel it (again 
something everyone possesses although to differing degrees), so that one can 
transcribe it convincingly. This talent is what might be called a heightened spatial 
sense or sensitivity, and one has this sense better developed than another, just as 
some have a special talent for navigating or judging space, or moving through space 
at high speeds, for instance. Analogously, just as everyone without a serious 
cognitive defect is capable of employing discursive concepts, some are more able 
(more talented) in their conceptual understanding and manipulation than others. 
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Thus the two strands or our cognition turn out to have varying degrees of 
development in the individual, and this can be a difference between a particular 
conceptual or non-conceptual (spatiotemporal) aptitude. The importance of this 
account with further reference to aesthetic experience will become apparent as this 
thesis progresses. 
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Chapter 3 
Kant on Reflective Judgement 
 
 
So far in our analysis of Kant’s account of the genesis of cognition, we have been 
primarily concerned with the genesis of cognition at the transcendental level, where 
at this level he is concerned with the formal conditions under which objects can be 
experienced or cognised by us, within a spatiotemporal framework, and we have 
seen that the unity of apperception has been fundamental here as the first action of 
the understanding that allows sensible data to become a sensible representation for 
me and thereby acquire universal scope. Indeed it was crucial for Kant to establish 
the fact of apperception in order to ward off what Henry Allison calls 
‘transcendental chaos’, which Kant describes as the possibility that ‘Appearances 
might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be 
in accordance with the conditions of its unity’ (A90/B123). This ‘spectre’ of 
transcendental chaos, as Allison calls it, was warded off on the grounds that 
appearances, in order to be appearances, must be subject to the unity of 
apperception as the condition, or ground, of their unity, so that ‘the possibility that 
appearances are not so constituted is ruled out on the grounds of its incompatibility 
with the conditions of the unity of apperception’ (Allison (2001): 38). However in the 
first chapter of Kant’s Theory of Taste, titled ‘Reflective Judgment and the 
Purposiveness of Nature’ (the analysis of which will form an important part of this 
chapter), one of Allison’s central points, and upon which his argument is based, is 
that although in the first Critique the spectre of transcendental chaos was warded off, 
the spectre of empirical chaos remained a real possibility, and that it wasn’t until the 
third Critique, the Critique of Judgement (CJ), that Kant came to deal with this threat. 
Allison characterises this threat as ‘a scenario in which the uniformity that nature 
necessarily exhibits in virtue of its conformity to the transcendental laws imposed by 
the very nature of the understanding does not translate into an empirically accessible 
uniformity, understood as one which could support induction and analogy’ (Allison 
(2001): 38). Although we can be sure that there will be a unity of experience at some 
level since the understanding imposes unity upon appearances - so that for instance, 
through the category of causality it is guaranteed that our experience of an external 
world is a one where causality necessarily holds (event-a necessarily precedes and 
determines event-b in accordance with a rule) - our transcendental laws cannot 
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guarantee a cognisable order at the empirical level, so that it cannot guarantee, 
regarding causality, that we will not be met everywhere with accidental succession 
rather than genuine causality (and can never thereby arrive at a connected empirical 
order). As Allison argues, warding off empirical chaos involves invoking a special a 
priori principle that nature is purposively or systematically ordered or arranged, a 
principle which Kant allocates to reflective judgement. This much however can be 
discerned from the Critique of Judgement, where in both the published and 
unpublished introductions Kant goes to lengths to provide such an argument, as 
obscure in its details as it may be. What Allison is really aiming to do in ‘Reflective 
Judgement and the Purposiveness of Nature’ however, is connect our need for a 
special a priori principle regarding nature’s purposiveness with Kant’s account of 
concept formation, where the formation of empirical concepts requires such a 
principle governing its activity. This account of the genesis of concepts, in appealing 
to the capacity of reflective judgement makes it especially important for our 
purposes, for the faculty of reflective judgement is foundational to Kant’s theory of 
taste, which will form the topic of this thesis from the next chapter forward.  
 
Reflection and Schema 
In understanding Kant’s account of concept formation, Allison, like Waxman, turns 
to the Jäsche Logic, where Kant distinguishes between the matter and the form of a 
concept and where he is considering the formation of particular concepts. Regarding 
this concept formation Kant writes; 
To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able to compare, to 
reflect, and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding 
are the essential and universal conditions for the generation of every concept 
whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing 
these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another 
in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on what 
they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves 
themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I 
acquire a concept of a tree. (JL 9:94-5) 
As Allison points out, this account of concept formation is highly problematic, for 
apart from the implausibility of the chronology, this account of concept formation is 
‘hopelessly circular’. For the concept of ‘tree’ is supposedly arrived at through 
reflection upon those constituents – the trunk, leaves and branches - that account for 
the recognition of a tree in the first place. Thus we supposedly select and abstract 
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certain tree-constituting features in the formation of the concept which pre-supposes 
the concept of a tree in the first place, which is what is supposed to be explained not 
presupposed. Longuenesse also finds this account problematic, stating that 
comparison cannot be prior to reflection and abstraction, but presupposes the initial 
effort to ‘reflect the similarities among the elements compared and abstract from (leave 
out) their dissimilarities’. For Longuenesse this process of arriving at the empirical 
concept shouldn’t be considered linear, but as operating simultaneously, so that 
‘only insofar as comparison is conjoined with the two other operations can it be 
geared from the outset towards universal representation, that is, the production of a 
concept’ (Longuenesse (1998): 116). It is in fact this ‘universalising comparison’ 
(Longuenesse’s term) that Longuenesse sees as what is essentially formative in 
Kant’s account of concept formation, and we have seen in Chapter 2 that being taken 
up into apperception enables any representation to become a universal. This 
universalising comparison is directed from the outset toward a detection of common 
marks or features in what is given through sensibility and to this extent all concept 
formation contains a ‘moment’ of reflection29. Kant’s account of comparison 
generally speaking is a complex one, in so far as there are many different ‘acts’ of 
comparison taking place throughout Kant’s theoretical writings. In the Amphiboly 
chapter of the first Critique for instance Kant distinguishes three different kinds of 
comparison or reflective acts. There is a logical reflection, which is a comparison of 
concepts formed by the understanding, there is an aesthetic comparison of objects 
delivered through the sensible given, and then there is what is called transcendental 
reflection, which aims to determine the ‘relation of given representations... to one or 
the other of the two kinds of cognition’ (A262/B138). This transcendental reflection is 
performed through what Kant calls concepts of comparison, 
The interrelations of given representations can be determined only through 
transcendental reflection, that is, through their relation to one or the other of 
the two kinds of cognition. Whether things are identical or different, in 
agreement or opposition, etc., cannot be established at once from the 
concepts themselves by mere [logical] comparison, but solely by means of 
                                                          
29 Thus Longuenesse sees it as mistaken to read Kant’s account of judgement in the first Critique as 
being solely determinative, as may be thought to be given the distinction between determinant 
judgement and reflective judgement as Kant presents it in both introductions to the third Critique. 
Because all judgement involves a moment of reflection, it is not that there are determinant judgements 
without reflection, even though there can be such a thing as a merely reflective judgements. For 
Longuenesse it is the judgement as merely reflective that determines the particular character of 
aesthetic and teleological judgement. Later in the chapter we will examine Rudolf Makkreel's 
arguments against Longuenesse's conception). 
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transcendental reflection, through distinction of the cognitive faculty to 
which they belong. (CPR A262/B138) 
Longuenesse relates this kind of reflection or comparison to a further, fourth kind of 
comparison, which is that act of comparison referred to already, that one as 
presented in the Jäsche Logic. Longuenesse further identifies this fourth kind of 
comparison with transcendental reflection (Longuenesse (1998): 112-5), and insofar 
as this comparison is geared toward concept formation, this is only possible if 
governed by the norm of universality. What is especially important for our purposes 
is that transcendental reflection as Kant accounts for it presupposes an aesthetic 
reflection, or comparison. The material that the universalising comparison operates 
with must itself be universally oriented so that it can subsequently be compared as 
to sameness and difference with other representations and not be thought of as a 
rule common to its synthesis, and Longuenesse appeals to a reflexion in making this 
perspicuous where Kant writes that ‘we compare only what is universal in the rule 
of our apprehension’ (Refl. 2880, Ak. XVI, 557). Both Longuenesse and Allison argue 
that in stating that what is compared is the rule of apprehension, what Kant is in 
effect stating is that what is subject to universalising comparison is a schema. (Allison 
(2001): 24), Longuenesse (1998): 116). It is through the comparison of schema that 
concepts, through the recognition of what is universal in the apprehension, are able 
to be formed. The initial problem with this account however, is that it appears to be 
in direct opposition to Kant’s account of the schematism as Kant outlines it in the 
first Critique. There the issue was how a concept which we are already in possession 
of relates to the sensible given, and the schema was introduced to answer this, where 
it operates as the ‘presentation’ of the concept in enabling its application. Here 
however the schema is being introduced to account for the generation of the concept 
in the first place, and in explaining the sense of this Longuenesse argues that if one 
approaches the relation between schema and concept from the perspective of the 
deduction the relation is reversed, and that, 
If one inquires, as the deduction does, into the formation or acquisition both 
of “rules for the determination of our intuition” and of concepts 
(“representing” these rules, which in turn “present” them in intuition: are 
their “schemata”), it seems clear that the “rules for the synthesis of intuition” 
must first have been acquired at the outcome of the operations described in 
the A deduction (apprehension, reproduction, and recognition), in order to 
be reflected as discursive concepts, “universal or reflected representations.”. 
(Longuenesse (1998): 116n) 
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The schematism in the sense of the deduction is the sensible representation of the act 
governing an initial grasping of the manifold in intuition. At the same time, this rule 
of apprehension is the concept, in the first sense of a concept as a rule of synthesis, 
and in this sense although we are arguing that the schema here precedes the concept, 
this is a preceding of the empirical concept, which in no way must be pre-supposed 
for the schema to be possible30. Nevertheless the schema as concept must have been 
formed through a comparative act of what is not yet schematised, and it is this initial 
formation that can help us make sense of Longuenesse’s account of an initial, pre-
conceptual schematism formation, which is obscure in the sense that she states that 
‘To compare representations in order to form concepts is therefore to compare 
schemata. And to compare schemata, by means of the three joint acts of comparison, 
reflection, and abstraction, is first of all to generate these schemata. Thus the 
schemata result from the very acts of universalising comparison of which they are 
the object’ (Longuenesse (1998): 116-7).  Longuenesse’s argument appears to be that 
in order to generate schema as a rule of apprehension there must be an initial 
universally directed act which generates each representation as to its particular form, 
and that it is only upon this particular form being analogous in terms of structure to 
a different form that schemata are formed, hence ‘several representations must be 
compared with one another so that different schemata, rules for apprehension, may 
arise in them and be reflected as concepts’ (Longuenesse (1998): 117). This is to say 
then that an aesthetic comparison must serve as the basis for the universalising 
comparison that is directed to the formation of empirical concepts, and in 
reconsidering the account of concept formation as it is presented in the Jäsche Logic, 
Kant is able to avoid the problems raised by Allison and Longuenesse regarding the 
apparent circularity of this account, where it seemed we already assume the concept 
in recognising the marks that make up its concept in order to reflect and abstract 
from them31. As Allison puts it, in comparing the various trunks, leaves and 
branches of a tree, ‘what one is really comparing are the patterns or rules governing 
                                                          
30 In Chapter 2 of Kant and the Capacity to Judge Longuenesse highlights the sense in which this first 
sense of concept, as Kant uses it, is also, as a sensible synthesis, a schema, writing that, ‘The concept is 
a rule insofar as it is the consciousness of the unity of an act of sensible synthesis or the consciousness 
of the procedure for generating a sensible intuition. This first sense of rule anticipates what Kant, in 
the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, calls a schema. Kant also makes this 
relation between the rule of synthesis as concept and schema apparent when he writes ‘[The] 
representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle 
the schema of this concept… it is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in 
space’. (A140/B180)   
31 Allison also provides an account of how Hume, and the empiricist more generally, fell prey to such 
circular accounts of concept formation. See Allison (2001): 22-25. 
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the apprehension of these items, that is, their schemata. And it is reflection on what 
is common to these patterns of apprehension or schemata, combined with an 
abstraction from their differences, that one arrives at the (reflected) concept of a tree.’ 
(Allison (2001): 25). Insofar as the universalising comparison is governed by the 
concepts of comparison it is rule governed. Yet the aesthetic comparison isn’t so 
governed, or directed by the concept and its schema, and this point, which both 
Longuenesse and Allison argue for, has important consequences. In a Reflexion Kant 
poses the following question: 
Question: could we, from an intuition alone, without comparison, abstract 
something in order to subordinate other things to it if they presented 
themselves? (We can become conscious solely of the activity of the 
imagination, i.e., of the combination of representations either with one 
another, or with our sensibility, without considering what is combined and 
its own marks, for example, a house. But a concept becomes clear only 
through its application in a comparison). (Refl. 2878, Ak. XVI, 556-57) 
It is only through the comparison, reflection and abstraction of the Jäsche Logic that a 
comparison as to what is universal in the rule of apprehension, that is the schema, 
can be operative, in generating the concept. Without this kind of comparison, which 
is the ‘universalising comparison’, there is nevertheless another kind of comparison, 
which Kant is here telling us takes place without regard to detecting the universal 
through marks, but solely with regard to what is sensible. This is of course the 
aesthetic comparison. This comparison, as a comparison of intuitions, is directed 
towards what is spatiotemporal, and in the Jäsche Logic Kant provides an example of 
such comparison (although not explicitly referring to it as aesthetic comparison) 
through an elaboration of his house reference of the Reflexion, 
If, for example, a savage sees a house from a distance, whose use he does not 
know, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same 
object as someone else who knows it determinately as a dwelling established 
for human beings. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is 
different in the two cases. In the former it is mere intuition, in the latter it is 
simultaneously intuition and concept.32 (JL 9:33) 
                                                          
32 This passage is often appealed to in arguing for a non-conceptualist reading of Kant, as Kant is 
explicit in stating that it is possible to be in possession of an intuition without possessing the concept 
corresponding to it. As already discussed, everything comes down to what sense of concept Kant is 
referring to when he states that there can be a mere intuition without a concept, and it is the concept 
in the second sense, as a universally reflected discursive representation (concepts in the common 
sense) that Kant must be referring to here, insofar as we have seen that the perception of something of 
which we do not possess the discursive concept (house, tree, etc) nevertheless must be governed, in 
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It is Longuenesse’s argument that not only does the savage not possess the concept 
of a house, as a dwelling place for human beings, he also doesn’t possess the rule of 
apprehension as it is common to a number of representations. In this sense he also 
doesn’t possess the schema of a house. This is to say that there is no rule of 
apprehension governing the synthesis of a house as a house, although there are rules 
governing the synthesis of it as an object, and a whole array of further concepts must 
be present in the perceptual recognition. If a computer were to find itself transported 
back to an earlier epoch, they would recognise an object with certain tactile and 
structural properties without having the rule of apprehension governing this object 
as a computer. There is thus a conceptual content within any representation of which 
we do not possess the concept but for any concept to be formed it must be governed 
by the ‘logical act’ of a universalising comparison, so that it is, ‘Only the “application 
in a comparison,” that is, the gradually dawning consciousness of a “rule of 
apprehension” common to the representation of various objects serving the same 
purpose, would pick out analogous marks and bring forth the concept of a house.’ 
(Longuenesse (1998): 118).  It is not only the empirical concept however that is 
generated as to its form, but also the category itself, and for Longuenesse, one of 
whose main tasks is to emphasise and explicate the epigenetic account of the 
categories as made, it is only through the application in comparison that the 
categories themselves are generated as to their form, 
To be sure, Kant maintains that the categories are a priori concepts. Yet, like 
any other concept, they can be recognised in the sensible only through 
“application in a comparison”... like other concepts they are made as to their 
form (generated as “clear representations” through “comparison, reflection 
and abstraction”). (Longuenesse (1998): 121) 
In order for these comparing procedures to take place, so that either the form of the 
empirical concept or category can be made, there must be an act of comparison 
which again, must be governed by the norm of universality in order to subsequently 
be picked up as common to many representations. Insofar as aesthetic sensible 
representations are brought to consciousness through an awareness of a rule of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
order to a perceptual synthesis of an object as an object, or of a this or that, by the concept in the first 
sense as Kant uses it, which is the rule governing the apprehension, or synthesis, and which is 
performed through the logical forms of judgement in relation to the unity of apperception. In 
addition, we have seen in Chapter 2 that Kant makes explicit reference as to how the apprehension of 
a house is made into a higher level perception, and that it is through the category of quantity that I 
‘draw as it were the outline of a house’ (B162). Consequently the appeal of the non-conceptualist isn’t 
successful in locating a argument for absolute non-conceptualism in this passage, yet as has been 
argued so far, this doesn’t preclude a non-conceptual argument per se. 
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apprehension governing this act, this awareness, as again Longuenesse points out, 
presupposes ‘that the sensible representations lend themselves to such a rule’, and in a 
further Reflexion Kant, when referring to the concept as community of 
representations writes 
This community of representations under one mark presupposes a 
comparison, not of perceptions, but of our apprehension, insofar as it 
contains the presentation of an as yet undetermined concept, and is universal 
in itself (Refl. 2883, Ak. XVI, 558) 
The apprehension, as Kant is referring to it here, must be a synthesised content 
guided by the logical form of judgement insofar as its representation, or 
presentation, is governed by the norm of universality: universality being the form of 
a concept, which is said here to not yet be determined. It is not determined insofar as 
it is not yet reflected as a discursive representation, that is, there hasn’t yet been the 
comparing, reflection and abstraction that generates the discursively reflected 
concept. Yet in order for the synthesis in the apprehension prior to the universalising 
comparison that lead to the empirical concept to be universal in itself, and contain an 
undetermined, or ‘obscure’ concept, the representation must be have been brought 
under the unity of apperception, since as was seen in Chapter 2, it is only by being 
brought under this unity that any representation can acquire the form of a concept in 
the first place, and we have seen that this is what Kant means when he states that the 
analytic unity of apperception presupposes a synthetic unity. Because what stands 
before me belongs to my representation it must be present as a synthesised manifold, 
which depends both upon the data before us being spatiotemporally unified and its 
acquiring the form of universality. In this case the indeterminate concepts, which can 
be said to be present in an unreflected state, become determinate through the logical 
act of universalising comparison and thereby acquire the form of an empirical 
concept. 
 
Synthetic Unity 
Thus the importance of synthetic unity in relation to subsequent acts of analysis is 
again reiterated in coming to understand Kant’s account of concept formation, and 
the importance of recognising the two different senses of concept as Kant uses them 
again comes to the fore. Only because I can combine representations through an 
initial act of synthesis can objects come before me in the first place, so that, as rules 
of apprehension, they can be both generated and reflected through acts of 
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universalising comparison. Being able to have an intuitive representation before us 
however, depends upon the objects being possible as a spatiotemporal intuition in 
the first place, and this is only possible on the pre-supposition of an original 
synthetic unity of the space and time that makes up the representation. This original 
synthetic unity precedes the category but, as belonging to the unity of apperception 
must, insofar as an object is met with, be under the logical forms of judgement, so 
that it is upon meeting with these objects that this logical form can be exercised and 
generate categories, as the concepts under which the data of sense is brought. We 
saw in Chapter 2 that the formal intuitions of space and time, as  priori unities 
generated in imagination provide the framework for spatial and temporal intuitions. 
But the intuitions themselves, by conforming to this unity and by being 
representable only on the presupposition of it, themselves have an intuitive 
combination, or synthetic unity that must be in place in order for what is similar 
within these representations to become reflected as similar, or the same (or 
according to any other of the concepts of comparison). It is because of this intuitive 
combination that something is always exclusively sensibly determined in the 
representation, even though the representation itself may be fully reflected under 
concepts. In original synthetic unity we are able to aesthetically compare the content 
of any representation, where insofar as this content is under apperception it 
possesses the form of universality, and is thereby able to be subsequently codified as 
schemata. Insofar as something becomes a rule of apprehension it also becomes the 
concept that functions as the initial seizing act, and thus the categories themselves 
are generated through the act of comparison/reflection/abstraction in relation to the 
formal spatiotemporal in synthetic unity. Indeed insofar as the category of unity 
itself presupposes an initial act of non-categorical synthesis (B131), we can only 
make sense of this arising of the category on the assumption that the logical form of 
judgement (or the capacity to judge) acts upon the sensible given in generating what 
is universal in the spatiotemporal33. 
                                                          
33In response to Longuenesse’s obscure remark as to how the schemata can themselves provide the 
terms for a universalising comparison and be the product of such a comparison Allison writes, ‘If I 
understand her correctly, the gist of Longuenesse’s answer is that this comparison does not begin 
with a blank slate. This is because the mind, in its universalising comparison, is guided by the very 
same concepts of reflection that are operative in the comparison of schemata that leads to the 
formation of reflected concepts. Presumably, at this level, however, the comparison leads the mind to 
seek similarities and differences, which can be codified as schemata governing apprehension and then 
reflected as concepts. And this is possible, according to Longuenesse, because this comparison is 
oriented from the beginning toward the acquisition of concepts applicable in judgement.' (Allison 
(2001): 27). Comparison can also be said not to begin with a blank slate insofar as there is a 
spatiotemporal unity within original apperception. 
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Purposiveness and Universality - Allison 
As was mentioned at the opening of this chapter, Allison’s central argument in 
Chapter 1 of Kant’s Theory of Taste is to relate Kant’s account of concept formation, as 
it has been outlined so far, with Kant’s further argument as it occurs within the third 
Critique - that the formation of an empirical experience (through empirical concepts) 
depends upon a special a priori principle unique to judgement. This principle as Kant 
accounts for it, states that nature is systematically ordered, or arranged, and is 
supposed to guide our reflective judgement upon the natural (empirical) world, 
where, ‘To reflect (or consider) is to hold given representations up to, and compare 
them with, either other representations or one’s cognitive faculty, in reference to a 
concept that this makes possible’ (FI 20:211). The concept (of the purposiveness of 
nature) here makes the reflection possible, in arriving at a coherent empirically 
ordered construct, and it thus becomes apparent that Kant’s account of empirical 
concept formation and the resulting ordering (systemising) of nature is not yet fully 
in place as of the first Critique nor fully accounted for in the Jäsche Logic34. Reflective 
judgement is different from determinative judgement in that only the former has an a 
priori principle unique to it, which is to say that although determinative judgement 
brings a content to experience through rules or concepts already in the 
understanding’s possession, this kind of content is insufficient for, or 
underdetermines the content met with in the empirical realm. This is because the 
pure concepts of the understanding and their application to the sensible given 
concern solely the formal conditions under which a spatiotemporal world of objects 
can be experienced, and as was noted this formal aspect of cognition, where 
anything in order to be a representation for me must be unified through 
apperception, foreclosed the prospect of what Allison called ‘transcendental chaos’. 
Thus through the act of determinative judgement in determining the spatiotemporal 
we do not arrive at anything like the experience we do in fact possess, and this is 
because, 
                                                          
34 Allison points out that empirical concept formation is itself a form of systematicity insofar as the 
formation of such concepts involves a taxonomical classification into genera and species. The concept 
‘gold’ for instance functions both as a species and a genus, and is ‘at once a species ‘of yellow objects, 
of metal, and things soluble in aqua regia, and so forth. But at the same time the concept also functions 
as a genus under which different types of gold (or of things composed of gold) are to be distinguished 
as species’. Allison also references Ginsborg in discussing how searching for the universal for the 
particular (which is what is characteristic of reflective judgement) can take the form of searching for 
both empirical concepts and empirical laws, and in stating that these are both part of the same quest 
for empirical systematicity. (Allison (2001): 30-38) 
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It is quite conceivable that, regardless of all the uniformity of natural things 
in terms of the universal laws, without which the form of an empirical 
cognition in general would not occur at all, the specific differences in the 
empirical laws of nature, along with their effects, might still be so great that it 
would be impossible for our understanding to discover in nature an order it 
could grasp, i.e., impossible for it to divide nature’s products into genera and 
species, so as to use the principles by which we explain and understand one 
product in order to explain and comprehend another as well, thereby making 
coherent experience out of material that to us is so full of confusion (though 
actually it is only infinitely diverse and beyond our ability to grasp). (CJ 
5:185) 
Thus it is apparent that in order to ward of ‘empirical chaos’ and enable the 
possibility of the formation of empirical concepts the fact of reflective judgement 
must be established. 
Apart from Allison’s convincing point that Kant’s account of empirical concept 
formation must be supplemented with his account as presented in the third Critique, 
there is, I think, nevertheless a problem in the way Allison aims to connect the 
account of concept formation as a comparison of schema (as discussed above) and 
the principle of the purposiveness of nature. In drawing out this connection Allison 
appeals to a passage already quoted and which Longuenesse appeals to in arguing 
that it is the schema, as the rule of apprehension, that is compared in a universalising 
comparison and that generates the empirical concept. This is one of Kant’s Reflexions 
where, in reference to the concept as a community of representations, Kant stated 
that, 
This community of representations under one mark presupposes a 
comparison, not of perceptions, but of our apprehension, insofar as it 
contains the presentation of an as yet undetermined concept, and is universal 
in itself. (Refl. 2883, Ak. XVI, 558) 
Allison, in appealing to the significance of this remark for the comparison of 
unformed schema (as aesthetic comparison), sees a special importance in Kant’s 
contention that the apprehensional content contains something ‘universal in itself’, 
stating that this, 
may reasonably be taken to refer to the schemata, since a schemata must 
have a universal nature if it is to serve as the exhibition of a concept. But it 
may also refer to the apprehended content on the basis of which the 
schemata themselves are formed, insofar as this content is to provide the 
foundation for a universalising comparison. (Allison (2001): 28) 
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Allison takes the last point in this remark to ‘indicate both the need for and the 
nature of the principle to which judgement must appeal in its logical reflection 
directed toward the acquisition of empirical concepts for use in judgement’, and that 
this reflection must assume that ‘there is something ‘universal in itself’ encoded, as it 
were, in our experience, which provides the basis for the formation of both schemata 
and reflected concepts (Allison (2001): 28). It is natural to be sympathetic to Allison’s 
argument insofar as there is a need to specify how both the aesthetic and 
universalising comparison lead to empirical concept formation given that such 
concept formation depends upon a unique a priori principle concerning nature’s 
systematicity. I believe that Allison’s way of drawing this connection however is 
somewhat strained however, insofar as the universality Kant is referring to doesn’t 
seem to be that which is arrived at through a principle regarding nature’s 
systematicity, but appears to be the universality generated through any 
representations belonging to me and thus acquiring the form of a concept. We have 
argued that it is insofar as a representation is brought to apperception that it 
acquires the form of universality, and it is true of the object which is subject to the 
aesthetic comparison here in question. It is because of this universality that a 
comparison is possible, and in this sense can be said to make the schema possible as 
the rule of apprehension common to the sensible synthesis taking place through the 
initial act of the understanding in relation to the data of sense. Consequently it does 
not seem quite right to pinpoint Kant’s passage from the reflexion as specifying an 
explicit connection between Kant’s insistence upon the importance of universality 
being normative in guiding concept formation insofar as it constitutes the form of a 
concept, and the principle of purposiveness as a principle of judgement. 
Although I have here discounted Allison’s attempt to link aesthetic and 
universalising comparison with the principle of purposiveness, it remains true 
however that there must be such a link if Kant’s account is to remain coherent.  It is a 
strength of Allison’s argument that it is within an initial account of reflective 
comparison that such a link aims to be forged, as the principle of the purposiveness 
of nature is itself a principle relevant to reflective judgement. Indeed the most 
coherent way to forge the link in question is precisely through this connection, and it 
may be true (and must be true for Kant) that aesthetic and universalising 
comparison, in generating the empirical concept does exploit the principle of the 
purposiveness of nature. Exactly how this is done however remains ambiguous, and 
Kant’s remark in the reflexion, I believe, doesn’t provide sufficient grounds for 
establishing the link in question. 
70 
 
Makkreel on Reflective Judgement 
In discussing Allison’s account we have assumed that the reflection of the Jäsche 
Logic and the reflective judgement of the third Critique amount to the same thing, 
and this assumption arises from both Allison’s and Longuenesse’s maintaining the 
identity in question, with Longuenesse stating that the application of the categories 
to experience presupposes ‘a progress from sensible representations to discursive 
thought: the formation of concepts through comparison/reflection/abstraction, which 
is just what reflective judgement is’ (Longuenesse (1998): 164-5). This identity, and the 
consequent claim that it is the reflective judgement as outlined in the third Critique 
that enables determinant judgement in the first place, is precisely what Rudolf 
Makkreel has found susceptible to doubt, stating that ‘the reflective judgement 
appealed to in the Critique of the Power of Judgement is not the logical reflection that 
Longuenesse sees at work in empirical concept formation and in the inductive 
procedures grounded by the Critique of Pure Reason’ (Makkreel (2006): 232). 
For Makkreel, determinant judgement is indeed only arrived at through the 
reflective acts as outlined in the first Critique, but reflective judgement is not 
concerned with a reflecting upon the sensible given in order to arrive at either 
empirical concepts or categories, but rather with reflecting upon what has already 
been arrived at determinately in some way (although with regards to what is 
contingent reflective judgement is needed to arrive at an order). In this sense, 
reflective judgement for Makkreel, is ‘meta-experiential’ and ‘instead of regarding 
reflective judgement as proto-experiential or subservient to the conceptual needs of 
the understanding, it should be considered as meta-experiential’, so that with 
regards to a judgement of taste as a paradigm instance of reflective judgement, this 
kind of judgement ‘attempts through a process of coordination to complete our 
experience and thus partly fill in the total system of experience that ideas of reason 
can only project abstractly. Being meta-experiential, reflective judgements about art 
are often parasitical on background determinant judgements’ (Makkreel (2006): 242-
3)35. In addition ‘reflective judgement is not so much about objects per-se as about 
their relation to us’ (Makkreel (2006): 223). 
There is a temptation to side with Makkreel in his contention that ‘an intersection of 
reflective and determinant judgements should not be seen as supporting the 
                                                          
35 In this sense, Makkreel holds a 'metacognitve' account of Kant’s account of the harmony of the 
faculties, where ‘The aesthetic judgement transforms an empirical determinant judgement about an 
object into a disinterested reflective judgement that expresses a subjective assessment’ (Makkreel 
(2006): 233). We will return to this issue in Chapter 4. 
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conclusion that their judgemental functions merge’ (Makkreel (2006): 223), insofar as 
in both the published and unpublished introductions to the third Critique Kant tends 
to refer to each kind of judgement as a distinct faculty. Although both kinds of 
judgement are concerned with bringing the particular under the universal, they do 
so in autonomous ways: determinant judgement seeking the particular for the 
universal, and reflective judgement seeking the universal for the particular. 
Nevertheless, I believe Makkreel is mistaken in seeing the determinant judgement as 
itself not being governed in part by the act of reflective judgement. So for Makkreel 
‘when Kant speaks of reflection in relation to the formation of empirical concepts, 
this is not yet reflective judgement’ (Makkreel (2006): 225), this cannot be quite right, 
insofar as for Kant, in the published introduction to the third Critique, it is the case 
that the apprehension of the manifold itself first requires an act of reflective 
judgement: 
For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place 
without the reflecting power of judgement, even if unintentionally, at least 
comparing them to its faculty for relating intuitions to concepts. Now if in 
this comparison the imagination (as the faculty of a priori intuitions) is 
unintentionally brought into accord with the understanding, as the faculty of 
concepts, through a given representation and a feeling of pleasure is thereby 
aroused, then the object must be regarded as purposive for the reflecting 
power of judgement. (CJ 5:190) 
Clearly, Kant is here drawing the link between reflective judgement and the 
harmony of the faculties. But what is relevant for our purposes is that all judgement, 
insofar as it requires intuitions (either pure or empirical) being brought to concepts, 
must be governed by a reflective aspect, where this is reflective judgement (the 
reflecting power of judgement) as presented in the third Critique. The explicitness of 
the role of reflective judgement in the formation of the empirical concept is further 
elaborated in the first Introduction (the first, lengthy and unpublished introduction 
to the third Critique) , where Kant writes, 
To every empirical concept, namely, there belong three actions of the self-
active faculty of cognition: 1. The apprehension (apprehension) of the 
manifold of intuition; 2. the comprehension, i.e., the synthetic unity of the 
consciousness of this manifold in the concept of an object (apperception 
comprehensive); 3.the presentation (exhibito) of the object corresponding to this 
concept in intuition. For the first action imagination is required, for the 
second understanding, for the third the power of judgement, which, if it is an 
empirical concept that is at issue would be the determining power of 
judgement. (FI 20:220) 
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The last statement clearly indicates that the determinant power is concerned with 
empirical concept formation and that there are two conditions of this judgement 
being possible. We also have seen in the published Introduction that the 
apprehension of forms in the imagination ‘can never take place’ without the 
reflective power of judgement and that comparing these forms with reference to the 
faculty of exhibition as such is what reflective judgement engages in.  Insofar as this 
act of judgement precedes and makes possible the determining power of judging, it 
seems that Makkreel is mistaken in stating that these judgemental functions don’t 
merge. In fact if we are going to make sense of determinant judgement as generating 
a determinant empirical concept, then this will only be possible through its 
connection with reflective judgement, since as we have seen, reflective judgement 
not only makes the systemisation of empirical laws and concepts possible, but makes 
empirical concept formation possible in the first place. Consequently, insofar as we 
are determining the contingent we are at the same time employing reflective 
judgement, which, with its unique principle regarding the purposiveness of nature, 
brings coherence and order to our empirical experience. 
The ambiguities however stem from Kant’s account itself, and the problem seems to 
be that reflective judgement is allocated a number of roles. Insofar as it is said to 
make possible the apprehension of forms in the imagination, then it does indeed 
appear to be synonymous with the acts of reflection in the Jäsche Logic, which 
Longuenesse sees as just reflective judgement. Here reflective judgement is 
comparing the faculty of intuitions with the faculty of concepts, but doesn’t yet 
subsume anything under the (determinate) concept. It is the task of presentation to 
subsume under a determinate concept. This presentational task for Longuenesse is 
what is essentially characteristic of Kant’s account of reflection in the Transcendental 
Deduction, even though the reflective aspect is the same, with the difference that in 
the Transcendental Deduction ‘this reflective procedure, unlike the third Critique’s 
“merely reflective” judgements, is determinative as well: first, because it consists not 
only in forming empirical concepts [through the concepts of comparison] but also 
applying them (remember a concept becomes clear only when it is applied in a 
comparison”)’ (Longuenesse (1998): 165). Clearly this account sees not only a close 
relation between reflective and determinate judgement, but a dependence relation. If 
this account is essential to the formation of determinate empirical concepts as such 
then it appears that there is a subsequent ‘cognitive’ form of reflecting judgement, 
which acts upon already determinately arrived at concepts, and ‘in contrast’ to the 
account where determinate concepts are not given, 
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If empirical concepts and even empirical laws are already given in 
accordance with the mechanism of nature and the power of judgement 
compares such a concept of the understanding with reason and its principle 
of the possibility of a system, then, if this form is found in the object, the 
purposiveness is judged objectively  and the thing is called a natural end, 
whereas previously things were judged as indeterminately natural forms. 
The judgement about the objective purposiveness of nature is called 
teleological. It is a cognitive judgement, but still belonging only to reflecting, 
not to the determining power of judgement. For in general the technique of 
nature, whether it be merely formal or real, is only a relation of things to our 
power of judgement, in which alone can be found the idea of a purposiveness 
of nature, and which is ascribed to nature only in relation to that power. (FI 
20:221) 
Clearly in such judgements the concept of the understanding is already given, and 
this is compared with ‘reason and its principle of the possibility of a system’. In the 
aesthetic case reflective judgement was called reflective insofar as ‘no determinate 
concept of the object at all is required’. In the teleological case the judgement is 
called reflective and not determining insofar as a determinate empirical concept is 
given but the judgement that nature is objectively purposive is not a constitutional 
but regulative idea of reason.  
Clearly then, searching for a unanimous definition of reflective judgement is highly 
problematic and unobtainable, since it appears to be operating at many various 
levels of cognitive activity.36 Insofar as the reflecting in teleological judgement 
already has a determinate empirical content then it is understandable that Makkreel 
argues that the reflecting judgement of the third Critique isn’t that of the first Critique 
since a determinate content is already arrived at – pre-reflecting judgement. So in 
one sense Makkreel is right. As discussed though, this doesn’t reflect the entirety of 
Kant’s arguments regarding reflective judgement, and insofar as the reflecting 
judgement in aesthetic cognition is an element of cognition, this must be in place in 
order for determinant judgement (presentation)37 to occur. In addition it is highly 
                                                          
36 Longuenesse recognises the complexity of Kant’s account of ‘mere reflection’ in a footnote when she 
writes ‘The “merely  reflective” use of the power of judgement thus concerns aesthetic judgement, 
teleological judgements, and the representation of nature as a system (“subjective purposiveness” of 
nature). “Merely reflective” means in all three cases reflective and not determinative, but this general 
description covers three specifically different  “merely reflective judgements.” The third kind is the 
condition for all empirical judgements, that is, a condition for all judgements where judgement is “in 
its reflection at the same time determinative.” (xx: 212). This last case, I think, can already be found in the 
first Critique.' (Longuenesse (1998): 164 n.47)  
37 Although in order to avoid the objection that in that case everything can be said to be beautiful 
insofar as a comparison in imagination is a precondition of all determination in the concept, it will 
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significant that Kant remarks that in aesthetic judgement we schematise without a 
concept (CJ 5:287). Insofar as the imagination is engaged with an apprehension prior 
to any empirical concept determining activity, and insofar as reflecting judgement is 
concerned with this activity, we can make sense of Kant’s account. We have seen 
that generating schemata, as rules of apprehension, are a pre-condition of 
universalising comparison and determinate concept formation. With aesthetic 
judgement however it is not the case that we are involved in the exhibition or 
presentation of the determinate concept, for this would be objective judgement and 
would be cognitive, and the schematisation isn’t engaged in this kind of 
subsumptive task (even though a conceptual content can be present in the 
perception). As Allison puts it, with this kind of schematisation, what is yielded is 
‘what might be described as the exhibition of the form of a concept in general (but 
not any concept in particular)’ (Allison (2003): 171). In this sense we make sense of 
Kant’s remark which was quoted earlier (CJ 5:190) that with aesthetic judgement the 
faculty of intuitions (imagination) is compared with faculty of concepts 
(understanding) in general, rather than specific intuitions being compared with and 
brought to concepts. Although we will go into the details of Kant’s aesthetic theory 
in the next chapter, the point here is that making sense of Kant’s remarks that there 
can be a schematisation without concepts involves appreciating that there is an 
activity of reflective judgement which is only intelligible in a stage or activity of 
judgement, which itself is only intelligible upon its orientation within an overall 
account of the merging of reflective and determinant judgement.  
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
have to be shown that there is something special or particular about the reflecting judgement in 
aesthetic judging that accounts for its character. This will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
The Harmony of the Faculties and the Role of Concepts 
 
 
In our first three chapters we have carefully considered the role of concepts in Kant's 
account of cognition, and have explored the ways in which a Kantian non-
conceptualism can be defended. Now that we have a more definite understanding of 
the relations between the understanding and imagination as such, and how they 
relate to each other with regard to the generation of representations, we are now in a 
position to explore the central argument of Kant's aesthetic theory - his account of 
the harmony of the faculties. It is well established that Kant's account here is a non-
cognitive one, insofar as Kant himself tells us that in aesthetic judging we are not 
concerned with the application of concepts, but with reflecting on the sensible data 
before us with regard to its purposivity, or counter-purposivity for the faculty of 
judgement as such. What is a contentious issue in Kant's account however, is the 
exact nature of the role of concepts in the relations between the imagination and the 
understanding in determining aesthetic response, and this has lead to an array of 
varying and conflicting interpretations regarding Kant's account of the harmony of 
the faculties. More recently, one of the most prominent commentators on Kant's 
third Critique, Paul Guyer, has provided a categorisation of what he considers the 
three most prominent ways in which this account gets interpreted by its various 
readers and commentators. Using Guyer's categorisation as a kind of template, we 
will ourselves examine Kant's account of the harmony of the faculties in exploring 
not only the three categories themselves, but the merits of this categorisation. Using 
the arguments of our previous chapters we will argue that although there is some 
merit in Guyer's categorisation and in his own 'metacognitive' reading of Kant's 
account, there are further considerations in the other readings which demand a 
broadening, or revision, of Guyer's interpretation.  It is important to emphasise 
however, that the main focus of this chapter is upon reaching an adequate 
understanding of Kant's account and the extent to which concepts are operative in 
aesthetic experience.  
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Guyer's Categorisation 
Paul Guyer, in various books and articles, has argued for a certain way that Kant's 
account of the harmony of the faculties should be read, and in doing so has 
diagnosed three different ways in which this account tends to be interpreted by its 
various commentators. Guyer's categorisation is determined upon how a 
commentator reads Kant’s general account of determinate concept formation and at 
what stage such formation is established relative to Kant’s idea that in aesthetic 
experience there is a formal play between the imagination and the understanding. 
For Guyer, those who adhere to a ‘precognitive’ account see the imagination 
engaged in a synthesis prior to determinate concept formation, so that the 
imagination, performs a schematisation as it were, that the understanding finds 
harmonises with its subsumptive (bringing under concepts) aspect. A 
‘multicognitive’ account is somewhat similar to the precognitive account in that it is 
an activity that occurs prior to determinate concept application, but that rather than 
the object that stimulates the imagination suggesting a possible simplicity of fit 
under a determinate concept, it suggests many possible fits, so that it is simply that 
the object is purposive for cognition in a general way, suggesting many possible 
schematisations or potential determinations through concepts, without being 
determined by any particular one. A ‘metacognitive’ account, which is what Guyer 
offers as the best way to read Kant’s account, argues that it is mistaken to see any 
account as talking about an activity of the imagination prior to determinate concept 
formation, since our sensory empirical based experience is determinately governed, 
so that conceptual determination must be prior to, and a condition of, recognizing a 
particular harmony that this determinate cognition offers. Guyer's idea is that the 
aesthetic judgement 'goes beyond' the determinate empirical judgement or 
recognition that makes up the conceptual component of perception, but that this 
conceptual determination must be in place in the first place:   
On such an approach, the free and harmonious play of imagination and 
understanding should be understood as a state of mind in which the 
manifold of intuition induced by the perception of an object and presented 
by the imagination to the understanding is recognized to satisfy the rules for 
the organization of that manifold dictated by the determinate concept or 
concepts on which our recognition and identification of the object of this 
experience depends. (Guyer (2005): 98-99) 
Towards the end of the last chapter it was pointed out that Rudolf Makkreel does in 
fact hold a metacognitive position insofar as he is arguing that determinant and 
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reflective judgement are two distinct kinds of judgemental acts whose functions do 
not merge, and where determination of the empirical has to be in place before 
reflective judgement (as that which ‘is not so much about objects per se as about 
their relations to us’ (Makkreel (2006): 223)) has anything to act upon38. Since 
aesthetic judgement is a paradigm instance of a reflective judgement, it turns out 
that determination must be in place prior to this subsequent reflective activity, and 
again, ‘The aesthetic judgement transforms an empirical determinant judgement 
about an object into a disinterested reflective judgement that expresses a subjective 
assessment’ (Makkreel (2006): 233). Clearly then, with any approach to and 
interpretation of Kant's account of the harmony of the faculties, a great deal hinges 
upon the exact relations between determinant and reflective judgement and whether 
there can be a ‘merely’ reflective judgement, prior to and independently of 
determination. What is clear from the outset however, is that Kant’s own account 
that the judgement of taste is in some sense non-conceptually determined (the 
aesthetic judgement being a ‘judgement on the purposiveness of the object which is 
not grounded on any available concept of the object and does not furnish one’ (CJ 
5:190)), needs to be accounted for. For by becoming clear in what sense this kind of 
judgement and its resulting phenomenological character doesn’t involve concepts as 
its determining ground, we shall be able to be clearer as to the extent of 
determination that must be in place before a judgement of taste is possible. 
 
Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism 
Key to this task is understanding the exact sense in which imagination and 
understanding can be said to be in a harmony with each other when determining the 
aesthetic response. It is clear that the understanding is the faculty of concepts, as this 
is how Kant characterises it at (CJ 5:190). In this section Kant also referred to the 
imagination as ‘the faculty of a priori intuitions’. Given that the content of an 
intuition insofar as it is conditioned by what is outside of us is empirical, what is a 
priori in our intuition must be what is generated through the active faculty in 
intuition, which (as was noted at the close of the last chapter), in the third critique 
                                                          
38 In The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited (2005)  Guyer, categorises Makkreel, based upon his 1990 
book, as a ‘precognitivist’, which in his 2006 article, Makkreel objects to, stating that Guyer’s 
‘metacognitive interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic harmony… has some parallels with my meta-
experiential approach.’ For Makkreel's full objection see (Makkreel (2006): 242, fn.69).  
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Kant often refers to as apprehension39. Because of this reference to apprehension, there 
is perhaps a temptation to locate this activity of the imagination in a highly pre-
conceptual activity governed by the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of 
reproduction of the A-deduction. In our discussion of this however, we noted that 
although there may be a sense in which the syntheses of apprehension and 
reproduction may generate a kind of representational content apart from being 
brought under a concept (recognition), this kind of content wouldn’t be actual 
experience, as Kant accounts for it  (we noted that Kant states that it must only be 
possible for the ‘I think’ to attach itself to our representations, not that it must actually 
accompany them). In order for a representation to be so determinate as to be able to 
an actual one, i.e. an object before me which I can respond to, then it must be subject 
to the unity of apperception which is an act of the understanding. Insofar as the 
object or intuition is given empirically, or even constructed a priori, then it must 
involve a synthesis under the concept so that it can be my representation. 
Consequently, when Kant refers to the imagination as apprehending the object, we 
have good reason for thinking that this cannot be taken to mean an apprehension 
prior to the concept, but must be an apprehension made possible through the 
concept. 
To this extent we are in agreement with Karl Ameriks arguments against a strongly 
non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s account of aesthetic cognition. In Interpreting 
Kant’s Critiques, Ameriks indicates that he actually regrets Kant’s remarks that an 
aesthetic judgement pleases without a concept, as he sees such remarks as having 
caused a confusion that can mislead interpreters in attempting to ground a synthesis 
in the imagination that isn’t determined by concepts40. In our study so far we have 
seen that there is no making sense of the idea that there can be a perceptual content 
(not the (animal) perception of the Jäsche Logic, but the perception on the first 
                                                          
39 This is also perspicuous in the first Introduction, where in relation to the role of concepts in his 
account Kant writes, ‘A merely reflecting judgement about a given object, however, can be aesthetic if 
(before its comparison with others is seen), the power of judgement, which has no concept ready for 
the given intuition, holds the imagination (merely in the apprehension of the object) together with the 
understanding (in the presentation of a concept in general) and perceives a relation of the two 
faculties of cognition which constitute the subjective, merely sensitive condition of the objective use of 
the power of judgement in general (namely the agreement of those two faculties with each other)'. (FI 
20:223-4) 
40 This is what Paul Guyer has taken Fiona Hughes to task for in Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology: Form 
and World (2007) (about which more will be said toward the end of the chapter), and likewise what 
Karl Ameriks has taken Hanna Ginsborg to task for in The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition 
(1990). Ameriks criticises Ginsborg for on the one hand recognising the conceptual nature of ordinary 
perception and on the other hand defending a strong non-conceptualism with regard to Kant's 
aesthetic theory. See (Ameriks (2003): Chapter 13) 
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Critique) that isn’t determined by the concept. We have argued that the formal 
intuition of space and time as formal intuitions are non-conceptual constructs, yet at 
the same time space and time as formal a priori intuitions are not perceptions, but are 
the pre-condition of spatial and temporal constructs and which are a product of the 
imagination. For Ameriks it is an orthodoxy for staying loyal to the text of the third 
and first Critique's that such writers go astray, and asks whether a ‘mild-revisionism’ 
isn’t needed in order to maintain an intelligible position that keeps in mind the role 
of concepts at some stage in the aesthetic response. Ameriks is undoubtedly right to 
maintain the need for recognizing that concepts must be present at some stage, and 
we have seen that this must be the case in having an object stand before us in the 
first place. What I question however, is whether in recognizing the role of concepts 
in aesthetic cognition, we really need to construe this recognition as entailing a mild-
revisionism. If it is integral to an account of perceptual synthesis that concepts are 
involved in making such a synthesis possible, then this is an orthodox Kantian 
position which must be prevalent in the aesthetic case no less than any other. Again, 
the problem that the ‘orthodox’ would have is that insofar as the apprehension of 
imagination is said to involve a conceptual determination, this then blurs or annuls 
Kant’s distinction between the imagination as the faculty of intuitions and the 
understanding as the faculty of concepts. Insofar as imaginative syntheses involves 
recognition in the concept then it is an act of the understanding. It might perhaps be 
conceded along with Ameriks that Kant, ‘might have gone a little overboard in 
discouraging talk of concepts’ (Ameriks (2003): 314), insofar as this may push one 
into what Ameriks again calls a ‘radical’ interpretation regarding pre-conceptual 
syntheses41. In order to make sense of Kant’s account however, we can acknowledge 
the conceptual constraint upon imaginative content and argue that when 
imagination interacts and harmonises with the understanding in aesthetic cognition, 
the understanding here is thought of differently from the way it is thought of when it 
is active in synthesizing the manifold in imagination (which, in this initial case we 
may think of as the pre-condition of perception as such). It is this subsequent 
(second stage) activity of the understanding which the imagination isn’t governed by 
                                                          
41 Malcolm Budd, in 'The Pure Judgement of Taste as an Aesthetic Reflective Judgement' (2001), also 
signals the potentially misleading language of Kant's formulations (especially FI 20:224) in suggesting 
a quite radical non-conceptualism (or precognitivism according to Guyer's classification). Budd 
however argues that Kant's maintaining that the aesthetic judgement is not concerned with the 
concept does not thereby commit him to the radical non-conceptualism in question. For it is also 
apparent that the objects being something of a certain kind doesn't preclude our abstracting from this 
with regard solely to its form, where responding to the form is not a concern with the particular 
concept(s) that makes up the recognition of the object as a particular thing (Budd (2001): 253). The 
importance of this point will be become obvious later in this chapter. 
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in so far as it is apart from this faculty, and it will be this relation that will account 
for the special character of aesthetic judgement and that will also account for the 
sense in which aesthetic judgement can be said to please universally without a 
concept. How is this can occur will become apparent as we progress. 
 
An ‘aesthetic judgement of reflection’ 
As indicated, the importance of the role of reflective judgement in Kant’s account of 
the harmony of the faculties is prevalent throughout both introductions to the third 
Critique, and we have noted that section VII of the first Introduction is important for 
Kant’s making apparent the fact that aesthetic judgement is a species of reflective 
judgement. At the close of the last chapter we quoted a passage where Kant 
announces the ‘three actions of the self-active faculty of cognition’, (apprehension, 
comprehension and presentation (FI 20:220)), and we pointed out that the apprehension 
of forms in the imagination ‘can never take place without the reflecting power of 
judgement, even if unintentionally, at least comparing them to its faculty for relating 
intuitions to concepts’ (CJ 5:190). In the language of the first introduction this is 
possible because, ‘in the mere reflection on a perception it is not a matter of a 
determinate concept, but in general only of reflecting on the rule concerning a 
perception in behalf of the understanding, as a faculty of concepts.' (CJ 2:220) The 
generating of ‘a rule’, is the generating of a schema, as it is only the schema that, as a 
product of the imagination can provide an intuitive content which the 
understanding can respond to and which possesses something universal so that 
reflection is possible (‘we compare only what is universal in the rule of our 
apprehension’ (Refl. 2880, Ak. XVI, 557)). In this sense the schema mediates between 
intuition and concept in a certain way, and where, as remarked previously, because 
no determinate concept is involved, in this kind of reflection we can be said to 
schematize without a concept. 
Subsequent to the passage just remarked upon however (FI 20:220), Kant for the first 
time states that this kind of reflecting judgement, where we reflect on a general rule 
on behalf of the understanding, is an aesthetic  one, and Kant writes, 
If , then, the form of a given object in empirical intuition is so constituted that 
the apprehension of its manifold in the imagination agrees with the 
presentation of a concept of the understanding (though which concept be 
undetermined), then in the mere reflection understanding and imagination 
mutually agree for the advancement of their business, and the object will be 
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perceived as purposive merely for the power of judgement, hence the 
purposiveness will itself be considered as merely subjective; for which, 
further, no determinate concept of the object at all is required nor is one 
thereby generated, and the judgement itself is not a cognitive judgement. 
Such a judgement is called an aesthetic judgement of reflection. (FI 20:220-
21) 
Again the fact that no determinate concept is involved in the apprehension being 
brought into accord with the understanding is emphatically emphasized, and is 
something we need to bear in mind when discussing the cognitive nature of the 
aesthetic experience. We also learn, that it is the form of the object that conditions the 
aesthetic response. This is significant insofar as it is the form of the object that is 
what can be said to agree with the presentation of a concept so that it is the relevant 
content in the imaginations generating of a rule. It is in this sense also what is 
deemed as purposive for judgement (or purposive ‘merely for the power of 
judgement’). Because it is the form that determines the aesthetic response and is 
purposive for judgement, it is the spatial-dimensional element that we are 
responding to insofar as the objects spatial configuration is what can successfully 
agree with the faculty of exhibition or presentation. 
What is striking in Kant’s language within this passage and throughout the 
introduction is that it is not that any particular intuition is brought to the 
understanding, so that there is a resulting harmony based upon this imaginative 
exhibition (although we do respond to a particular object), but rather that the faculty 
of intuitions is brought into an accord or mutual agreement with the faculty of 
concepts, and that in this harmonious meeting the object is perceived not as 
purposive for any particular judgement, but as purposive for the power of 
judgement as such.  This does indeed appear to argue against  a precognitive 
reading of the harmony of the faculties (as Guyer characterises it), insofar as this 
precognitive interpretation is one would see the particular intuition as being good for 
a particular concept subsumption, but stops short of this actual subsumption. Thus it 
is as though a particularly beautiful flower were purposive for judgement and is 
easily brought under the concept as a particularly clear example of its concept, but 
stopped short of this subsumption. Of course, such an account appears unreasonable 
since it is highly implausible that we could recognize a flower and stop short of its 
subsumption under a concept (since the recognition entails this anyway). However, 
If anyone were to maintain such a position, the problem wouldn’t only this objection 
to the position but the fact that it sees the harmony in question as occasioned in 
individual rather than general terms. Of course it is the particular object that 
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occasions our response, but in responding to the form our pleasure is determined 
not by the fit between this flower and its resulting concept, but by the objects 
generating a harmony between the faculty of intuitions and the faculty of concepts 
generally speaking, which this particular flower instantiates.  
 
Aesthetic Pleasure 
It is not until section VIII of the first introduction however, that the aesthetic character 
of this kind of judgement is accounted for, which is that its response is determined 
by the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In this section Kant highlights the ambiguity 
that the term aesthetic brings with it. On the one hand aesthetic, for Kant, signifies 
that aspect of cognition whereby through the forms of our sensibility we stand in 
relation to objects, so that aesthetic indicates the sensory, spatiotemporal aspects of a 
cognition of a world of appearances (hence the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first 
Critique). There is also however the more typical, present day sense of aesthetic as we 
understand it, whereby aesthetic indicates that kind of response that is determined 
by the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. As a subjective response to our being 
affected by an object, this kind of response is non-cognitive insofar as it is not 
concerned with cognising any objective property of the object, but has sensation as its 
determining ground. Further on in the text Kant distinguishes between two kinds of 
aesthetic judgements (judgements based upon a response to pleasure or 
displeasure). There are aesthetic judgements of sense, and aesthetic judgements of 
reflection. The former is not connected with the faculty of cognition at all, and is 
‘related immediately through sense to the feeling of pleasure' (FI 20:224), and an 
example of such a judgement would be the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the 
taste of wine. An aesthetic judgement of reflection on the other hand, because it is ‘to 
be regarded as grounded in special principles of the power of judgement’ (FI 20:224), 
has a special reference to our cognitive powers. 
As far as the non-conceptualist/conceptualist debate goes, in a certain sense the non-
conceptuality of aesthetic cognition is indisputable, insofar as what determines such 
a response, or grounds such judgements is a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Were 
it the case that such a judgement was determined through a concept (of what the 
object is supposed to be), ‘in that case the judgement would not be made in relation 
to pleasure and displeasure, hence it would not be a judgement of taste’ (FI 20:225). 
This feature of aesthetic judgement - its determination through feeling - is what has 
lead Robert Hanna to declare that aesthetic judgement as such can be said to indicate 
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that there is a meaningful non-conceptual content within this sphere of cognitive 
activity42. This level of non-conceptual activity is here what Hanna calls ‘moderate’, 
insofar as accounting for the total phenomenon (the perceptual experience) is 
determined at some stage by concepts. Very strong conceptual content for Hanna 
would be a cognitive activity that could be accounted for as a phenomenon 
completely without reference to concepts, and he considers an intuitive content prior 
to a concept to be such an example. Earlier on we noted that Karl Ameriks 
challenges the non-conceptualist of Kantian aesthetic judgement to specify in what 
sense non-conceptualism is operative and to recognize that total non-conceptualism 
is inherently untenable, or ‘radical’, insofar as it fails to acknowledge or account for 
the conceptual element that is necessarily involved in the representation of an object 
in the first place. Hanna does in fact meet this requirement of Ameriks insofar as 
Hanna sees the non-conceptualism involved in aesthetic experience as moderate, 
arguing that even though a given object falls under some concept (qua perceptually 
apprehended), ‘this conceptual fact is wholly irrelevant to its being beautiful, since 
its being beautiful consists merely in the relation between its phenomenal form and 
the pleasure we experience in the harmonious interplay of our cognitive faculties’ 
(Hanna (2005): 266). Indeed for Guyer, it is likely that Hanna would turn out to be, 
like himself, a metacognitivist, since Hanna sees concepts involved in aesthetic 
cognition (like Guyer he uses Kant’s example of perceiving a rose as beautiful). The 
particular character of the response however, is determined by something apart from 
(something going beyond) the conceptual instantiation, which must be a fittedness of 
the intuitive content presented by the form for the understanding as the faculty of 
concepts. 
I believe that Hanna is right in seeing the pleasure in aesthetic response, insofar as it 
is what determines this response, as what accounts for a non-conceptuality of 
aesthetic judgement, and to my mind, this can be conceded without resorting to any 
mild-revisionism. However, in acknowledging this it is important to recognize the 
character of this pleasure as the determining ground of aesthetic response. As noted, 
with an aesthetic judgement of sense, i.e. the taste of wine, the judgement isn’t 
related to the faculty of cognition, so that it is just a modification of our state, 
whereas the aesthetic judgement of reflection does relate to the faculty of cognition 
and its special principles (of the power of judgement). These special principles 
insofar as they belong to the power of judgement can only be principles of 
purposivity, and in terms of the difference between the two kinds of aesthetic 
                                                          
42 See Hanna's 'Kant and Nonconceptual Content' (2005). 
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judgement it matters whether the reflection on a representation precedes the feeling 
of pleasure or whether the pleasure precedes the reflection: 
For if the reflection on a given representation precedes the feeling of pleasure 
(as the determining ground of the judgement), then the subjective 
purposiveness is thought before it is felt in its effect, and to this extent, 
namely in terms of its principles, the aesthetic [reflecting] judgement belongs 
to the higher faculty of cognition and indeed to the power of judgement, 
under whose subjective but nevertheless still universal conditions the 
representation of the object is subsumed. (FI 20:225) 
Kant thus highlights the priority of the reflecting act itself in relation to the feeling of 
pleasure, which indicates that reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure 
alone would not be adequate in accounting for the particular nature of aesthetic 
reflecting judgement. Only insofar as this relation is in place can there be any hope 
of securing a universal claim for any given aesthetic reflective judgement, and to this 
end Kant states that, ‘for if the aesthetic judgement carries such a claim with it 
[universal validity], then it also makes a claim that its determining ground must lie 
not merely in the feeling of pleasure and displeasure alone, but at the same time in 
a rule of the higher faculty of cognition, in this case, namely, in the rule of the power 
of judgement’ (FI 20:225). Consequently, understanding the kind of non-
conceptualism of Kant’s aesthetic account must also recognize the cognitive priority 
(the thought) which must precede and determine the aesthetic judgement of 
reflection (the feeling).  
The sense in which a subjective purposiveness is connected with the pleasure we 
take in an object as occasioning such purposiveness is developed in sections VI and 
VII of the published introduction. In section VI Kant makes an important remark 
regarding the connection between the subjective purposiveness experienced in 
aesthetic judgement and the special a priori principle unique to judgement. Kant 
writes that, 
The attainment of every aim is combined with the feeling of pleasure; and, if 
the condition of the former is an a priori representation, as in this case a 
principle for the reflecting power of judgement in general, then the feeling of 
pleasure is also determined through a ground that is a priori and valid for 
everyone; and indeed merely through the relation of the object to the faculty 
of cognition, without the concept of purposiveness in this case having the 
least regard to the faculty of desire, and thus being entirely distinct from any 
practical purposiveness of nature. (CJ 5:187) 
85 
 
Although Kant at this stage is referring to reflective judgement generally, i.e. insofar 
as it is concerned with both aesthetic and teleological judging, Kant’s point is that it 
is the aim of our judgement, through its special principle, to find an orderliness in 
nature that once found is the source of a pleasure. If we find nature counter-
purposive, i.e. not adapted to our search for order or systematicity, then this is the 
source of a displeasure. What is important for Kant is that this pleasure is 
determined by the contingency of the order that we find in nature, and as Kant 
accounts for this, it seems that the pleasure obtained through this contingency is due 
to the fact that we are actually able to cognize order in what seems inherently 
chaotic, or at least so diverse as to threaten to overwhelm our desire to grasp it 
according to some order. Thus whereas unifying the data of the senses in accordance 
with the categories is not the kind of thing that determines a pleasurable experience, 
since the understanding here proceeds ‘unintentionally, in accordance with its 
nature’ (CJ 5:187), with reflecting judgement there is a more of a conscious aim 
which is aware of the fact that there is a potential for failure. It is because of the 
intentional as opposed to unintentional act of finding order in the contingent that the 
consciousness of potential failure or potential disorder, when not experienced, so 
that order is found (our aim is achieved), that there results a noticeable pleasure.43  
Although Kant has been referring to the purposiveness of nature insofar as it is 
common to both teleological and aesthetic judgement, section VII is concerned solely 
with the aesthetic representation of the purposiveness of nature. As noted this 
representation of purposiveness is aesthetic insofar as it is concerned with the feeling 
of pleasure or displeasure. What is important here is that we are not concerned with 
any determinate cognition, and we cannot be since, as Kant points out, it is precisely 
because of the aesthetic character of the experience that the experienced 
purposiveness cannot be predicated of nature as a property of nature. In this sense 
Kant states that the purposiveness precedes the actual cognition of an object, and in 
this since it isn’t denied that an actual cognition of an object takes place. It is just that 
the purposiveness of the object, in the aesthetic case, isn’t derived from the actual 
cognition. Thus it is as though we weren’t actually concerned with what the object is, 
but just with the purposiveness exemplified in the ‘mere apprehension of the form’, 
so that aside from any concern with determinate cognition we enjoy just the fact that 
it is purposive for cognition in the first place. 
                                                          
43 Although Kant acknowledges that the pleasure of discovering that nature is orderable into species 
and genera becomes dulled after we have become used to it, we can, through ‘study’ or reflection 
experience this pleasure again. 
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Free Play 
So in aesthetic reflective judgement we are experiencing an element of cognition 
whereby we not are concerned with the application of concepts with regard to 
determinate cognition, but with a sensation, whereby through this sensation we can 
be said to be aware that what we are experiencing is itself purposive for cognition. 
This however is just to say that in aesthetic experience we experience a 
purposiveness or harmony between the faculty of the imagination and the faculty of 
the understanding insofar as the former is concerned with the apprehension of 
objects as spatiotemporally unified, and the latter is concerned with bringing this 
intuitive content under concepts – although of course no actual subsumption need 
be required and is irrelevant to the actual experience in question.  We have argued 
however that it would be mistaken to read this account as allowing a scenario 
whereby no determinate content, as conceptually determined, is involved in the 
representation, so that the harmony of the faculties thereby be read as a scenario 
where the apprehensional content is entirely conceptually undetermined and 
purposive for cognition just insofar as it stops short of any actual cognitive 
application. In this sense it is perhaps natural to adopt Guyer's position who, as we 
have seen, offers an account of the harmony of the faculties which he calls 
'metacognitive', whereby the harmony of the faculties, in their free play, ‘goes 
beyond’ the determinate concept in accounting for the phenomenology of aesthetic 
experience. Although Kant is explicit in stating that aesthetic reflective judgement 
isn’t concerned with determinate cognition, for Guyer it would miss Kant's point to 
say that determinate concepts aren’t involved in the aesthetic experience at all, for 
although they are present, it is just that they are not relevant to the particular 
character of aesthetic judgement. The trouble with Guyer’s account however is that 
in putting forward the metacognitive approach, he seems to maintain that quite 
highly determinate empirical concepts are always involved in cognition, and hence 
always present within any aesthetic experience. In arguing this Guyer appeals to the 
fact that Kant, in his examples of aesthetic judgements, always uses examples with 
determinate conceptual content, such as roses, hummingbirds, and crustacea, and he 
argues that,  
The ordinary assumption about judgements of taste, which Kant clearly 
shares with the rest of us, is that the objects of such judgements must be 
identified by means of particular empirical concepts and that we must be 
cognizant of the application of such concepts to them in order to make such 
judgements, just as is the case with any other kinds of judgements about 
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objects, in spite of whatever features are distinctive of aesthetic judgements. 
(Guyer (2005): 94-95) 
In developing this argument Guyer proceeds to argue that in making an aesthetic 
judgement we do not make an indeterminate reference but always a determinate 
one, stating that, ‘An aesthetic judgement does not have the form “This is beautiful” 
but rather “This F is beautiful”: this hummingbird, this sunset, this painting, this 
symphony, [etc,]’, and thus we need to individuate each object we come across 
empirically so that we can ‘assess our aesthetic responses to objects or even respond 
to them at all’ (Guyer (2005): 95).  
There are number of things to be said about Guyer’s argument. The first is that it 
strikes as inaccurate to state that aesthetic judgements never have the form ‘This is 
beautiful’, but rather ‘This F is beautiful’. To be sure, it may well be the case that in 
the majority of cases where we predicate beauty of something the subject has a 
highly determinate conceptual content. But this can hardly said to be always the 
case, and it is perfectly reasonable to believe that we can have an aesthetic response 
to a whole host of representations that are, to a large degree, conceptually 
indeterminate. If we were to travel through regions of space for instance, there 
would be a great deal of phenomena for which we would not possess the concept 
and to which we could have a genuine aesthetic response. In such a scenario (an 
interplay of various bodies for instance) we would just say ‘this is beautiful’, or ‘that 
is beautiful’, and if pushed as to what we were referring to we would just say 
something along the lines of “I don’t know what it is, it's just that thing”, or even just 
“that thing" (or collection of things). Of course, in referring to a thing we are in effect 
referring to a subject of which we are predicating that it is beautiful, and so in this 
sense the judgement does have the form ‘This F is beautiful’. Nevertheless this 
doesn’t concede Guyer’s argument since in stating ‘This is beautiful’ we are referring 
to a content, and adding ‘thing’ is superfluous in terms of adding anything to this 
statement, and so if Guyer’s second kind of statement (“This F is beautiful’) is to be 
substantively different from the first it must be only insofar as the predicate holder 
(the F) is a more determinate concept than ‘thing’ would indicate. What ‘thing’ in 
fact signifies is just an indeterminate concept (although this isn’t necessarily the case 
as we may refer to something as ‘thing’ knowing fine well what it is), and we do 
have plenty of indeterminate representations (remember Kant’s example of the 
savage and the house). It is true however that a more determinate conceptual 
understanding of what is in front of us can change our initial aesthetic response, and 
Kant’s examples within the text of third Critique testify to this; where, for instance, a 
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building might be ornamented so as to encourage a pleasant aesthetic response and 
perhaps ordinarily would, except that the building is a church; and a human body 
might be tattooed with all kinds of wonderful designs which we would ordinarily 
respond well to, except that it is human being whose dignity (for Kant) is violated 
through tattooing. So although it would be right to point out that our aesthetic 
responses can be and often are changed depending upon the degree of 
determination in our representations, it is wrong to argue, as Guyer does, that we 
are unable to have an aesthetic response to something that doesn’t have a highly 
determinate conceptual content.    
We say ‘highly determinate’ here because we do of course recognize that there must 
be a degree of determinacy in any representation, qua represented. This really seems 
to be Guyer’s point as he appeals to Kant’s theory of knowledge as outlined in the 
first Critique in arguing that any representation must be determined conceptually. 
Guyer’s mistake seems to be that in recognising that any representation must be 
empirically determinate to some degree, the representation is also therefore 
empirically determinate in a full degree as a reflected representation. We have seen 
however that empirical concept formation comes only through subsequent acts of 
the understanding where through the comparison/abstraction/reflection of the Jäsche 
Logic we form more determinate empirical concepts (just as we have argued that 
some principle unique to judgement enables this formation). Prior to this more 
determinate conceptual representation it is possible to have representations which 
are still conceptually determinate, and we can have an aesthetic response to a 
particle collider if it stands before us, without having the least clue what it is, other 
than a ‘thing’, i.e. something with substance, extension, colour, etc. Consequently, 
although it is true that we ‘must’ determine any representation before us through 
concepts, the degree of determinacy mustn’t necessarily be at the high level Guyer 
argues must be present in order for us to have an aesthetic response in the first place. 
Consequently, there is a definite appeal to the metacognitive approach insofar as it 
argues that a degree of determinacy must be present in any representation, and a 
reading of this kind forecloses the possibility of any precognitive reading which 
would see the relevant activity of the imagination as occurring at the pre-conceptual 
level, where it would be generating content through some non-conceptual means 
and instantiating a harmony insofar as this particular content is purposive for the 
initial act of the understanding in providing a first determination for this content. 
Although Kant repeatedly emphasizes that in mere reflection we are not concerned 
with determinate cognition, this nevertheless doesn’t preclude the possibility, and 
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the fact of, there being a determinate content in the aesthetic representation. The 
point is that in accounting for the harmony in question and its phenomenological 
character we are looking for something very different, that does indeed ‘go beyond’ 
a question of determinacy. 
 
Longuenesse and Conceptual Indeterminacy 
By way of contrast it is interesting to compare Guyer's account of the harmony of the 
faculties with Béatrice Longuenesse's, since where for Guyer the level of 
determinacy (and our going beyond it) is an important feature of aesthetic 
judgement, for Longuenesse it is essentially the indeterminacy of aesthetic judgement 
that is of key importance. This aspect of her argument stems from her understanding 
of Kant’s account of the role of reflection in cognition generally, so that for 
Longuenesse, although a unique faculty of reflective judgement becomes an explicit 
concern for Kant only by the time of the third critique, this shouldn’t blind us to the 
fact that an important role for reflection has always been present in Kant’s account of 
the genesis of cognition and concept formation. What is characteristic of the third 
critique’s account of reflective judgement, isn’t the fact that it postulates a faculty of 
reflective judgement as such, as a special act that enables us to arrive at universals, 
but that that there is such a thing as a merely reflective judgement, and we have seen 
in the introductions to the third critique that Kant’s reference to a merely reflective 
judgement is often, and clearly important to his account of the character of aesthetic 
judging. However, there is a difficulty in Longuenesse's argument that might make 
it appear that she is offering a precognitive account of the kind that Guyer has 
criticised as being misinformed, and which Allison has also criticised as being 
flawed44.  Makkreel’s criticisms of Longuenesse’s account of reflective judgement 
does in part also appear to be motivated by the fact the she appears to offer a kind of 
precognitive (Makkreel uses the term 'proto-cognitive') account of the harmony of 
the faculties (Makkreel (2006): 241-44), and so it is important to explore her argument 
with an aim to clarification. 
We have seen that it is only with reference to Kant’s account of reflection that 
anything like an adequate account of concept formation is possible. Of course it 
wasn’t enough just to appeal to an act of reflection in arriving at an empirical 
concept without begging the question as to how any particular instance was 
recognized as having the marks that already pick out this object as an instance of a 
                                                          
44 See (Allison (2001): 354, n.2) 
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particular kind. Thus, in following Allison and Longuenesse we saw that a more 
sophisticated argument was needed in grounding Kant’s account of concept 
formation, and that it was necessary to appeal to various acts, such as aesthetic 
reflection, transcendental reflection, and pre-conceptual schemata, in order to 
provide this. Indeed, this provided a phenomenological apparatus for pre-discursive 
cognition insofar as there turn out to be various stages of cognition which can be 
present without an overt recognition (through a rule common to apprehension) of 
what is before us, and we saw that there is good reason to suppose that when a 
savage has a mere intuition of a house, not only does he not possess the concept of 
what is before him, but also doesn’t possess the schema, as a reflected content. So 
reflection turns out to be necessary for more determinate cognition, and for the 
function of determinant judgement. A difficulty with Longuenesse’s account 
however, is that she appears to locate the particular character of aesthetic judgement 
in just this successional account of the arrival at determinate cognition, and in fact 
sees the aesthetic judgement as a failed attempt to arrive at a conceptual 
determination. Thus with reference to merely reflective judgements Longuenesse 
writes that, 
This restrictive modifier [merely] is meant to deny that these judgements are 
in any sense determinative; they are purely reflective. They differ in this 
regard from other judgements relating to the sensible given, which are not 
merely reflective, but determinative as well. What makes judgements merely 
reflective is that in them, the effort of the activity of judgement to form 
concepts fails. And it fails because it cannot succeed. This is the case in 
“merely reflective” aesthetic judgement, where the agreement of imagination 
and understanding is of such a nature that it cannot be reflected under any 
concept. (Longuenesse (1998): 164) 
As Longuenesse has pointed out, it obliges us to recognise the merely reflective 
judgement as key to accounting for the particular character of aesthetic judgement. 
The fact that it is merely reflective indicates that what is especially characteristic of 
such judgement is the fact that there is an aspect of determination (as Kant 
persistently indicates) that is essentially irrelevant in accounting for its particular 
character. Longuenesse’s ambition is locate the particular character of aesthetic 
judgement in just this feature of reflective judgement, going so far as to argue that an 
actual determination is entirely irrelevant to the phenomenon of the harmony of the 
faculties. It must be asked however, at what level of determination is Longuenesse 
arguing the aesthetic reflective judgement doesn't reach? In the section just quoted 
Longuenesse states that the restrictive modifier denies that aesthetic reflective 
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judgements are in any sense determinative, whereas in the following sentence 
Longuenesse states that in this sense these judgements differ from other judgements 
that relate to the sensible given, insofar these other judgements are determinative as 
well. We know by now however that the sensible given is not the sensible given of 
the empiricists, but is constructed through the synthetic activity of the agent, so that 
in this sense a degree of determination is present in the perceptual recognition of 
aesthetic judgement. This degree of determinacy does in fact become apparent when 
Longuenesse is drawing a comparison or likeness between aesthetic reflective 
judgements and the "judgements of perception" of the first Critique. This kind of 
judgement contrasts with the categorical application that goes on in "judgements of 
experience" (which for Longuenesse are arrived at through the acts of 
comparison/reflection/abstraction and concerns the application of the categories as 
universal reflected representations as discussed in the previous chapter), so that, 
[Here we have] another dimension to the "application" of the categories [...] 
For although judgements of perception do not apply categories in the sense 
that they do not subsume empirical objects under categories understood as 
"universal and reflected representations" (Kant's definition for concepts in 
general), they nevertheless do presuppose  synthesis according to the categories, 
those "blind" syntheses of imagination that the categories, as full-fledged 
discursive concepts, "universally represent." (Longuenesse (1998): 165) 
Thus it is apparent that when Longuenesse sees aesthetic reflective judgement as 
non-determinate this isn't a complete indeterminacy, since as perceptual constructs 
perceptions must have a synthetic unity arrived at through the sortal functions of the 
categories. However, although Longuenesse is arguing for a degree of determination 
in the aesthetic reflective judgement, it is not clear that it matches up with the actual 
nature of our aesthetic experience. This is because, as discussed, aesthetic judgement, 
although not as necessarily determinate as Guyer argues for, does have a fairly high 
degree of determinacy in its perceptual recognition. Thus it may seem odd to think 
that the aesthetic judgement has failed at determination insofar as I see that what I 
am calling beautiful is a bunch of lilies, and not just a conceptually indeterminate 
sensible given. This feature of Longuenesse's account is what has lead Allison to 
object to it, asking in what sense can an aesthetic judgement be a failed one when it 
is not aiming at determination. Longuenesse has responded to Allison's criticisms in 
a separate article, and one of the merits of this dialogue is that it helps us attain a 
precision with reference to Longuenesse's position. 
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In responding to Allison's criticism that the aesthetic reflective judgement cannot be 
said to fail since it isn't aiming at determination, Longuenesse states that she agrees, 
but that nevertheless a sense of failure is still appropriate. In explaining she 
highlights one of the most appropriate passages that Allison writes in stating his 
overall position with regard to his understanding of Kant's account of the harmony 
of the faculties, where Allison, in Kant's Theory of Taste, writes 
The function attributed to the imagination in mere reflection is not that 
different from the one assigned to it in cognition [...]. The difference is only 
that in the mere reflection involved in a judgement of taste, the imagination 
does not exhibit the schema of a specific concept under which the object can 
be subsumed in a determinative cognitive judgement. Instead, it exhibits a 
pattern or order (form), which suggests an indeterminate number of possible 
schematisations (or conceptualisations), none of which is fully adequate, 
thereby occasioning further reflection or engagement with the object (Allison 
(2001): 51) 
It is apparent why Longuenesse is in  agreement with Allison on this account, for 
Allison here states that the object is not subsumed under a determinate concept, but 
has an indeterminacy that allows for a kind of open-ended reflection or engagement 
with the objects formal properties. What is more is that the object suggests an 
indeterminate number of possible schematisations, so that according to Guyer's 
classifications, Longuenesse, insofar as she is in agreement with Allison on this 
point, appears to be putting forward something of a multicognitive account, 
whereby the object is purposive for an indeterminate amount of conceptual fits but 
not any particular one. Again however, the problem becomes apparent: if there is no 
subsumption under a particular concept, how is it that with the aesthetic reflective 
judgement we are invariably aware of what it is we have having an aesthetic 
response to? This of course is Guyer's criticism of the multicognitive approach, 
where the argument is that this account fails to see that the aesthetic judgement is 
already at a quite high degree of conceptual determination, and is not at some 
precognitive stage in its manifestation. However, although it is perhaps tempting to 
concede Guyer's argument here, it is important to recall the way Kant has phrased 
his argument regarding the harmony of the faculties; 
If , then, the form of a given object in empirical intuition is so constituted that 
the apprehension of its manifold in the imagination agrees with the 
presentation of a concept of the understanding (though which concept be 
undetermined), then in the mere reflection understanding and imagination 
mutually agree for the advancement of their business, and the object will be 
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perceived as purposive merely for the power of judgement [...], for which, 
further, no determinate concept of the object at all is required nor is one 
thereby generated, and the judgement itself is not a cognitive judgement. (FI 
20:220-21) 
We can see here that Kant is explicit in stating that no determinate concept is 
generated in the aesthetic reflective judgement, and nor is one required, for it is not 
concerned with this kind of judging at all (determinate judgement). What becomes 
apparent then is that the aesthetic reflective judgement is a specific kind of 
judgement or reaction that is altogether of a different kind from determinant 
judgement. Even though there is usually a high level of determination making up 
the perceptual content of the aesthetic judgement, this is essentially another matter, 
so that the concern of the aesthetic judgement is with, quite literally, another matter, 
viz. the formal properties of the object, which are suggesting schematisations 
without being restricted to any particular one. Thus what we are saying is that a use 
of multicognitivist terminology isn't by itself enough to put one into the false 
position Guyer ascribes to it. Guyer sees the language of the multicognitive 
approach as committing itself to a position whereby the pre-conceptual intuition is 
suggesting a number of possible fits without settling on any, whereas on his account, 
the concept is already determined or arrived at, with the free play going beyond this 
determinate concept in its purposiveness for judgement as such. However, the 
aesthetic judgement is an aesthetic response regardless of the degree of conceptual 
determinacy that makes up our recognition of the object, and our aesthetic response 
is in no sense diminished just because we do not know what we are responding to. 
This highlights the fact that the aesthetic judgement, just as a pure aesthetic reaction, 
is not concerned with the determination in the judgement at all. Thus where Guyer 
states that the nature of the aesthetic judgement is that it goes beyond the conceptual 
determination that makes up the perceptual recognition, it really seems more correct 
to say that we have an aesthetic reflective judgement regardless of the fact that there is 
a degree of conceptual determinacy making up the perceptual recognition. Thus it is 
not with the object as a particular kind of object that the character of the aesthetic 
judgement is to be characterised (and the going beyond this), but just with the 
formal configuration of the object, which happens to be a bunch of flowers.45 Where 
the problem with Longuenesse's account might be thought to lie however, is with 
her continued insistence that the aesthetic reflective judgement is a failed one. In her 
                                                          
45 This is not to say that the fact that it is a particular kind of object is not important to an overall 
aesthetic assessment, where the importance of an object as a symbol for instance, comes into 
consideration. 
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response to Allison, Longuenesse states that aesthetic reflective judgement is a failed 
cognitive one because 'aesthetic judgement starts where the search for concepts 
collapses' (Longuenesse (2003): 146) , again making it apparent that Longuenesse sees 
the aesthetic reflective act as part of an overall task of concept formation. Through 
our evaluation however we can attain a clearer sense in which the aesthetic 
judgement can be said to fail, even though there will be a degree of determinacy and 
therefore conceptual success in the perceptions having been formed, and this is 
because the aesthetic reflective judgement is concerned with something other than 
the determinate conceptual content that governs our perception of what the object is. 
This is to say that the aesthetic reflective judgement is performed regardless of the fact 
that a determinant content has already been obtained. Thus if an object briefly flits 
before my vision this is often enough to judge determinately what the object is, 
insofar as I possess the schema for it. Thus I may have briefly seen a chair. This by 
itself however may not be enough for us to be able to pass an aesthetic judgement on 
it, and we may feel that in order to make an aesthetic evaluation we need to spend 
some time reflecting upon the object, taking in its formal configurations and certain 
elements of its detail before we are in a position to pass an aesthetic judgement. Thus 
the aesthetic judgement is a specific kind of activity where the faculty of judgement 
continues to engage with the object even though categorisation is already obtained 
through the same reflective act that continues to reflect upon the objects form. Out of 
a kind of cognitive habit the mind always approaches objects with an aim towards 
objective determination, but soon finds itself engaged in another activity. In the first 
Critique Kant testifies to this continuous engagement with objects, where he writes 
that, 'Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but the understanding gives us rules. It 
is always busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of 
rule in them' (A126). Longuenesse's position is essentially that with the aesthetic 
reflective judgement this searching for a rule on behalf of the understanding fails, so 
that 'some sort of rule' is not found, but that instead we find a purposiveness for the 
faculty of rules as such, so that the failure to find a rule or concept is 'a welcome 
failure [where] knowing becomes an inferior goal, enjoying [] the superior one: the 
"purposiveness without a purpose" of aesthetic judgement' (Longuenesse (2003): 
146)46. 
                                                          
46 In spite of my defence of Longuenesse here, and the sense in which the aesthetic judgement is a 
failed cognitive one, I still think that the choice of the term 'failed' is somewhat misleading, insofar as 
we have argued that the aesthetic judgement is concerned with something other than determinate 
content. What I have tried to show is what I think Longuenesse is trying to say in saying that the 
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Issues with Guyer's Account 
Although we have criticised certain elements of Guyer's classification this isn't to say 
that we are in a complete rejection of it, for there are elements of it that certainly 
seem valid as far as categorisation goes, and we have recognised the good sense of 
his metacognitive approach. In fact, our own argument and defence of the 
multicognitive approach draws very close in certain respects to Guyer's 
metacognitive account. Thus although we argued that it is perhaps more accurate to 
state that with aesthetic reflective judgement we are engaged with the object in a 
certain way  regardless of the fact that a level of determination is involved in our 
recognition of what is before us (as opposed to Guyer's going beyond the determinant 
judgement in making an aesthetic judgement), there is still a common ground in our 
readings.  The disagreement is really with his account of what level of determinacy 
must be involved in a perceptual content, so that Guyer in his eagerness to refute the 
precognitive and multicognitive accounts has overstated the case when, as was 
discussed earlier, he argued that the aesthetic judgement always has a high level of 
determinate empirical content. We saw that this is not always necessarily true, so 
that my aesthetic judgement doesn't always take the form 'this F is beautiful', but 
might just take the form 'this is beautiful', without our having the least clue what it is 
we are responding to other than a thing of some kind. An account such as 
Longuenesse's can accommodate this fact much easier because her account does not 
stipulate that such a level of determination is necessarily involved in the aesthetic 
reaction, so that the 'savage' or person who has no sense of what is before him is still 
able to have a legitimate aesthetic response47. The point with the aesthetic reaction is 
that it is engaged with the object in spite of the fact that it may already have a highly 
determinate conceptual content, and this is because it is in the nature of the 
understanding to engage and re-engage with the object reflectively, with the aim  of 
finding some sort of rule. 
Consequently what we find through our analysis is a kind of synthesis of the various 
readings of the harmony of the faculties. We have reached this conclusion however 
through a criticism of Guyer's arguments, whilst at the same time embracing certain 
aspects of his metacognitive account. We indeed agree with Guyer that the best way 
to characterise aesthetic reflective judgement is through recognising that a degree of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
aesthetic reflective judgement in a sense fails, as this carries the sense of her argument, which 
ultimately I think is correct. 
47 In coming to possess the concept however, our aesthetic evaluation is liable to change, just in so far 
as our recognition of the objects having to satisfy a certain end in it is existence or function is 
prevalent. 
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empirical determination is usually present, and that the aesthetic judgement must in 
some sense be said to go beyond this content in accounting for its particular character. 
We also agree with Guyer (and Ameriks) that an account of the harmony of the 
faculties that located the relevant determinant of the aesthetic response at a highly 
indeterminate level of conceptualisation (so that for instance, no conceptualisation at 
all has been obtained, and an entirely pre-conceptual content is purposive for 
cognition as having suggestiveness of fit), is mistaken. One of the major problems 
with Guyer's account however is due to his specific understanding of what 
conceptual determination for Kant means, so that Guyer sees those writers who 
argue that the aesthetic judgement may or may not be (empirically) determinate as 
failing to see that all perceptual recognition, for Kant, has a determinate content. We 
have argued however that this is a mischaracterisation, for there is often a 
recognition of what determination means for Kant48. Thus Guyer in 'The Harmony of 
the Faculties Revisited', states that Malcolm Budd 'may also suggest the 
multicognitive approach when Budd writes that "the imagination's freedom consists 
in its not being adequate to some particular empirical concept - all that is necessary 
is that it should be adequate to some empirical concept of other."' (Guyer (2005): 86, 
n.2). It is apparent however that Budd is not advocating a multicognitive approach 
as Guyer characterises it. Budd recognises that the perceptual content involved in 
the recognition of the object is conceptually determined, qua Kant's definition of 
perception, and that consequently the aesthetic judgement does have a conceptual 
content (Budd (2001): 249-50). Budd can maintain this without having to subscribe to 
the level of determination that Guyer sees as necessarily involved in aesthetic 
response, so that Budd isn't suggesting that in free play the imagination plays with 
an entirely conceptually undetermined content which is purposive for the faculty of 
concepts. Thus what is apparent is that an interpreter may appear to offer a 
multicognitive approach in their stipulating that in aesthetic judging the imagination 
suggests an indeterminate number of fits, or a fittedness as such (or any other 
multicognitive terminology), but that they are just as close to a metacognitive 
reading than Guyer supposes. Thus in discussing the issue of the extent of 
conceptualisation in aesthetic judgement Budd writes: 
                                                          
48 I am here of course referring to Kant's statement in the first Critique that 'The same function that 
gives unity to the different representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of 
different representations in an intuition, which expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the 
understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions 
through which it brings the logical form of a judgement into concepts by means of the analytical 
unity, also brings transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of 
the manifold in intuition in general'. (CPR A79/B105) 
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[T]he only viable interpretation of Kant's view is that in judging an item's 
beauty, although it may well be recognised as being something of a certain 
kind, its being an instance of that kind must not be allowed to figure in the 
process of reflection, which must focus solely on the objects form. In fact, it is 
easy to see that the reflection involved in a judgement of taste must allow the 
subject to abstract from what the object is seen to be. For to perceive the 
object's form it is necessary to perceive the formed matter that composes the 
object, which (for visual perception) will involve seeing the distribution of 
apparent colours (chromatic or achromatic) across its facing surface, seeing it 
as being red here and white there, say. (Budd (2001): 253). 
Such a statement makes it apparent that Budd comes closer to our metacognitive 
reading - whereby the aesthetic reflective judgement takes place regardless of the 
fact that a level of determination is reached -  than to Guyer's multicognitive 
account. It is again apparent that this distinction between multicognitive and 
metacognitive is somewhat strained insofar as someone subscribing to the latter 
view may use terminology of the former view (according to how Guyer characterises 
it). This just signals however that the problem lies with Guyer's characterisation of 
the various readings, rather than with the categorisation itself. It also signals a 
misunderstanding of what determination means for Kant, so that if an object does 
not have a high degree of determinate content and is an unknown quality, Guyer's 
definition of aesthetic judgement as going beyond the determinate concept cannot be 
applied, for there is no determinate concept for the reaction to go beyond, and this 
just highlights that the aesthetic reaction is with something entirely other than the 
objects determinate empirical content, which it doesn't need to have in responding to 
the objects form49. 
                                                          
49 Rachel Zuckert in Kant on Beauty and Biology argues for a sense in which the conceptual recognition 
involved in a perception of the object can be conceptual, without being concerned with a determinate 
empirical conceptualisation, even though the object may well be empirically determined. Thus 
Zuckert writes that, '[The] presence of conceptual description in appreciation of beautiful form does 
not, however, render aesthetic judging of form a conceptually determined judgement[... S]uch 
concepts might be said to "indicate" that which we represent sensibly, viz., to point to this particular 
shade of yellow here, not to ground a judgement that the object is (to be categorised as) yellow. More 
significantly, however, we use concepts or identify properties in our estimation of beautiful objects in 
a way contrary to the way we usually, "logically," use them, in classifying objects or making objective 
judgements.' (Zuckert (2007): 199). In maintaining that there is a presence of 'conceptual description' 
in aesthetic judging, Zuckert posits a 'metacognitive' account since she recognises that perceptual 
recognition always has a degree of conceptually determinate content ('Like Ameriks, then, I take it to 
be consistent with Kant's position that there is "some use" of concepts, or a "kind of conceptualism" in 
aesthetic judging.' (Zuckert (2007): 200)). Zuckert however seems to share the same sense of the 
judgements taking place regardless of the fact that a determinate empirical content is present in the 
recognition of what the object is, where the concepts are used to a  different end ('Rather, [in aesthetic 
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Another example of Guyer's misunderstanding is reflected in his criticism of Fiona 
Hughes for what he sees as an illegitimate moving between two different accounts of 
the harmony of the faculties, so that he sees her as offering both a precognitive 
account and a version of his own metacogntive account. The reason he sees Hughes 
as offering a precognitve account is because she sees the aesthetic judgement as 
occurring prior to any determinate concept formation (Guyer (2009): 212). The 
reason he sees Hughes as offering a metacognitive account is because Hughes 
recognizes that concepts are a pre-condition of any experience whatsoever, and that 
the aesthetic judgement is just 'a heightened version of the pervasive coordination of 
the faculties necessary for any judgement [whatsoever].' (Hughes (2007): 155). 
Because Hughes appears to present these supposedly divergent strands of 
argumentation he essentially sees Hughes's overall account as confused, with 
unresolved tensions. Hughes account however is only confused if it is really the case 
that in her 'precognitive' account she sees Kant as positing the idea that in aesthetic 
experience the imaginative perceptual content that is stimulating the response is of a 
pre-conceptual kind which is found to be pleasing in its formal aspects just insofar as 
it is purposive for the faculty of concepts. Hughes however is quite aware that this is 
never really a possibility, for in her discussion of the threefold synthesis she 
highlights that although it may appear that Kant is suggesting an account whereby 
there can be a representational content not governed by concepts, this isn't really the 
case, and that 'Kant closes down this possibility [of pre-conceptual synthesis] in later 
versions of his argument, arguing that even apprehension requires unification under 
a concept' (Hughes (2007): 126). In addition, Hughes recognises that although the 
second edition of the deduction may appear to make room for an imaginatively 
apprehended content which may in turn make room for a aesthetic precognitivism, 
this is again only apparent, so that 'all sensory apprehension is cognitive' (Hughes 
(2007: 139). Hughes doesn't seem to be unsure about the fact that all representational 
content for Kant is governed by the application of concepts, and the confusion really 
seems to come from Guyer's failure to recognise that in a representations having a 
determinate content it doesn't thereby have to have a highly determinate empirical 
content, so that it can be quite indeterminate as far as a schematised representation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
judging] we use concepts (parallel line, curve, yellow, etc.) to point out certain properties of this 
particular object, as they are embedded in relations to one another that hold "in the given 
representation" alone (CJ 5:286).' (Zuckert (2007: 199)) . Thus the conceptual content that is used in 
aesthetic judging is concerned with something other than objective categorisation even though this 
categorisation may be arrived at, as an objective determining judgement.  
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goes. Hughes choice of language is perhaps unfortunate in her stating that in 
aesthetic judgement we 'stop short' of conceptual determination, but her essential 
point seems to be that in aesthetic judgement we continue to engage with the object 
regardless of the fact that a level of determination has been reached. Here the 
understanding continues to engage with the object in a continuing search for rules, 
but finds a new kind of pleasure in finding that the object is just purposive for the 
faculty of rules, or concepts (the understanding) as such. 
Thus once we begin to recognise that for these writers there is a recognition of what 
is involved in a objects being represented (viz. that a level of conceptual 
determination be involved), then these writers elude the straightforward 
classification that Guyer offers, and conform closer to the conclusions of the 
metacognitive approach than Guyer realises (although as we have just seen, Guyer 
acknowledged the metacognitive aspect of Hughes's account). Guyer's classification 
is valid just for those accounts that do want to maintain that a pre-conceptual 
imaginative content is present in the aesthetic response, whether they are 
precognitive (the intuition being purposive for a particular concept under which it is 
not yet subsumed), or multicognitive (the intuition being purposive for an 
indeterminate number of conceptual possibilities). Insofar as we have called 
Longuenesse's and Budd's account 'multicognitive' however, we are saying that they 
are not to be equated with Guyer's account of what multicognitive implies, so that a 
recognition of a level of determination in the perceptual content is prevalent. These 
accounts have agreed with our own metacognitive reading, and it remains to re-
iterate the nature of the play in question: insofar as Kant is explicit that it is not the 
purposiveness of the intuition for any particular concept, but just a purposivity for 
the faculty of concepts as such, then there is an indeterminacy in the playfulness of 
aesthetic judgement so that it suggests many (multi) possibilities of schematic 
ordering. There may be a more or less determinate conceptual content in the 
recognition of what the object is, but we respond to the object regardless of this 
determinate conceptual content, in responding to the objects formal properties, 
which may be found to be more or less purposive for cognition (the faculty of 
concepts) as such. 
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Chapter 5 
The Mathematical Sublime and the Role of the Infinite 
 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of Kant's account of the mathematical sublime, as 
it is presented within the First Section of the Second Book (the Analytic of the 
Sublime) of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgement50. In this Chapter I will 
focus closely on Kant's idea that our experience of the infinite is an important 
determinant of this kind of experience of the sublime, and I will look especially at 
Paul Crowther's argument that Kant's account of the role of the infinite is in fact 
superfluous to his account. I will challenge Crowther's argument on the grounds that 
I believe that the role of our experience of the infinite is in fact essential to our being 
able to have the relevant aesthetic response, and I will argue further that this is 
importantly connected with the way the imagination operates in being confronted 
with vast magnitudes; a feature of Kant's account that is quite neglected in the 
literature. In addition I will discuss further criticisms of Kant's account which 
stipulate that the experience of the sublime is too conceptually loaded, or 
determined, to be a purely aesthetic judgement. I will here argue that a resolution to 
this issue must be found in understanding that for Kant it is predominantly 
indeterminate, and not determinate, ideas of reason that influence our aesthetic 
response. At the end of this chapter I will discuss and highlight an interesting 
relation between Kant's account of the unity of space and time as infinite wholes, as 
presented in the Analytic of the Sublime, and our analysis of Chapter 2 regarding 
space and time as formal intuitive unities.  
 
The Mathematical Sublime 
The peculiarity of the aesthetic judgement of beauty was that even though it 
possesses a determinate conceptual content (and thus has a cognitive/conceptual 
component), it is the relation of the intuition to the faculty of concepts as such that 
                                                          
50 Kant's division within the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgement (which is the first Division of 
the Critique of the Power of Judgement as such) between two 'Books', the Analytic of the Beautiful and 
the Analytic of the Sublime, has caused much confusion, not least because of his placement of his 
discussion of fine art and genius within the Second Book. See (Zammito (1992): 124-136). 
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determines the particular character of our aesthetic response or reaction, and not to 
its being brought under any particular concept. This purposiveness of the faculty of 
intuitions for the faculty of concepts as such is a felt purposiveness, which is just to 
say that what is characteristic of aesthetic judgement is its non-cognitive character, 
where the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, as feelings, determine or make up 
our response. As we saw however, what makes an aesthetic judgement of sense 
different from and aesthetic judgement of reflection is the fact that the feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure maintain an important relation to the faculty of concepts, 
and the sublime, like beauty also has a relatedness to concepts which plays an 
important role in determining the particular aesthetic character of such judgements. 
 Kant is quick to highlight the similarities between the two kinds of aesthetic 
response, and at the opening of the Analytic of the Sublime Kant makes apparent 
this similarity between the two kinds of judging: 
The beautiful coincides with the sublime in that both please for themselves. 
And further in that both presuppose neither a judgement of sense nor a 
logically determining judgement, but a judgement of reflection: consequently 
the satisfaction does not depend on a sensation, like that in the agreeable, nor 
on a determinate concept, like the satisfaction in the good; but it is 
nevertheless still related to concepts, although it is indeterminate which, 
hence the satisfaction is connected to the mere presentation or to the faculty 
for that, through which the faculty of presentation of the imagination is 
considered, in the case of a given intuition, to be in accord with the faculty of 
concepts of the understanding or of reason, as promoting the latter. (CJ 5:224) 
It is thus clear that it is a purposiveness for the faculty of concepts as such that, as in 
the case of the beautiful, determines the nature of our response to the sublime; and 
we now learn that there are two different ways in which this purposiveness can be 
operative: either the intuition is purposive for the faculty of concepts of the 
understanding, or for the faculty of concepts of reason. As has been shown, in 
judgements of beauty it is the purposiveness of the intuition for the faculty of 
concepts of the understanding that determines our response, where the imagination 
is engaged with an object the form of which is amenable, or purposive for, the 
categorisational or sortal function of the understanding, as that which is capable of 
bringing a more determinate content to our representations. With the sublime 
however, there is quite a different cognitive story to be told, insofar as here the 
intuition is purposive for the concepts of reason rather than the understanding. What 
is peculiar about this relation however, is that the intuition is purposive for reason 
insofar as it is counter-purposive for the understanding, and this marks what Kant 
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calls ‘the most important and intrinsic difference between the sublime and the 
beautiful’ (CJ 5:243).   
Kant’s account of the sublime has a complexity that his account of the beautiful does 
not, insofar as Kant distinguishes between two experiences of the sublime – the 
mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime; where the former is concerned 
with vast magnitude and the later is concerned with vast power in nature. However, 
in the general definition of the sublime that opens the Analytic of the Sublime, Kant 
argues that the counter-purposiveness with regard to the faculty of the 
understanding has its origins in what is essentially the formlessness of objects in 
nature51. Thus vast objects whose magnitude we cannot comprehend are said to be 
formless insofar as they cannot be easily taken up as single unified representations, 
and in this sense overwhelm the imaginative function. It is important to note 
however, that this general account of the sublime seems to accord principally with 
what Kant calls the mathematically sublime, insofar as this aspect of the sublime is 
concerned with a magnitude that is too large for presentation, as a singularly 
comprehended intuition52. It is in fact this aspect of the sublime that is the most 
complex in Kant’s analysis, where the role of the infinite with regards to the 
comprehension of vast magnitude is ambiguous, and which has lead to diverse and 
conflicting commentaries in the secondary literature.  
Kant opens his discussion of the mathematical sublime with a distinction between 
simply saying that something is great, i.e. great without qualification, and saying 
that something is absolutely great (what Kant calls ‘sublime’). With the former kind 
of judgement Kant argues that it is made without reference to any objective 
                                                          
51 Although Kant is explicit in limiting his account to the sublime in nature, as we will see, he uses 
examples of the sublime in art (the pyramids, St. Paul's cathedral, etc).  
52 Even in Kant’s account of the dynamical sublime, where it is the power in nature that determines 
our response, the mathematical sublime appears to be in some sense operative as a condition of this 
experience. Thus, in his discussion of the dynamical sublime Kant speaks of ‘Bold, overhanging, as it 
were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, volcanoes with their all-
destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a 
rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc.’ (CJ 5:261) With such examples of the dynamical sublime 
however, it is clear that magnitude plays a role, for here the sheer magnitude, in addition to the sheer 
force, is what overpowers us. Interestingly the same object can act as the grounds of both kinds of the 
experience, and Kant elsewhere speaks of the calm ocean ‘bounded only by the heavens’ (CJ 5:270), 
where it is clear that this unboundedness and vastness stimulates an experience of the mathematical 
sublime. In this case however power is not operative in stimulating our response, and thus the 
relation between the two doesn’t work both ways, unless we also construe sheer magnitude as power 
(which doesn’t appear to be the way Kant intends it). Thus Kant’s account of the sublime as two 
distinct kinds of experience is more complex than he would lead us to believe, with at least the 
mathematical sublime being constitutive of our experience of the dynamically sublime in nature. 
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standard, but solely with reference to a subjective one. Although Kant isn’t very 
clear on what this amounts to, it appears that with this kind of judgement there is 
not some determinate standard or set before us, such as horses of particular sizes, 
against which we judge the greatness of a particular horse, but that there is some 
standard in our mind such as the general size of horses against which we make our 
judgement. Consequently there is not some conceptual measure in mind when we 
make such a judgement, and in this sense Kant refers to this estimate as an ‘aesthetic’ 
one, which subsequently serves as a ground of universal communicability (CJ 5:249). 
By contrast, in saying that something is absolutely great, i.e. great beyond all 
comparison (i.e. sublime) we make a judgement that presupposes no standard 
outside of it, but must be sought entirely within itself. With reference to objects in 
nature, because, as physically limited items, they can always be compared to 
something greater, it is clear that they belong to the first kind of judging, so that 
something’s being simply great, or small is always referred to a subjective standard. 
If the sublime is that which is absolutely great then it is clear it is not to be sought in 
things of nature, and thus, so Kant concludes, that it is only through ideas of reason, 
insofar as they do not presuppose any standard outside of them, that something can 
be called absolutely great, i.e. sublime. 
The role of the aesthetic, understood as the sensory, non-conceptually determining 
aspect of measurement, is important to Kant’s next stage in his analysis of the 
sublime, and here Kant remarks upon the primacy and significance of the aesthetic 
with reference to mathematical estimation or measurement. Kant initially argues 
however, that when presented with any vastly great object there are two ways in 
which we can estimate its magnitude. Either we can obtain a determinate measure 
through the use of mathematical concepts, or we can make an estimation 
aesthetically, by eye as it were, judging by how many units one thing would fit into 
another. Although these are two different ways of measuring magnitude, Kant 
highlights the primacy of the aesthetic in all estimation or measurement, for he 
argues that with mathematical estimation we make use of units, and define units by 
other units, and that any unit can only have sense for us, as a measure, insofar as we 
can grasp it aesthetically. There would be no sense in our estimating something to be 
10ft long if we did not know by eye how long a foot was, or if needed the initial 
measures that make up a foot53. Kant’s whole point here is to draw a fundamental 
                                                          
53 There is something of a resemblance between Kant’s discussion in this section and his discussion of 
the incongruence of counterparts in the Prolegomena, which was a subject of discussion in Chapter 2. 
Just as in that text Kant here emphasizes the fundamental non-reductive aspect of the aesthetic in our 
spatial experiences. The non-conceptuality here also consists in the fact that although the perceptual 
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difference between aesthetic and mathematical estimation in order to highlight that 
the essential determinant in the mathematically sublime is the failure of our ability 
to grasp aesthetically vast magnitudes, and this leads to an important further 
distinction between the activities involved in taking up a quantum into the 
imagination: 
To take up a quantum in the imagination intuitively, in order to be able to 
use it as a measure or a unit for the estimation of magnitude by means of 
numbers, involves two actions of this faculty: apprehension (apprehension) 
and comprehension (comprehension aesthetica). There is no difficulty with 
apprehension, because it can go on to infinity; but comprehension becomes 
ever more difficult the further apprehension advances, and soon reaches its 
maximum, namely the aesthetically greatest basic measure for the estimation 
of magnitude. (CJ 5:251-2) 
Comprehension becomes more difficult when in surveying a great object or vista, 
what we have apprehended falls out of view as we proceed to take up more of the 
object aesthetically, so that comprehension ‘loses on one side as much as it gains on 
the other, and there is in the comprehension a greatest point beyond which it cannot 
go’ (CJ: 5:252). The feeling of the sublime becomes felt when this greatest point is 
either reached or surpassed, although for Kant it is ambiguous whether both kinds 
of experience (failed comprehension and successful comprehension that nevertheless 
strains this faculty to the limit) can trigger the sublime or just that experience of 
failed comprehension. Thus in the examples that follow the passage just quoted, 
Kant refers to an experience of the sublime that is got through entering St. Peter’s in 
Rome.  Here the sheer vastness of the internal space overwhelms the imaginations 
attempt at comprehension, whereby the imagination ‘reaches its maximum and, in 
the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but is thereby transported into an 
emotionally moving satisfaction’ (CJ 5:252). What is most peculiar here is that this 
example contrasts with the one immediately before it, in the sense that this prior 
example locates the optimal emotional experience in the successful comprehension in 
one intuition, and Kant refers to Nicolas Savary’s observation in his report on Egypt 
that ‘in order to get the full emotional effect of the magnitude of the pyramids one 
must neither come too close to them nor be too far away’ (CJ: 5:252). Thus there is an 
ambiguity in what sense the sublime accompanies the experience of the vast 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
object must have a conceptual content, qua perceptual, there is an inherent non-conceptual element 
which is just that element delivered through the space as a formal intuition. Any object must be 
described conceptually within this space, but this space itself, as that which makes spatiality possible 
is originally and principally non-conceptual in character. 
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magnitude, and whether it can be triggered not only by failed comprehension, but 
also successful comprehension that nevertheless pushes the limits of what can be 
taken up in a single act. 
  
Kant on the Role of the Infinite 
If there is an ambiguity or difficulty with this stage in Kant’s argument however, 
there is an even greater one when it comes to clarifying the role of the infinite in our 
experience of the sublime. The problem is with the exact role Kant assigns the 
infinite in determining the nature of our phenomenological (aesthetic) experience 
and the fact that it doesn’t fit easily into Kant’s analysis, and can perhaps even be 
read as non-necessary in satisfactorily explaining (philosophically) such experiences. 
In the second section of §26, the role of infinity in the experience of the sublime 
comes more into the fore, and at the opening of the second paragraph Kant writes 
that; 
The imagination, by itself, without anything hindering it, advances to infinity 
in the comprehension that is requisite for the representation of magnitude; 
the understanding however, guides this by numerical concepts, for which the 
former must provide the schema. (CJ 5:253) 
Kant doesn’t tell us why the imagination, ‘without anything hindering it, advances 
to infinity’, and this is presented just as a fact about the imagination. Nevertheless, I 
believe that Kant’s argument here can be supported with his account of inner sense 
as it presented in the first Critique, for there we learned that time is directional and 
proceeds in accordance with the analogy of drawing a line, which if it were to 
represent time most accurately would be a never-ending line (the disanalogy with a 
line is that a line is a determinate measure, whereas time is a continual progression). 
Given that inner sense is the basis of intuition as such it is then not surprising that 
the imagination would, if unchecked, proceed indefinitely. The understanding 
however, through the concept of the understanding, provides a determinate 
mathematical content in the estimation of magnitude, and because of this 
conceptually determining activity ‘there is certainly something objectively purposive 
in accordance with the concept of an end (such as all measuring is), but nothing that 
is purposive and pleasing for the aesthetic power of judgement’ (CJ 5:253). 
Mathematical estimation itself is also the kind of thing that can proceed indefinitely, 
and given any particular measure, from one that can be taken up in a single intuition 
(such as a foot) and one that cant (such as the ‘diameter of the earth’), we can 
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continue proceed unhindered in apprehension (logical comprehension but not 
aesthetic comprehension), to infinity. 
However, our minds are not of the kind that are satisfied with infinite progression, 
where due to the nature of this progression there would be no closed series and thus 
no totality or completeness of magnitude. Here the importance of the role of reason 
comes into play, as that which, 
Requires totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that can never be 
entirely apprehended although they are (in the sensible representation) 
judged as entirely given, hence comprehension in one intuition, and it 
demands a presentation for all members of a progressively increasing 
numerical series, and does not exempt from this requirement even the 
infinite (space and past time), but rather makes it unavoidable for us to think 
of it (in the judgement of common reason) as given entirely  (in its totality). 
(CJ 5:254) 
The paragraph following this harks back to the discussion that opened the sublime 
regarding the role of an absolute measure in comparison with which everything (in 
nature) is small, and Kant here is explicit in telling us that it is the infinite 
comprehended as a whole that plays this role (of absolute measure), which is also 
what Kant called the sublime as such. Of course the idea of grasping the infinite as a 
whole is impossible, as this would require a determinate measure, which can never 
be given. For Kant however it is ‘even to be able to think the given infinite without 
contradiction’ that is of special significance here, for this ‘requires a faculty in the 
human mind that is itself supersensible’ (CJ 5:254). The only way in which we can 
coherently think of the infinite as a whole, given that we cannot think of it as a 
mathematically unified concept, is as the substratum of the phenomenal world. This 
substratum must of course be located in a noumenal realm, and in this sense infinity 
is comprehended as a ‘pure intellectual estimation of magnitude under a concept’ 
(CJ 5:254) (i.e. the concept of a supersensible substrate or underpinning of the 
phenomenal realm), and is thus made more determinate. 
Here Kant has been referring to the infinite as an absolute measure, which is only a 
measure that reason can generate and in comparison with which everything else is 
small. The problem is with how infinity as a measure gets into the experience of the 
sublime and how it operates in determining our response.  
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Crowther - the Superfluity of the Infinite 
Paul Crowther is one of the main commentators on Kant’s discussion of the sublime 
and he is critical of Kant’s account, or what he sees as Kant’s account, of the role of 
infinity in our experience of the sublime. Crowther, in his book The Kantian Sublime 
(and subsequently in his later book The Kantian Aesthetic), argues that Kant is 
actually operating with two differing and conflicting lines of argument in his 
account of the mathematical sublime. There is both what Crowther calls a baroque 
line of argument, and an austere line of argument. Crowther sees Kant as running 
both arguments together which in turn leads to the confusion and complexity of the 
mathematically sublime, but that when it comes down to an intelligible and 
plausible philosophical position it is only the austere approach that offers itself. For 
Crowther, The baroque line of argument sees Kant as arguing that when faced with 
an object of vast magnitude we are somehow prompted to appeal to infinity as an 
absolute measure against which the phenomenal object is compared, and in trying to 
form this absolute measure we find our imagination overwhelmed in the attempt. 
Imagination thus experiences a humiliation in the attempt to satisfy a demand of 
reason yet in doing so also finds an exaltation in the fact that there is nevertheless a 
demand of reason which itself points to a supersensible substrate within us and 
which enables us to transcend the phenomenal54. The austere approach on the other 
hand, doesn’t appeal to any of the architectonics of infinity as a measure as 
prompted by an experience of the sublime, but just locates the feeling of displeasure 
in our imaginative inability to comprehend in one intuition a vast object. The feeling 
of pleasure instead is located in the fact that reason ‘requires totality for all given 
magnitudes’ (CJ 5:254), and that although we cannot grasp in intuition such a totality 
we nevertheless possess the idea of such a totality. The pleasure is in recognising 
that as noumenal beings who possess such ideas, we have a faculty that transcends 
the sensible. On this line of argument the infinite as a measure is not operative, so 
                                                          
54 Crowther summarily expresses the argument thus: (i) In our encounter with vast formless objects, 
we are led to estimate the greatness of their magnitude by reference to the absolute measure – namely 
infinity as a whole. (ii) Yet in searching out this fundamental aesthetic measure imagination is led into 
a regress that quickly overwhelms its powers of comprehension. It is totally unable to present the 
measure in terms of the single intuition which reason demands. (iii) Despite this, the felt frustration of 
imaginations inadequacy gives way to a feeling of pleasure at the fact that – in accordance with our 
ultimate vocation – reason has triumphed over sensibility and shown, thereby, that we have a faculty 
that transcends the limitations of our phenomenal being. (Crowther (1991): 100) 
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that ‘there is no reason why infinity should play any necessary role in the experience 
of the sublime’ (Crowther (2010): 179)55. 
The austere line of argument as Crowther presents it, does have a neatness that 
matches Kant’s more straightforward account of the dynamically sublime, and offers 
an account that appears to match straightforwardly our phenomenological 
experience of the sublime. However, it is questionable whether the baroque thesis as 
Crowther presents it is in fact the way Kant presents his argument, and thereby  
really captures the role that Kant assigns to the infinite. 
 
The most controversial aspect of Crowther’s reading of Kant and his baroque 
account is to be found in what exactly the role of infinity as a measure is supposed to 
be playing. Crowther reads Kant as offering a somewhat peculiar account of this, 
where in stipulating that we are driven to recognize infinity as an absolute measure, 
we are using this measure  as a measure against which the vast phenomenal object is 
compared, and Crowther writes, 
Now, of course, in judging magnitude one can do so either by calculating 
how many times the relevant unit of measure will fit into the object 
measured, or by taking a measure which is greater than the measured item 
and judging how many times the item would fit into it. Kant assumes 
(without explanation) that it is the latter strategy which holds in the case of 
vast phenomena. (Crowther (2010): 176) 
As mentioned earlier, it is in the effort to grasp the infinite as an absolute measure 
that the imagination is overwhelmed, and we learn subsequently that this effort is 
made so as to find an absolute measure against which the phenomenal item can be 
compared as a unit that fits into infinity as a measure. The reason this account is so 
peculiar is that, as Crowther points out, that it appears as philosophically 
superfluous phenomenologically speaking, in the sense that there appears to be no 
introspective accord between the explanation here offered and the relatively instant 
experience of the sublime in nature. In addition, it also seems bizarre to postulate 
                                                          
55 Crowther does argue however that the infinite may play some role in an overall experience of the 
sublime, stating with reference to infinity that ‘It may be that on occasion vast objects do suggest the 
idea of infinity to us, but even then this might be explained more economically than in terms of the 
baroque thesis’. Crowther goes on to argue a vast object may seem infinite and thus be compared to 
what it may be like to comprehend the idea of infinity as a whole, so that ‘On these terms, the 
suggestion of infinity would be regarded as a by-product of the way the object overwhelms the 
senses, that is as something which will intensify or enhance the experience of the sublime, rather than 
something which is necessarily involved in its production'. (Crowther (1991): 105). 
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that we try to arrive at a measure of the infinite as an intuitive whole against which 
other unities, or measures, are compared, which in itself is impossible (being only 
possible as an idea). There would be no way of seeing how many times a vast 
phenomenal object could fit into something that is itself unbounded. 
It should be granted that, due to the difficulty of Kant's argument at this stage of the 
mathematical sublime, it may indeed appear that he presents his argument in this 
way, and Crowther sees the passage immediately prior to the one which sets up the 
distinction between apprehension and comprehension (5:251-2) as especially 
indicative of this view. Here Kant writes, ‘Now for the mathematical estimation of 
magnitude there is, to be sure, no greatest (for the power of numbers goes on to 
infinity); but for the aesthetic estimation of magnitude there certainly is a greatest; 
and about this I say that if it I judged as an absolute measure, beyond which no is 
greater subjectively (for the judging subject) possible, it brings with it the idea of the 
sublime’ (CJ 5:251). It is certainly not unambiguous however that Kant intends his 
argument as it is interpreted by Crowther, for, contrary to what Crowther maintains, 
Kant nowhere actually mentions the attempt to measure the intuition against 
infinity, as a unit that would fit into it so many times. It is clear however that infinity 
as a supreme measure is supposed to play an important role in determining our 
aesthetic response. It is also apparent that the sensible object is involved in somehow 
triggering the experience of the infinite, and after arguing that the infinite is only 
possible as an idea of reason Kant tells us that, ‘Nature is thus sublime in those of its 
appearances the intuition of which brings with them the idea of its infinity’, and that 
‘the latter cannot happen except through the inadequacy of even the greatest effort 
of our imagination in the estimation of the magnitude of the object’ (CJ 5:255). The 
closeness of the relation between our experience of the sublime and the experience of 
the infinite is here apparent, for it is only insofar as an object invokes infinity that the 
sublime is experienced56. But this is only possible if the imagination finds itself 
inadequate in successfully comprehending an object. Yet the question remains why 
must our failing to comprehend in a single intuition what is before us prompt a 
cognitive move towards the infinite. 
 
 
                                                          
56 The strength of this claim leads Crowther to essentially ignore its importance, for it goes 
beyond what the austere version maintains.  
 
110 
 
Responses to Crowther 
Certain writers have appealed to the importance of this stage in Kant’s argument in 
their interpretation of the mathematically sublime, just as they have been dismissive 
of Crowther’s austere recommendation and his ambition to limit the role of the 
infinite as a determinant of aesthetic response, and Patricia Matthews argues that the 
infinite is invoked because an object seems to be infinite when it cannot be taken up 
in a single act of comprehension: 
When Kant speaks of using imagination to comprehend the infinite, he is 
speaking of the infinite as the object in nature that we are trying to measure. 
From a subjective point of view, this object seems infinite. We are not trying to 
measure the infinite independently of the object in nature. There is not one 
view according to which imagination attempts to comprehend the infinite as 
a whole and use it as a measure in estimating the object (the baroque thesis), 
and another view according to which the imagination attempts to 
comprehend the object as a whole (the austere thesis). Further, the reference 
to reason’s idea of the infinite is not gratuitous, but is implied when the 
object that imagination tries to grasp as a whole seems infinite. (Matthews 
(1996): 173) 
For Matthews then the idea of infinity is prompted when, as far as we can tell, the 
phenomenal object seems to go on forever, as unbounded. Because this thought 
strains the imagination, as it were, in an attempt to represent it, we experience a 
displeasure. But we experience a pleasure when we nevertheless recognize that we 
possess the idea (of reason) of the infinite, and thereby partake of the noumenal, as 
well as the sensible realm. On this account there is no postulating of the idea that we 
search out the infinite as a measure against which we compare the phenomenal 
object (the baroque thesis), yet the infinite is assigned a key role insofar as through 
the object it triggers the experience of the sublime57.  
I believe Matthews account to be closer to the actual text of the mathematical 
sublime, insofar as it recognizes the importance of Kant’s contention that nature is 
sublime in those of its  appearances which brings with them the idea of its infinity. 
The infinite on this account doesn’t look to be a strained additive inserted for both 
                                                          
57 Henry Allison essentially offers the same point, stating that when confronted with the 
overwhelmingly vast ‘the imagination finds itself stretched beyond its natural limits, unable to 
comprehend in a single intuition the magnitude that is appearance suggests. In other words, such 
objects present themselves to the imagination as if they were absolutely great. (Allison (2001): 232) 
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architectonic and historical reasons58, but a more intuitive feature of what we do 
experience in incomprehensible vastness, viz. its neverendingness. Nevertheless, 
there remains something unsatisfactory about the idea that phenomenal vastness just 
seems to be infinite, for as Crowther points out in response to Matthews, 
a phenomenon can surely be experienced as overwhelming per se without 
appearing to be infinite. Indeed, if one person insists that the infinite must be 
involved, then another, with equal validity, can claim that this is not the case, 
in so far as they can find no introspective evidence that it figures in their own 
experience of the sublime. (Crowther (2010): 181n) 
However, if we can locate the move towards infinity as a necessary feature of the 
way we negotiate the vastly overwhelming in nature, then even if it is not 
immediately (phenomenologically) obvious that the infinite is a determinant in an 
experience of the sublime, there may be some argument for grounding its role in 
determining this response59. 
 Perhaps the only way of grounding such necessity is in appealing to what Kant 
states as a fact about the way the imagination functions, and this is the passage 
discussed earlier at (CJ 5:253) where Kant stated without explanation that, ‘The 
imagination, by itself, without anything hindering it, advances to infinity in the 
composition that is requisite for the representation of magnitude’. Although Kant 
goes on to discuss this with reference to the role of the understanding as guiding this 
progression determinately through numerical concepts, it nevertheless tells us 
something about the imagination as it functions of its own accord in representing 
magnitude. Thus if it is a necessary feature of the imagination to run to infinity 
unchecked (and remember we supported this claim with Kant’s account in the first 
Critique whereby it is the essential character of inner sense to run on in analogy with 
a never-ending line and is in  liaison with the understanding in generating a 
synthesis through concepts), then insofar as we are experiencing something 
unbounded (overwhelmingly vast) that aesthetically does not limit the intuition, 
then there is a sense in which the imagination is unhindered in its attempt to 
comprehend the item. If the intuition was bounded there would clearly be no need 
for the imagination to advance beyond its comprehension, but because it is 
unbounded the imagination runs onwards. Here it needn’t be maintained that the 
object actually seems to be infinite (Matthews), but just that the object isn’t limited 
                                                          
58 See (Crowther 1991: 105-6) for his arguments as to why he thinks that Kant aimed at making infinity 
a key determinant of sublime aesthetic response. 
59 This is say that perhaps other introspective, or philosophical analytic, evidence can be located for 
supporting the argument. 
112 
 
by an act of comprehension, and so prompts an experience of the minds running on 
to infinity (we don’t thereby say that the object as such appears to be infinite, but 
that the experience of infinity is stimulated)60. On this account the displeasure arises 
from the frustration of trying to form a sensible idea of this as a totality, whereas the 
pleasure arises from being able to grasp it as an idea of reason, so that,  
Just because there is in our imagination a striving to advance to the infinite, 
while in our reason there lies a claim to absolute totality, as to a real idea, the 
very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of 
the sensible world awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us. (CJ 
5:250) 
Thus there is no grasping of infinity as in some sense a determinate measure against 
which we measure the vast object, which in turn stimulates an experience of the 
supersensible (Crowther). It is rather that infinity is stimulated through the 
experience of unbounded phenomena, and because reason demands totality in the 
presentation of magnitude, the idea of infinity as a whole (an absolute measure - 
noumenal substrate) is generated, thereby showing that we are at least able to think 
of infinity as a whole even if we cannot grasp such an idea aesthetically. 
In support of this argument it should be noted that towards the end of the section on 
the mathematical sublime Kant further elaborates upon the differences between 
apprehension and comprehension with reference to the difference between a 
temporal and an instant synthesis of spatiality. These remarks are important and 
much neglected in that they make reference to the function of inner sense in the 
measurement of space, which we have argued is important in making sense of 
Kant’s contention that the imagination proceeds unchecked to infinity, and Kant 
writes that, 
The measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time the 
description of it, thus an objective movement in the imagination and a 
progression; by contrast, the comprehension of multiplicity in the unity not 
of thought but of intuition, hence the comprehension in one moment of that 
which is successfully apprehended, is a regression, which in turn cancels the 
                                                          
60 In The Sublime in Kant and Beckett Bjørn K. Myskja sides with Matthews against Crowther's reading 
of the mathematical sublime. In agreement with what we have stated Myskja states that it is not quite 
precise to say that the object we are calling sublime seems to be infinite but that 'at most, it seems 
limitless' (Myskja (2002): 135). As we are arguing, what the sublime does is lead the imagination to an 
idea of reason, which in this case is the infinite. Myskja however leaves his account there and doesn't 
discuss why the imagination operates in this manner. 
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time-condition in the progression of the imagination and makes simultaneity 
intuitable. (CJ 5:258-9) 
The taking up ‘in one moment’, i.e. in an instant, of an intuition does what Kant calls 
‘violence’ to the faculty of inner sense, insofar as this latter faculty proceeds 
successively. It may be thought that Kant’s argument at this stage invalidates the 
argument I have just put forward, insofar as inner-sense is thwarted by the 
comprehension of magnitude. But the point is that with the overwhelmingly vast we 
are unable to take up an intuition ‘in one moment’ so that the imagination as 
temporally progressive, doesn’t find the ‘time condition’ to be cancelled, but finds it 
to be opened as it were, insofar as there is no bounds to limit its movement. Thus 
although in engaging with everyday objects we put a check upon inner sense every 
time we successfully comprehend (take up in one moment) an object, with the 
overwhelmingly vast we free-up this faculty so that it will advance towards infinity, 
in turn bringing about the experience of the sublime. Because we possess reason 
however  our mind 'requires totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that 
can never be entirely apprehended although they are (in the sensible representation) 
judged as entirely given' (CJ 5:254). Thus even though there is an open-ended infinite 
progressing in the synthesis of time, reason demands that even this movement 
towards the infinite be thought of as a totality, so that the positing of a noumenal 
supersensible substrate (infinity as an absolute totality) is necessitated. 
On this account of the sublime then we have rejected Crowther’s reading of the 
mathematical sublime to the effect that the ‘baroque’ line as he presents it isn’t really 
Kant’s position at all. We have also rejected his austere reading insofar as, although 
presenting a neatly straightforward account, it is too far away from Kant’s actual line 
of argument where the infinite is indeed presented as playing a necessary role in 
determining aesthetic response (of the mathematically sublime kind). This hasn’t 
been however just to satisfy architectonic concerns, for it has turned out that Kant 
has a good reason for positing the move towards infinity as an aesthetic measure we 
cannot grasp intuitively, and this comes from the fact that inner-sense, when 
uninhibited, will run onwards towards an infinite synthesis in the imagination. Thus 
we have been able to develop and sustain Kant’s notion, which Matthews, Allison 
and Myskja have supported, that ‘Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances 
the intuition of which brings with them the idea of its infinity’. 
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Sublimity and the Role of Concepts 
Where the concept of ‘play’ seemed well fitted to an analysis of the beautiful, it is 
less obviously well fitted to an analysis of the sublime. In experiencing the beautiful 
we are experiencing a phenomenal order that is well adapted, or purposive, for the 
faculty of cognition as such (as the faculty of concepts) where this sensible content is 
independent of, or apart from, determination under a particular concept. In this 
sense, conceptually speaking, there is an indeterminacy about the experience, for in 
any representation there remains an irredeemably aesthetic component, and where 
this is of a particular formal arrangement, the intuition is in a playful rapport with 
the faculty of concepts, as offering easiness and suggestiveness of fit, even though, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter, the intuition is brought under some, more or 
less determinate, concept(s). 
With the sublime however, that the imagination and reason, as opposed to the 
imagination and understanding, are supposed to be in play (CJ 5:258) is more 
difficult to appreciate. Here the imagination isn’t suggesting possible 
schematisations, or the intuition’s fittedness for the subsumptive function of the 
understanding, and, as we have seen, a necessary determinant of the experience of 
the mathematically sublime is that the object be found actually counter-purposive 
for the faculty of the understanding. Thus the relevant purposiveness, insofar as 
there is a one determining the experience of the sublime, is the imaginations being 
purposiveness for the faculty of reason. That the faculty of the imagination is 
purposive for the faculty of reason is perhaps easier to appreciate than that the 
cognitive relation between them is one of play. The purposiveness here however, as 
Kant tells us, is born out of a conflict between imagination and reason rather than a 
harmony, and, with the mathematically sublime, this consists in our having, 
a feeling that we have pure self-sufficient reason, or a faculty for estimating 
magnitude, whose preeminence cannot be made intuitable through anything 
except the inadequacy of that faculty which is itself unbounded in the 
presentation of magnitudes (of sensible objects). (CJ 5:258) 
Because we can form the idea of the infinite as a supersensible totality, as an idea of 
reason, our interest in the overwhelmingly vast is awakened and maintained. It is 
also apparent that this awakening of reason has an important moral significance 
(insofar as reason is the source of moral ideas), and that the relation of reason to the 
sensible is somehow purposive for this moral experience, and ‘produce[s] a 
disposition of the mind which is in conformity with them [viz. ideas of reason] and 
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compatible with that which the influence of determinate (practical) ideas on feeling 
would produce’ (CJ 5:256). The trouble with Kant’s account of the sublime however, 
is that in arguing that the purposiveness in question is a purposiveness for ideas of 
reason, here, unlike with our experience of the beautiful, it appears that our aesthetic 
experience in being determined, essentially lies in the generation of quite 
determinate concepts, so that our experience of the sublime is less an aesthetic 
experience but more akin to a determinate moral experience. 
As articulated in the literature, the criticism is that our experience of the sublime 
appears to be more like moral experience than aesthetic experience (and for 
Crowther this is especially true of the dynamical sublime), and that because quite 
determinate concepts are involved, the character of disinterestedness is essentially 
lost insofar as we take a strong interest in practical ideas of reason, thus again 
jeopardizing the sublimes aesthetic character. It should be remembered however, 
that as an aesthetic judgement of taste as opposed to an aesthetic judgement of sense, 
there must be something that grounds the universality inherent within such 
judgements, and that in the case of the beautiful the pleasure in the experience was 
grounded in a perceived, or felt purposiveness for the faculty of cognition as such. 
The pleasure in the sublime on the other hand is grounded in a felt purposiveness of 
the experience for ideas of reason, insofar as they are awakened and sustained, and 
the question is whether the right kind of indeterminacy, or non-cognitivism is here 
operative. What is essential then is the exact role of certain concepts in determining 
our response.  
Concerning the role of concepts of reason determining our aesthetic response, 
Crowther writes; 
In this respect, for example, we not only have to recognize the superiority of 
reason over imagination, but also to know that this is in accordance with the 
broader demands of reason. Our pleasure arises, we will recall, ‘from the 
correspondence of this very judgement of the inadequacy of the greatest 
sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of reason, insofar as striving for 
them is nevertheless a law for us’ [CJ §27]. This means that, in Kant’s 
exposition, the sublime hinges on quite specific (morally significant) concepts 
concerning the scope and significance of reason. This determinate conceptual 
content, of course raises problems concerning the sublime’s aesthetic status. 
(Crowther (2010): 180) 
Not only are certain morally significant concepts here operative in determining our 
response to the sublime in nature but theoretically significant concepts of reason 
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must also be operative, insofar as the infinite as underlying supersensible substrate 
is central in determining the pleasure in the sublime61.  
However, what should be noted first of all in response to Crowther’s criticism is that 
these concepts are not determinate (a ‘determinate conceptual content’) but 
essentially indeterminate. Although there are facts of reason which determine and 
govern our actions and self-perceptions, for the most part these actions and self-
perceptions do not consist in a determinate awareness of these determinants. One of 
the reasons Kant’s account of the mathematically sublime is difficult to access is that 
it posits somewhat alien determinants in terms of what governs our response, and 
the average person standing in front of the supremely vast would perhaps never 
guess at the idea of infinity grasped as a noumenal substrate as being what is 
responsible for their pleasurable response (although a feeling for infinity of some 
kind may be felt, and the term itself is often appealed to in such experiences, albeit 
not necessarily in the way Kant elaborates upon it62). However, even here, the issue 
isn’t that of any particular, even indefinite, concept determining our response in 
terms of accounting for our pleasure in the sublime, for Kant himself is explicit in 
arguing against such a view. Here it is helpful to appeal to the argument of our 
previous chapter, where we noted that what is essential in understanding the nature 
of the purposiveness in the experience of the beautiful is that the intuition is 
purposive for the faculty of the concepts of the understanding. By contrast, in the 
case of the sublime, the intuition is said to be purposive for the faculty of the 
concepts of reason. Thus it is not a purposiveness for any particular, even 
indeterminate concept that characterizes our response to the sublime, and about this 
Kant writes; 
Thus, just as the aesthetic power of judgement in judging the beautiful relates 
the imagination in its free play to the understanding, in order to agree with 
its concepts in general (without determination of them), so in judging a thing 
                                                          
61 In addition to Crowther's arguments see (Myskja (2002): 115-149). 
62 In an interesting recollection by Thomas De Quincey in Recollections of the Lakes and the Lake Poets, De 
Quincey recalls a conversation with William Wordsworth whilst both were eagerly anticipating, at 
midnight, the delivery of a newspaper. A connection between vast magnitude and a sense of the 
infinite is apparent when De Quincey recalls Wordsworth as saying: ' [...] Just now, my ear was 
placed upon the stretch, in order to catch any sound of wheels that might come down upon the lake 
of Wythburn from the Keswick Road; at the very instant when i raised my head from the ground, in 
final abandonment of hope for this night, at the very instant when the organs of attention were all at 
once relaxing from their tension, the bright star hanging in the air above these outlines of massy 
blackness fell suddenly upon my eye, and penetrated my capacity of apprehension with a pathos and 
a sense of the infinite, that would not have arrested me under other circumstances'. (De Quincey 
(1970): 160) 
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to be sublime the same faculty is related to reason, in order to correspond 
subjectively with its ideas (though which is undetermined). (CJ 5:256) 
It may be thought that this an inconsistency on Kant’s part, for what his essential to 
his analysis of the mathematical sublime is that what is essentially responsible for 
determining our response is reasons idea of infinity as underlying noumenal 
substratum. However as we have noted, this idea is not pervasive in its effect upon 
our phenomenal experience. Although this idea is responsible for our experience, the 
phenomenal character of our experience is predominantly determined by the felt 
relation to the faculty of concepts of reason as such, where this is a felt purposiveness 
for the faculty of reason as such, as that which is the source of practical ideas (thus it 
is a felt purposiveness for morality as such). In order to account for the 
phenomenologically felt differences between the mathematically and dynamically 
sublime (although Kant was the first to recognize a distinction in kind here, and in 
common parlance there is no distinction), it must just be recognized that there are 
different operations of reason going on, although in both cases it is only through 
philosophical analysis that the differences become clear, and that 
phenomenologically speaking in both cases it is a purposiveness for the faculty of 
the concepts of reason as such (and by implication a purposiveness for the moral 
within us as such) that accounts for the felt character of our experience.63 
                                                          
63 Myskja highlights the worry that because the determinant of the experience of the mathematical 
sublime is an idea of theoretical reason rather than practical reason, Kant cannot really claim that our 
experience of the mathematically sublime generates a feeling for our supersensible vocation (Myskja 
(2002): 141). In his 'General Remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgements' however, 
Kant signals the connection between the theoretical and moral aspects of reason when he states that:  
 
The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual satisfaction is the moral law in all its 
power... and, since this power actually makes itself aesthetically knowable only through 
sacrifices (which is a deprivation, although in behalf of inner freedom, but also reveals in us 
an unfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty together with its consequences reaching 
beyond what can be seen), the satisfaction on the aesthetic side (in relation to sensibility) is 
negative... but considered from the intellectual side it is positive... From this it follows that 
the intellectual, intrinsically purposive (moral good), judged aesthetically, must not be 
represented so much as beautiful but rather as sublime, so that it arouses more the feeling of 
respect (which scorns charm) than that of love and intimate affection, since human nature 
does not agree with that good of its own accord, but only through the dominion that reason 
exercises over sensibility. (CJ 5:271)  
 
Although Kant here indicates that there is a connection between the aesthetic and the moral 
experience, it must be conceded that Kant is sparing on the details as to how the relation between the 
experience of the infinite as supersensible substratum and moral reason is exactly to be characterised. 
However, just in so far as the experience of the mathematically sublime is characterised by a sense of 
humiliation at the inadequacy of our sensible self, and then an elevation and sense of reverence or 
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In a sense then it is not surprising that Kant should argue that the sublime requires a 
greater level of sophistication than the beautiful, for, as we have seen, experiencing 
the sublime pre-supposes a developed and refined feeling for morality, or a 
developed sense of what it means for reason to place demands upon our 
phenomenal selves. Thus Kant writes that, 
There are innumerable things in beautiful nature concerning which we 
immediately require consensus with our own judgement from everyone else 
and can also, without being especially prone to error, expect it; but we cannot 
promise ourselves that our judgement concerning the sublime in nature will 
so readily find acceptance by others. For a far greater culture, not merely of 
the aesthetic power of judgement, but also of the cognitive faculties on which 
that is based, seems to be requisite in order to be able to make a judgement 
about this excellence of the objects of nature. (CJ 5:264)  
However, it is important to notice that although an experience of the sublime 
requires greater culture, it is not elitist, or academic in acquiring this access. For 
although this greater culture essentially consists in the possession or development of 
‘moral ideas’ (CJ 5:265), these ideas are not so determinate as to limit access to the 
sublime to an elite few, such as the fact that in moral action our decisions and actions 
are governed by universality as such, i.e. the categorical imperative, or that this 
thereby locates us in part in a noumenal realm insofar as we consider ourselves free 
agents. What is characteristic are that these ideas are felt rather than comprehended 
conceptually, and that it is because of this that access to the sublime is not restrictive. 
Thus Kant writes of the judgement of the sublime that ‘it has its foundation in 
human nature, and indeed in that which can be required of everyone and demanded 
of him along with a healthy understanding, namely in the predisposition to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
respect  for what is absolutely great (the infinite), then there is an analogue with moral experience 
where our phenomenal, sensible self, which doesn't act in accordance with good of its own nature, is 
humbled by the demands placed upon by the moral law; the latter of which can only be located in a 
noumenal realm and identified through reason. Again a conceptual awareness of this relation is not 
what is determining the aesthetic response, for the sense of relatedness between the two experiences 
are beneath the surface as it were, and slightly earlier to the above passage Kant writes that: 'The 
satisfaction in the sublime in nature is thus only negative... namely a feeling of the deprivation of the 
freedom of the imagination by itself, insofar as it is purposively determined in accordance with a law 
other than that of empirical use. It thereby acquires an enlargement and power which is greater than 
that which it sacrifices, but whose ground is hidden from it, whereas it feels the sacrifice or deprivation and at 
the same time the cause to which it is subjected' (CJ 5:269 Italics my emphasis). I understand 'feeling' here 
to be opposed to cognising, which would make the judgement non-aesthetic.  
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feeling for (practical)ideas, i.e. to that which is moral' (CJ 5:265) 64. What this indicates 
is a more aesthetic or non-conceptually based relation to the moral domain, and thus 
more of a felt (or non-cognitive) relationship between the intuition and reason. In 
addition, it is only through such an indeterminacy that the judgement of the sublime 
can be said to be a reflective one, insofar as the imagination remains undetermined 
by any conceptual content65, but can be said to reflect on the content with regard to 
moral significance (although as stated, of what exact kind remains undetermined). It 
is also only on this account that we can make any sense of the idea of play between 
imagination and reason. Because it is a felt purposiveness of the intuition for the 
faculty of the concepts of reason as such, the imagination can be said to engage and 
re-engage with the intuition, so that the experience is open-ended as it were. 
 
The Unity of Space and Time 
Central to our earlier chapters, especially Chapter 2, was recognising the importance 
of space and time as formal wholes delivered through inner and outer sense and 
through which it is possible for us to place things in space and time and have 
spatiotemporal perceptions/experiences. Although this is of no central concern to the 
argument of the third Critique, as Kant is not concerned here with the conditions of 
cognition as such (which gave rise to recognising the importance of space and time 
as formal wholes), but with a particular kind of cognition (aesthetic and teleological), 
there is nevertheless an interesting resonance with his argument for the 
mathematical sublime. What makes for an arguable interconnection between the two 
accounts is that both place special emphasis upon space and time as unified wholes. 
The difference is that in the case of the first Critique the formal wholes of space and 
time were just delivered through inner and outer sense, whereas in the third Critique 
the significance of the whole of space and time as comprehended is something 
delivered through reason. This betrays a fundamental difference between what each 
                                                          
64 In relation to the connections between the sublime and morality more generally Paul Guyer has 
argued that the connections here are part of an overall task on Kant's behalf to show how aesthetic 
experience can help us realise our own moral autonomy without undermining its own uniquely 
autonomous (i.e. aesthetic) character (although Guyer is much more sympathetic to the dynamical, as 
opposed to the mathematical sublime in this respect). See Guyer's 'Bridging the Gulf: Kant's Project in 
the Third Critique'  in A Companion to Kant, Edited by Graham Bird (2010). 
65 As Matthews points out, Crowther’s austere reading of the mathematically sublime appears to 
amount to a determinate form of judgement rather than reflective, as we would no longer continue to 
reflect on the object causing the sublime experience when ‘reasons idea of a totality completed the 
assessment for us'. (Matthews (1996): 174) 
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account aims to show. In the Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique, 
regarding the unity of space and time, Kant, it will be recalled, wrote the following; 
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains 
more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the 
manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive 
representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but 
the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I 
ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes 
all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not 
belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first 
become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines 
sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori 
intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the 
understanding. (CPR B160-1) 
It is clear here that Kant is concerned with the generation of space and time as formal 
wholes as purely a priori cognitive entities, where this is a pre-conceptual synthesis 
essential to the worlds being represented as spatiotemporal in the first place. In the 
analytic of the sublime by contrast, the significance of space and time as wholes has 
what we might call an externalist rather than internalist import. The only way to 
comprehend the infinity of space and time as unified wholes is through the idea of 
their being a supersensible substrate operating as the basis of the phenomenal world. 
This clearly makes reference to a unified space and time apart from us and which we 
comprehend only through reason, and this is quite apparent when Kant, when 
discussing the estimation of magnitude, writes, 
The mind hears in itself the voice of reason, which requires totality for all 
given magnitudes, even for those that can never be entirely apprehended 
although they are (in the sensible representation) judged as entirely given, 
hence comprehension in one intuition, and it demands a presentation for all 
members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt 
from this requirement even the infinite (space and past time), but rather 
makes it unavoidable for us to think of it (in the judgement of common 
reason) as given entirely (in its totality). (CJ 5:254) 
Grasping infinity here (the whole of space and past time) as intelligible substratum is 
clearly different from possessing space and time as formal wholes of inner and outer 
sense. It would be highly artificial however to construe an account of space and time 
as externalist that isn’t somehow grounded in, or making reference to, Kant’s 
internalist, or first Critique account, of space and time. This is because space and 
time, although predicated as external and as something in which we phenomenally 
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exist, is essentially generated a priori in inner and outer sense, so that it would be 
highly misleading, as far as reading Kant goes, to speak of a space and time apart 
from us. Thus as we have seen, it is the imagination that runs on to infinity because 
it is the nature of inner sense to do so when not held in check by the limiting 
function of the understanding and by successful comprehension in a single intuition. 
So although Kant makes reference only to reason as generating our comprehension 
of space and time as infinite whole, there must be some connection with the 
functions of inner and outer sense as making this recognition possible.  Perhaps the 
natural way to make this connection is in seeing that the only way we can form the 
idea of infinity as a whole is if we somehow possess this capacity in the first place. 
We know that the time-condition in the progression of the imagination when not 
checked through successful comprehension will proceed towards infinity. Yet Kant 
also tells us that our mind demands the grasping of infinity as a whole in accordance 
with the higher demands of reason. The only way we can be said to make perform 
this second task is if space and time are already presented to inner and outer sense, 
as formal wholes in the first place. This is not of course an aesthetic presentation but 
an intuitive ground that makes the idea of infinity as a whole possible in the first 
place66.  
 
    
                                                          
66 The case here is somewhat similar with the 'absolute space' as Kant accounts for it in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Here Kant introduces the notion of space as an idea of 
reason, which contrasts with space as an intuition and space as a concept as they are accounted for the 
Critique of Pure Reason. Space as an idea of reason, or what Kant also calls 'absolute space', like other 
ideas of theoretical reason, makes reference to an incomplete totality of concepts, which here is the 
totality of all possible relative spaces. Relative space is the perceivable empirical framework whereby 
the motion and position of bodies and their structures may be detected. Yet this relative space is only 
conceivable in its being located in a larger space, which is itself another relative space. Because this 
regress of relative spaces goes on to infinity, the idea of an absolute space must be posited as that 
which must, contrary to relative space, be absolute and immaterial, insofar as if it were a material 
perceivable space we could only make sense of it within another spatial framework. Consequently 
this idea of an absolute space is 'in itself nothing, and no object at all' and is a 'pure, nonempirical, and 
absolute space, with which I compare any empirical space, and in which I can represent the latter as 
moveable (so that the enlarged space always counts a immovable) (MFNS 4:481-2). As an absolute 
spatial framework, this idea of space bears some similarity with space as formal intuition. The 
difference is however that absolute space as an idea of reason is arrived at through a regress in spatial 
comprehension, whereas space as an intuition is presupposed as the possibility of the representation 
of space as such. Consequently absolute space as an idea of reason, just like the infinite space as 
supersensible substratum, is only possible only on the pre-supposition of the unity of space as formal 
intuition. 
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Chapter 6 
Kant's Creation Aesthetic: Genius, Taste and Seeming Like Nature 
 
 
So far in our discussion of Kant’s account of the role of concepts in governing 
aesthetic experience we have focused on the issue of aesthetic responsiveness, and 
what it means to have an aesthetic response or reaction to a particular configuration 
that is before us. In terms of a distinction that is drawn in the literature, this means 
that we have been focusing on providing an account of a ‘reception aesthetic’, where 
we have been concerned with the conditions that must be in place in order to have 
an aesthetic response, and with explicating these conditions within a Kantian 
framework in order to provide a satisfactory theory and interpretation. There is 
another aspect of Kant’s theory of taste however, that is concerned with what is 
called a ‘creation aesthetic’. This further aspect of Kant’s overall account of aesthetic 
activity is to be found in the latter stages of the third Critique, and is concerned with 
the conditions that must be in place in order to create rather than respond to an 
aesthetic product (i.e. work of art). It is clear that, in order to create a successful 
aesthetic configuration, it is not enough just to be able to have an aesthetic response, 
or a particularly heightened aesthetic sensitivity, and that something other than 
mere aesthetic responsiveness must be possessed in order to be able to create 
aesthetic works (although to be sure aesthetic sensitivity and responsiveness will be 
a necessary condition for aesthetic creation). What this something else is, and how 
this bears upon the both the intuitive and conceptual aspects of cognition, is the 
subject of this chapter. Of central concern is Kant’s contention that ‘Beautiful art is an 
art to the extent that it seems at the same time to be nature’, and with exploring what 
it means for ‘nature’ to act through an individual in aesthetic creativity. 
 
Aesthetic Creativity 
Kant’s discussion of art begins at section 43 under the title ‘On art in general’. In this 
preliminary section, which precedes the more explicit focus on beautiful, or fine art, 
Kant begins to define art through distinguishing it from various other phenomena 
and human activity. Thus art is firstly distinguished from nature, as an intentional 
work is distinguished from an effect whose determining ground (i.e. the reason for 
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its existence) is not governed through intention (i.e. through an end determining the 
cause and subsequently the effect). Secondly art is distinguished from science. Kant 
accounts for the difference here as a distinction between a practical and a theoretical 
faculty, where the latter as opposed to the former is concerned with learning and 
applying theoretical principles. Already here it can be seen that there is a particular 
non-cognitive element to artistic creation, which is unique insofar as it is an ability 
that is never sure if it is equal to its end, with Kant stating that ‘thus that which one 
can do as soon as one knows what should be done is not exactly called art. Only that 
which one does not immediately have the skill to do even if one knows it completely 
belongs to that extent to art.’ (CJ 5:303-4). Third and finally, Kant distinguishes art 
from handicraft. Kant appears to present two reasons for this distinction, and the first, 
less convincing argument, is that with handicraft its production is burdensome, and 
is in itself only attractive because of its remunerative results, whereas the production 
of fine art is regarded as agreeable in itself, and not because of any remuneration. 
The second, more convincing argument that Kant gives for this distinction is that art 
is distinguished from handicraft because art requires more talent. What exactly this 
talent consists in is at this stage undeveloped, but it is apparent from Kant’s 
subsequent discussion of this distinction that it is in its mechanical aspect that 
handicraft is distinguished from art, and that the latter is art precisely insofar as it 
has something free in it, which we will subsequently see means non-rule governed. 
With the next section Kant begins his discussion of beautiful, or fine art, and what is 
most relevant for our purposes in this section is his distinction within what he calls 
aesthetic art (as opposed to mechanical art) between agreeable art and beautiful art. 
The former kind of art for Kant is that which ‘is aimed at mere enjoyment’, and 
comes down to a kind of skill in facilitating social gatherings, such as the art of 
‘telling entertaining stories, getting the company talking in an open and lively 
manner, creating by means of jokes and laughter a certain tone of merriment’, etc. 
(CJ 5:305). The second kind of art however contrasts with agreeable art in that, as 
beautiful art, it ‘is a kind of representation that is purposive in itself’. Because of the 
universality inherent within this purposiveness (being purposive for the faculty of 
cognition as such), ‘[this] universal communicability of a pleasure already includes 
in its concept that this must not be a pleasure of enjoyment, from mere sensation, but 
one of reflection; and thus aesthetic art, as beautiful art, is one that has the reflecting 
power of judgement and not mere sensation as its standard’ (CJ 5:306). Thus 
beautiful art is beautiful precisely insofar as it engages the faculty of cognition in its 
reflective aspect (i.e. its judgemental aspect), where although not actually seeking a 
124 
 
determinate concept for the representation before us, we reflect upon its content as 
purposive for the faculty of concepts as such. 
The particular cognitive aspect of our response to beautiful art Kant goes on to 
discuss in the next section, and something of the complexity of this kind of aesthetic 
response is noted insofar as with this kind of response we are responding to 
something that is intentionally produced through human means. This essentially 
means that in being faced with an artwork we are conscious of an intention on behalf 
of the artist in its production and existence (‘In a product of art one must be aware 
that it is art’ (CJ 5:306)). Kant’s concern here is with highlighting the fact that the 
production of an artwork depends on certain rules for its production, and the 
representation of an end that brings the art work into existence (it doesn’t just 
spontaneously appear). The worry here is that this rule based aspect of a work of 
beautiful art invalidates or corrupts what ought to be the non-cognitive aspect of our 
response to a beautiful object, where it is not through any particular conceptual 
recognition that our pleasurable response is determined, and Kant writes that, 
That is beautiful which pleases in the mere judging (neither in sensation 
nor through a concept). Now art always has a determinate intention of 
producing something. If however this were a mere sensation (something 
merely subjective) that is supposed to be accompanied with pleasure, then 
this product would please, in the judging, only by means of the feeling of 
sense. If the intention were aimed at the production of a determinate object, 
then, if it were achieved through art, the object would please only through 
concepts. But in either case the art would not please in the mere judging, i.e., 
it would not please as beautiful art but as mechanical art. (CJ 5:306) 
If the rule was the pervasive feature of the work, then the ‘feeling of freedom in the 
play of our cognitive powers’ would be hindered, and the judgement would be 
based on the perception of the successful execution of a rule for production (the 
successful production of the end – mechanical art). The paradox is how the 
purposiveness in the art work can be free (i.e. unintentional) although the 
representation of an end (and intention) governed the works production. Kant’s 
beginning of a solution to this  problem begins by stating that with a work of art ‘the 
purposiveness of its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary 
rules as if it were a mere product of nature’ (CJ 5:306) (hence the sections heading 
that ‘Beautiful art is an art to the extent that it seems at the same time to be nature’). 
The difficulty is then how artistic creation can seem to be like a non-intentionally 
governed act, i.e. as though created by nature. 
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Kant’s means of solving this problem is through his introduction of genius, and with 
his introduction of this concept we make the move from a reception aesthetic, with 
reference to what it means to have a response to beautiful art, to a creation aesthetic, 
and the conditions that must be in place in order to create a work, or works, of 
beautiful art. Kant begins his discussion of genius with a preliminary definition 
which is immediately refined, so that the opening passage runs thus: 
Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Since the talent, as 
an inborn productive faculty of the artist, itself belongs to nature, this could 
also be expressed thus: Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind 
(ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art. (CJ 5:307) 
The introduction of this notion clearly offers a tentative solution to the problem as to 
how a work of art must seem both intentionally created and unintentional at the 
same time: it is because nature acts through the genius that nature manifests itself, as 
it were, in the work of art. Because the ‘rule’ is delivered by nature, somehow this 
satisfies the demand of an artwork not being conceptually governed. Kant’s 
introducing here the notion of the genius making use of some kind of non-
conceptually governed rules is quite striking, and regarding this Kant writes that, 
The concept of beautiful art[,] does not allow the judgement concerning the 
beauty of its product to be derived from any sort of rule that has a concept 
for its determining ground, and thus has as its ground a concept of how it is 
possible. Thus beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule in accordance with 
which it is to bring its product into being. (CJ 5:307) 
This notion is so striking because a rule tends to be thought of as something that is 
inherently conceptually determined, and in its being put to use proceeds according 
to determinate ends (I can't make bread unless I possess its concept). However, we 
have seen that the rule based element of artistic production threatens to rob beautiful 
art of its non-end based purposiveness, and mechanical art is not fine art precisely 
insofar as it embodies determinate rules in its presentation. This is just what Kant’s 
notion of non-concept based rules is supposed to overcome: not only is our response 
to beautiful art based upon its embodying non-conceptually determinate rules, the 
creation of a work of art itself depends upon a special ability to employ non-
conceptually-determinate rules in bringing about the end product. How exactly such 
rules come to be applied by the genius in artistic production is something Kant not 
elaborated in any detail, and there is an inherent obscurity in the notion and in the 
sense in which non-determinate rules interacts with determinate rules which govern 
artistic production. This is a difficult aspect of Kant’s theory. For on the one hand the 
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genius, with nature acting through him, must make use of rules that do not have 
concepts for their determining ground, and Kant asks, 
Since the gift of nature must give the rule to art (as beautiful art), what sort of 
rule is this? It cannot be couched in a formula to serve as a precept, for then 
the judgement about the beautiful would be determinable in accordance with 
concepts; rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed, i.e. from the 
product, against which others may test their own talent, letting it serve them 
as a model not for copying but for imitation. (CJ 5:309) 
On the other hand the genius must make use of determinate rules in order to 
maintain a level of academic correctness, and on this point Kant states that 
There is no beautiful art in which something mechanical, which can be 
grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something academically 
correct, does not constitute the essential condition of the art. For something 
in it must be thought of as an end, otherwise one cannot ascribe its product 
to any art at all; it would be a mere product of chance. But in order to aim at 
an end in the work, determinate rules are required, from which one may not 
absolve oneself. (CJ 5:310) 
It is clear that the rules in both a determinate and indeterminate sense as Kant is 
referring to them, concern the manner of presentation. On the one hand there must 
be a degree of academic correctness. Thus in drawing the artist must be able to draw, 
for without that ability anything put down on paper would be without discipline, 
and as Kant refers to it, a ‘product of chance’. What was represented couldn’t really 
be called intentional at all since there would be no method and thereby no means-
end relation that is essential to artistic production. But the art work, insofar as it 
looks like nature, is not supposed to unintentional in this way (i.e. badly or 
randomly executed), but is supposed to be unintentional insofar as the academic 
constraints (the conditions of artistic representation) aren’t governing the overall 
presentation and merit of the work. In this sense Kant states that the art work should 
be ‘without the academic form showing through, i.e., without showing any sign that 
the rule has hovered before the eyes of the artist and fettered his mental powers’ (CJ 
5:307). Thus the genius, as an original talent, must look beyond established academic 
norms for their manner of presentation, and the talent for doing this is something 
that is itself unable to be articulated or formulated according to rules, and in this 
sense it is a talent which cannot be taught.  
A work of art looks like nature insofar as it doesn’t look like artifice (the ‘rule’ 
hovering before the artists eyes). This is to define looking like nature in the negative 
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however, and more needs to be said of what it means to look like nature in a positive 
sense. What is clear though is that in order to look like nature the art work must 
embody a purposiveness for judgement which is the form of purposiveness as such, 
and this is a sense of what it means for the art work to look like nature, so that Kant 
writes that, 
In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the 
purposiveness in its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by 
arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature. On this freedom in the 
play of our cognitive powers, which must yet at the same time be purposive, 
rests that pleasure which is alone universally communicable though without 
being grounded on concepts... art can only be called beautiful if we are aware 
that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature. (CJ 5:306) 
Because the purposivity must be recognised as free in a work of art (not constrained 
by any concept), this means that the determining ground of our pleasurable response 
must to a degree be located in a formal purposiveness of the representation for the 
faculty of cognition. There are then conditions of an artworks representational aspect 
that are formally constrained. An added complexity of Kant's account however, is 
that although the formal purposivity is central to our response to the artwork as 
nature, the artwork is an artwork precisely insofar as its production is governed by 
an intention, and thereby isn't an arbitrary production. This means that the free play 
between the imagination and the understanding is in part characterised by a play 
between an intuitive content and a central or governing conceptual idea that it is the 
task of the genius to impart. Thus there are levels of complexity that govern our 
response to works of art, and the difficulty is in how to reconcile our response to the 
formal constraints governing the success of an artwork (as formally purposive for 
judgement), and the intellectual content that governs the artwork as artwork. In 
resolving this difficulty however, there are tensions with Kant's account of genius 
that must be resolved. 
 
Taste and Genius 
Central to Kant's account of genius is his account of aesthetic ideas, and here the 
question of artistic content is introduced. Before his introduction to his account of 
aesthetic ideas however, there are further issues concerning the manner of artistic 
presentation, and Kant presents a section titled ‘On the relation of genius to taste’ 
(§48), where there are inconsistencies in this account that need to be explored. In this 
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section Kant wants to draw a distinction between taste and genius as between two 
quite different aptitudes or faculties, where the former is concerned with judging 
beautiful objects, whereas the latter is concerned with producing beautiful objects67. 
Here Kant is explicit that Genius as a productive faculty is productive of beauty, 
whereas taste is not a productive faculty of itself, but just a faculty for judging. This 
initial account however conflicts with Kant’s subsequent discussion of the qualities 
of beautiful art, for he goes on to argue that taste as a faculty can itself be productive 
(In fact this notion becomes central to Kant’s account of art, where an art work can 
be created in accordance with a standard of taste, yet fail as a work of art insofar as it 
lacks what Kant calls spirit). Thus after arguing that beautiful art functions by giving 
a pleasing form to things that in reality are ugly or displeasing (such as ‘death’ and 
the ‘spirit of war’), Kant goes on to write, 
So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is really only the 
form of the presentation of a concept by means of which that latter is 
universally communicated. – To give this form to the product of beautiful art, 
however, requires merely taste, to which the artist, after he has practised and 
corrected it by means of various examples of art or nature, holds up his 
work, and after many, often laborious attempts to satisfy it, finds the form 
that contents him. (CJ 5:312) 
Here Kant is quite explicit that the formal presentation of an idea itself requires 
‘merely taste’, and since what is beautiful in a work is in a large part its presentation, 
in this sense taste is creative. Immediately after the paragraph containing the above 
section however, Kant goes on to seemingly contradict his account again, for he 
writes that, 
Taste, however, is merely a faculty for judging, not a productive faculty; and 
what is in accordance with it is for that reason not a work of beautiful art, 
although it can be a product belonging to a useful and mechanical art or even 
to science, conforming to determinate rules which can be learned and which 
must be precisely followed. (CJ 5:313) 
Whereas in the earlier paragraph taste could be said to be creative of a beautiful art 
work, Kant is here saying that by itself it cannot, and herein lies the tension. This 
tension can be ameliorated to a degree however through the recognition that Kant 
appears to be operating with two different senses of the word beautiful, and that 
taste, by itself, can be creative of beauty in art insofar as it is concerned with the 
                                                          
67 ‘For the judging of beautiful objects, as such, taste is required; but for beautiful art itself, i.e., for 
producing such objects, genius is required’ (CJ 5:311). 
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creation of pleasing form, which itself is beautiful; but that what we might call true 
beauty, or profound beauty, itself requires the addition genius. Introducing this 
twofold account of beauty would help us make sense of Kant’s remark that, 
One demands that table settings, or a moral treatise, or even a sermon must 
have in themselves [the] form of beautiful art, though without seeming 
studied; but they are not on this account called works of beautiful art. (CJ 
5:313) 
On this account although beauty is predicated of certain objects or products by 
virtue of their pleasing form, these products are not really beautiful works of art – 
they merely have the ‘form of beautiful art’, so that something else is required 
(genius) to make them truly beautiful works of art. However, although this resolves 
some of tension at this stage of the argument, the diminished or minor productive 
role with reference to creating beauty that is here assigned to taste is apparently 
reversed further on in the third Critique. 
This turnaround in Kant’s discussion follows upon his discussion of aesthetic ideas 
(the discussion of which we will come to), and comes under the heading ‘On the 
combination of taste with genius in products of beautiful art’ (§50). By this stage of 
his discussion Kant has assigned genius to the faculty of imagination and, for 
reasons already discussed, the faculty of taste to the power of judgement, and the 
turnaround in Kant’s argument can be seen in the following opening section, 
If the question is whether in matters of beautiful art it is more important 
whether genius or taste is displayed, that is the same as asking whether 
imagination or the power of judgement counts for more in them. Now since 
it is in regard to the first of these that an art deserves to be called inspired, 
but only in regard to the second that it deserves to be called a beautiful art, 
the latter, at least as an indispensible condition (condition sine qua non), is thus 
the primary thing to which one must look in the judging of art as beautiful 
art. (CJ 5:319)  
Kant’s previous argumentation that beautiful art is beautiful precisely insofar as it is 
the product of genius seems to be invalidated. For it is now on account of genius that 
a work of art can be said to be inspired, but not beautiful. For the creation of beautiful 
art taste is required, and the importance of the role of taste is apparent in the 
subsequent passage where Kant states that ‘Taste, like the power of judgement in 
general, is the discipline (or corrective) of genius’ (CJ 5:319). The importance of the 
role of taste in governing artistic production is so important that Kant states that if 
anything must be sacrificed in the production of art, it must be on the side of genius 
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rather than taste, for the latter is what keeps the presentational aspect of the artistic 
production in check, and this must mean that taste maintains the purposivity of the 
production for judgement. Kant’s reasoning here is that taste has ‘its own principles’ 
with regard to the assessment of beauty in its presentational aspect and that to 
violate these is to violate the beauty in the work. The beautiful presentation in a 
work of art is its immediate and universal appeal and can be sacrificed less willingly 
than the intellectual and imaginative content that genius imparts to the work. 
Although there are certainly inconsistencies in Kant’s argumentation, and that this 
later section conflicts with the earlier in the importance assigned to the role of taste 
in the production of beauty, that Kant is nevertheless operating with a stronger and 
weaker sense of beauty is apparent. For although we might not now want to say that 
the beauty that taste is responsible for is a minor beauty (insofar as it is only with 
regard to taste that art ‘deserves to be a called beautiful art’), there is nevertheless a 
sense in which when taste is unified with genius in artistic production a more 
profound beauty will be generated. We can now see that genius and taste must be 
combined for the production of truly beautiful works of art, although taste by itself 
can be productive (for ‘in one would-be work of beautiful art, one can often perceive 
genius without taste, while in another taste without genius’ (CJ 5:313)). This is a 
corrective of Kant’s initial contention that taste is a faculty only for judging beautiful 
works of art whereas genius is a faculty for their production, and the concluding line 
of section 50, which clearly shows that Kant amended his conception of the role of 
taste in the creation of artistic beauty reads: ‘For beautiful art, therefore, 
imagination, understanding, spirit and taste are requisite’.68 
 
Aesthetic Ideas 
That taste without genius offers an inferior artistic production opens Kant’s 
discussion of what is essentially characteristic of genius, and Kant points out that 
there is a sense in which an artistic production can have a certain pleasing quality 
and be beautiful, yet be lacking in a certain respect. In this sense this lacking is felt as 
a lacking in spirit, and it is apparent that this is the quality that genius imparts to a 
work of art in order to impart deeper artistic value ('One says of certain products, of 
which it is expected that they ought, at least in part, to reveal themselves as beautiful 
                                                          
68 Interestingly enough, in a footnote to this sentence Kant remarks that the first three of these 
aptitudes receive their unification in the fourth, i.e. in taste. In this sense taste is a much more 
encompassing productive faculty than Kant makes out. 
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art, that they are without Spirit, even though one finds nothing in them to criticise as 
far as taste is concerned' (CJ 5:313)). Spirit is importantly connected with the ability 
to find and communicate aesthetic ideas, and Kant writes: 
Spirit, in an aesthetic significance, means the animating principle in the 
mind. That however, by which this principle animates the soul, the material 
which it uses for this purpose, is that which purposively sets the mental 
powers into motion., i.e., into a play that is self-maintaining and even 
strengthens the powers to that end. Now I maintain that this principle is 
nothing other than the faculty for the presentation of aesthetic ideas. (CJ 
5:313-4) 
Spirit, in an aesthetic sense, is a kind of surging towards creation and an animating 
force. In order for it to be communicative however, and provide a content (a 
material) with which to work, a talent for presenting aesthetic ideas is required, 
which is just what spirit, in an aesthetic sense is.69 Earlier on we noted that insofar as 
genius is a talent for giving the rule, where this rule is not conceptually determined, 
it is a special non-conceptually governed talent for recognising, intuitively, that a 
certain means of communication is appropriate. Kant himself recognised the 
obscurity in this notion, but that genius in its concept is precisely this unusual talent, 
and he signals the inspirational aspect of genius when he presumes that the German 
word genie is derived from the Latin genius ‘in the sense of the particular spirit given 
to a person at birth, which protects and guides him, and from whose inspiration 
those original ideas stem’. (CJ 5:308).  
This aspect of recognising an intuitive appropriateness is also present in Kant’s 
account of aesthetic ideas and expands what we might call the role of intuition in 
Kant’s philosophy. An important aspect of the first Critique was Kant’s notion that 
there are ideas of reason which are inherent to an understanding that operates in 
applying concepts of the understanding (categories) to experience, and an idea of 
reason is defined as a concept to which no intuition is adequate. This indicated the 
pervasiveness of concepts in our experience, in the sense that they ineluctably extend 
beyond what is intuitively given. In the third Critique however the pervasiveness of 
the intuitive aspect comes to the fore in the sense that it too presents an intellectual 
content, even though this content is not delivered by the concept of the 
understanding, although, as we will see, this content does have to agree with a 
discursive concept. Thus an aesthetic idea, as a ‘pendant’ or ‘counterpart’ to an idea 
                                                          
69 This is to say that there is non-aesthetic sense of spirit, just as we say that a person is spirited, where 
this doesn’t mean that they are aesthetically productive. 
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of reason is defined as ‘that representation of the imagination that occasions much 
thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, 
to be adequate to it, which consequently, no language fully attains or can make 
intelligible.’ (CJ 5: 314).  
It is only inevitable then that as an intuitive product, the faculty for the presentation 
of aesthetic ideas is essentially an imaginative faculty and thus a product of the 
faculty of the imagination rather than the understanding. As has been shown in 
previous chapters, this distinction between imagination and understanding is 
fundamental to Kant’s account of how cognition is possible, and more or less 
important roles are assigned to either depending upon the particular cognitive 
phenomena in general. What is apparent however is a further development in Kant’s 
account of the role of the imagination, in the sense that the third Critique account 
goes beyond that of the first Critique, where the imagination is primarily defined as 
the faculty for unifying spatiotemporal intuitions. Although the imagination in the 
first Critique is said to be creative, in generating intuitions, the third Critique offers a 
much broader creative role to the imagination, and ‘imagination’ is thus used in its 
more common sense of being aesthetically imaginative or creative.  
We saw however in our first chapter that there was a tension in Kant’s distinction 
between imagination and understanding precisely insofar as imagination, as an 
autonomous faculty, is supposed to be separate from the faculty of concepts, and yet 
appears to perform its synthesising operations through the concepts of the 
understanding (categories). There is a similar difficulty with the 
imagination/understanding distinction in Kant’s account of aesthetic ideas. The 
difficulty arises from the fact that there is an important relation between the 
imagination and the understanding with reference to the presentation of aesthetic 
ideas, where this is the relation between an intuitive representation which itself is 
not conceptually determinate (although possessing an intellectual content, i.e., a 
representation ‘occasioning much thought’), and a determinate concept of the 
understanding which governs the representations meaningfulness. Thus the 
imagination/understanding distinction is essentially a one between a intuitively 
active faculty and an conceptually active faculty, and the difficulty is in 
understanding to what extent the imaginative faculty can really be said to present a 
representation the communicates an intellectual content with an autonomy non-
usurped by the faculty of concepts. 
In understanding this relation between the imagination and the understanding in 
artistic production/appreciation, it is important to point out that although it may 
133 
 
initially seem that aesthetic ideas have no determinate conceptual content, there is 
nevertheless a sense in which there is a determinate conceptual content governing 
the particular artistic production. Kant sees the activity of the artist as being 
governed by what might be called a central or key concept; and with reference to the 
art of poetry (which for Kant is the highest art form), Kant sees the poet as 
‘[venturing] to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the 
blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc., as well as to make that of which 
there are examples in experience, e.g. death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as 
love, fame, etc., sensible beyond the limits of experience’ (CJ 5:314). This central or 
governing concept, as a (more or less) determinate conceptual idea70 is a product of 
the understanding or of reason. The central concept however must be supplemented 
or expanded through a non-discursive means , and with reference to this Kant 
writes, 
Now if we add to a concept a representation of the imagination that belongs 
to its presentation, but which by itself stimulates so much thinking that it can 
never be grasped in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically 
enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way, then in this case the 
imagination is creative, and sets the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into 
motion, that is, at the instigation of a representation it gives more to think 
about than can be grasped and made distinct in it (although it does, to be 
sure, belong to the concept of the object). (CJ 5:315) 
The question is then, how does the imagination in a non-conceptual way, expand 
upon a central concept or idea. Although it is clear at this stage that it does so in an 
intuitive representational way, it is not until The Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of 
Judgement, under the section (§59) ‘On beauty as the symbol of morality’ that Kant 
provides a solution to this problem. 
 
Aesthetic Symbols 
Kant’s discussion of the means of sensible presentation is very helpful in coming to 
understand how a concept can be explicated or illustrated, and there are two means 
by which sensible presentation can take place:  
                                                          
70 I say ‘more or less’ determinate conceptual idea since the artist may be operating with a central idea 
more or less consciously. This is to say that an artist can be consciously working on a theme, but they 
might not be, although some central idea does inform their activity. 
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All hypotyposis (presentation, subject sub adspectum), as making as 
something sensible, is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to a 
concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given a 
priori; or symbolic, where to a concept which only reason can think, and to 
which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with 
which the power of judgement proceeds in a way merely analogous to that 
which it observes in schematisation, i.e. it is merely the rule of this 
procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the 
reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept. (CJ 5:351) 
Thus there is something about certain intuitional representations that allow them to 
stand for a concept or idea which by themselves bring with them no schematic 
representation. What this certain something is that enables one representation to 
stand for another has to do with a certain structural analogue between the concept 
that is without a schematic intuition and the intuition that, although with a 
conceptual content, is used to stand as a presentation for a different concept (the 
concept without schematic presentation): 
Thus a monarchical state is represented by a body with a soul if it is ruled in 
accordance with laws internal to the people, but by a mere machine (like a 
handmill) if it is ruled by a single absolute will, but in both cases it is 
represented only symbolically. (CJ 5:352) 
An allegory can be said to present itself (in the imagination) when there is a 
sufficient or large degree of structural similarity in what we may call the rule of 
synthesis governing the respective cognitions. As was discussed extensively in 
earlier chapters, any synthesising operation, even at the perceptual level, requires 
both concepts and intuitions in order to operate, and thus it is important to 
acknowledge that although the imaginative representation is said to operate apart 
from any determinate concepts, it nevertheless has its schematising function by 
virtue of a structural analogue in a synthesis that is governed by concepts (the 
categories). Thus there is something about the way the despotic monarchical state is 
presented in the imagination that brings to mind the operations of a handmill, where 
this bringing to mind is just an awareness of a certain similarity in synthesis in the 
cognition. The imagination retains a distinctive role just because it is concerned with 
the spatiotemporal element of cognition, and the intuitions that it uses are able to 
function as a language (symbolically) just because the spatiotemporal orderings that 
govern synthesis speak not only for themselves but for other representations that 
have a similar structural analogue. In this sense the spatiotemporal configurations 
that are generated by the imagination outstrip what is discursively representable or 
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communicable, and ‘occasion much thinking’ (through association) without the use 
of determinate concepts.  
What it is important to remember however, is that the central concept, or group of 
concepts, that is/are being illustrated can themselves be more or less conceptually 
determinate insofar as our grasp of certain concepts are more or less conceptually 
determinate. This generates another issue regarding conceptual determinacy. Thus it 
is not simply the case that we always have a clear central conceptual idea which we 
expand in an intuitive way through the presentation of intuitions which function as 
symbols. The central idea itself may be highly indeterminate and elusive, both for 
artist and audience. In the above example we have a highly determinate idea of a 
certain monarchical constitution, and we thereby have a clear rule of synthesis that 
governs this concepts formation. Although art may engage with more determinate 
concepts like this, often the idea that the artist is concerned with itself has a larger 
degree of indeterminacy. This is because the concern of the artist is often, as 
mentioned, for that which transcends experience (ideas of reason, ‘the ‘kingdom of 
the blessed, the ‘kingdom of hell’, ‘creation’, etc.), and their endeavour to present 
some palpable, intuitive, intimation of such ideas. Because these ideas are further 
grounded in those central ideas of reason that are concerned with 'God, freedom [of 
will], and immortality' (CPR B395), and their implications, there is a necessary 
transcendent aspect to artistic creation as it aims to explicate, or offer intimations of 
such ideas. The question is where do such ideas come from? To be sure, the Dialectic  
of the first Critique has illustrated how the concepts of the understanding transcend 
what is sensibly given and cause a dialectic (conflicting concepts that we cannot help 
but think). However, Kant’s practical philosophy expanded upon the sense in which 
we can be said to have ideas of reason, whereby they are thrust upon us through our 
experience as moral agents. What we learned in particular is that not only are we 
constrained to think of ourselves as moral agents, but that we must actually posit a 
noumenal self insofar as we cannot but think of ourselves as free agents who remain 
undetermined (morally speaking) by the phenomenal world71. What is important 
here is that we are said to have access to (partake of) a supersensible (noumenal) 
                                                          
71 See for instance Chapter 3 of Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) where Kant 
writes about the human being that, 'Consequently he has two perspectives from which he can 
consider himself and from which he can acknowledge the laws governing the use of his powers and 
consequently governing all his actions. He can consider himself first so far as he belongs to the world 
of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy); and secondly - so far as he belongs to the intelligible 
[noumenal] world - under laws that are not empirical but, being independent of nature, are founded 
on reason alone. (Groundwork 4:452) 
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realm, so that there are two selves as it were, where the noumenal is causally 
efficacious in the phenomenal.  
What is interesting here is that Kant’s account in the third Critique expands upon his 
account of the role of noumena in the practical philosophy. Because we have access 
to a supersensible realm as the source of certain ideas of reason, we are able to 
present intimations of it. However because we have no direct acquaintance with any 
such realm, our ideas of such a domain have a limitedness and indeterminacy. 
Nevertheless, the sheer fact of noumenal participation, insofar as it is the grounds of 
all our moral experience and a large degree of the ground of our belief in the 
existence of a God (insofar as we are bound by laws of which we are not the author) 
provides a wealth of material for artistic creation, and it is the lot of the genius to 
both grasp this content and communicate it through intuitive means. How this 
content will be communicated depends of course on the artistic medium, and with 
reference to the art of poetry Kant writes that, 
It expands the mind by setting the imagination free and presenting, within 
the limits of a given concept and among the unbounded manifold of forms 
possibly agreeing with it, the one that connects its presentation with a 
fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate, and 
thus elevates itself aesthetically to the level of ideas. It strengthens the mind 
by letting it feel its capacity to consider and judge of nature, as appearance, 
freely, self-actively, and independent of determination by nature, in 
accordance with points of view that nature does not present by itself in 
experience either for sense of for the understanding, and thus to use it for the 
sake of and as it were as the schema of the supersensible. (CJ 5:326-7) 
It is because of the figurative quality of the imagination and its ability to 
communicate through intuitions that it is able to act as a 'schema of the 
supersensible'. It does this through a discriminate selection of representations that 
are able to function as symbols for something other than their original concept. In 
this sense Kant has an important ‘symbolist’ conception of artistic practice that is 
overlooked in the literature72, yet it is important to appreciate this aspect of his 
aesthetic theory as it is central to understanding how artistic production is able to 
communicate aesthetic ideas and provide a schema, as it were, for the supersensible. 
                                                          
72 Kant's aesthetics is often characterised as being 'formalist' and some times, with regard to his 
account of aesthetic ideas 'expressionist' (See Allison (2001): 286-290). But it seems to me that equally, 
if not more pervasive of Kant's account, is what we can call a 'symbolist' aesthetic. This is insofar as 
things in the world are used to stand as symbols for something else, and communicate much that is 
discursively ineffable. 
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The non-conceptual aspect in this mode of communication consists in the fact that 
symbolic representations are able to enliven or communicate an idea which 
transcends conceptual exhibition. It is important to remember however, that this 
could not occur if there were not a content to the idea, which qua discursively 
transcendent, has a strong element of conceptually indeterminacy (unable to be 
expressed through language). For it is only through the intimation of such a content 
that the art work engaged with such ideas succeeds. So although there is a degree of 
conceptual determinacy with reference to what the art work is engaging with (its 
content), there is nevertheless a degree of indeterminacy insofar as the ideas here are 
transcendent ideas, i.e. ideas that transcend what is given through experience and 
have their grounds in a noumenal as opposed to a phenomenal aspect of self-
experience. So although the symbol functions through an analogy in the rule of 
synthesis, and represents through a similarity in comprehension, the content itself, 
although intellectual, has a degree of conceptual indeterminacy (we might say the 
grasp of it is fleeting and never determinate), which for its full expression requires 
the talents of genius. 
 
Giving 'the rule as nature' 
Earlier on in our discussion we saw that one of Kant’s central claims regarding the 
nature of beautiful art, was that art, in order to be beautiful, must seem like nature. 
Because an artwork is an intentional production however, and is governed by the 
representation of an end in its formation, the only way in which an art work could 
be said to look like nature is if actual nature, as creative, is somehow acting through 
the subject. Because something can be said to look like nature just insofar as it 
embodies the form of purposiveness, as opposed to a purposiveness for something 
(which would make the judgement a conceptually determined one), or as Kant puts 
it, 
In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the 
purposiveness in its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by 
arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature[...] art can only be called 
beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature. (CJ 
5:306) 
then it appeared that a creative ability was a talent for presenting a certain 
configuration which by virtue of its formal properties was purposive for the faculty 
of judgement. Here the presented intuitive representation would be purposive for 
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the faculty of judgement as such, and the artist would be particularly adept at 
presenting such intuitive representations, that look like nature as it were. These 
representations  would be recognised as art insofar as they embody something 
academically correct (and academic correctness could just be construed as being 
drawn/written/made in accordance with an academic standard). On this account 
however, artistic talent appears to have little concern with artistic content, and it 
wasn’t until Kant’s introduction of aesthetic ideas that the importance of a governing 
central concept and its presentation came to the fore. In this later development 
genius, as artistic talent, was connected with the ability to communicate aesthetic 
ideas, and what is important is that this ability is connected with Kant’s initial claim 
that genius gives the rule to art. Thus in section 49, in his account of aesthetic ideas, 
Kant highlights some conclusions our analysis has drawn out: that genius involves 
not only an ability to present in an artistic way aesthetic ideas, but that they must 
first have a talent or aptitude for discovering them: 
Thus genius really consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach 
and no diligence learn, of finding ideas for a given concept on the one hand 
and on the other hitting upon the expression for these. Through which the 
subjective disposition of the mind that is thereby produced, as an 
accompaniment of a concept, can be communicated to others. (CJ 5:317)  
That the finding of ideas is essentially a concern with what is discursively 
transcendent is again apparent in what follows, as is identification of the talent for 
the presentation of the idea with 'giving the rule to art', and Kant argues that this 
latter talent, 
Is really that which is called spirit, for to express what is unnameable in the 
mental state in the case of a certain representation and to make it universally 
communicable, whether the expression consist in language, or painting, or in 
plastic art – that requires a faculty for apprehending the rapidly passing play 
of the imagination and unifying it into a concept (which for that very reason 
is original and at the same time discloses a new rule, which could not have 
been deduced from any antecedent principles or examples), which can be 
communicated without the constraint of rules. (CJ 5:317) 
The artist must first possess what ‘is unnameable in the mental state’, the idea, and 
then present this idea so as to make it universally communicable, which just means 
to give it artistic form. The presentation of these ideas, insofar as they are translated 
into a intuitive communicative form (through the use of symbols) is what discloses 
‘a new rule’ insofar as it is original and not imitative of previous ways of 
communicating aesthetic ideas. It is the art of genius to unify the imaginative 
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representational content into or around a concept (idea), since it is only by having a 
conceptual content that the art work is recognised as intentional, and thereby, a 
work of art (having an intention as its determining ground). As discussed however, 
this concept itself can be more or less determinate (or general73), and its expansion 
through artistic representation expands upon this central concept so as to express 
what is connected with its idea, and in this sense communicates ‘much that is 
unnameable’ (CJ 5:316).  
So the connection between the nature in the genius giving the rule to art and 
aesthetic ideas is made apparent, and the overarching concern of genius is the 
communication of ideas in a non-discursive way (because of the limits to discursive 
expression), i.e. aesthetically. However, there thereby seems to be a tension in this 
analysis, insofar as genius is defined as an aptitude for making art seem like nature 
where this is also an aptitude for giving the rule to art (i.e. a new rule which is 
original and exemplary). But because looking like nature has also been characterised 
as the ability to create a representation that is purposive in its form without the 
constraint of any 'arbitrary rules' (i.e. formally purposive for judgement), then it 
seems there is a conflict in what it means for a representation to look like nature. On 
the one hand it is the formal aspect of the work that consists in the artworks seeming 
like nature, whereas on the other hand it is the artworks embodying a content that is 
original and exemplary in its unification in a concept that appears also to consist in 
the artworks seeming like nature. Clearly then the issue is to how to reconcile this 
form-content issue, where, artistically, an ability to present representations that are 
purposive for the faculty of cognition is as important to making art seem like nature 
as is the communication of a meaning. 
 
Form and Content 
On the face of things, given Kant's account of aesthetic ideas, and its relation to his 
account of genius, one might well read Kant as maintaining the idea that fine art is 
essentially concerned with communicating (expressing) a content rather than 
presenting a configuration that is purposive for judgement. This is because giving 
the rule to art isn't just a matter of presenting good form which is purposive for 
                                                          
73 We might say that a lot of artworks are variations on various themes. Thus a certain virtue, or the 
theme of virtue itself may be governing the general theme of the work, although it is illustrated or 
communicated in various different ways, according to the strength of the artistic idea. Thus any work 
can be insipid or profound, depending upon how successfully and richly the idea is communicated. 
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cognition but is a matter of presenting an intellectual content in a non-discursive 
way that is original and yet exemplary. The difficulty is in seeing how this 
intellectual content be presented in a way such that it looks like nature, when 
looking like nature is defined as looking as though free from any conceptual 
determination, and this is the difficulty we need to resolve74.  
There are two positions that we need to consider in finding a solution to this 
difficulty. The first takes the lead from an argument proposed by Martin Gammon, 
who puts forward a solution to the difficulty generated by Kant's account of 
adherent beauty. The problem of adherent beauty is an issue disclosed in the 
Analytic of Beauty and is closely related to the problem we are discussing now, and 
this is the problem as to how a judgement of taste can said to be aesthetic when there 
are considerations regarding the objects purpose or concept that also determine our 
response to its presentation. A pure judgement of taste is a comparatively less 
common kind of aesthetic judging, and by far the most common kinds of aesthetic 
judgements are of the more complex kind, where concepts of the objects 
functionality or end govern our response. Judgements regarding fine art are, as 
shown, clearly of the adherent kind, since their content is governed by a conceptual 
content, and it is only insofar as the art work embodies some kind of intention on the 
part of the artist that the representation is recognised as a work of art (and not a 
product of mere chance). The problem is how the work of art retains a purposiveness 
for judgement as such in its presentation (looks like nature), whilst having a 
conceptual content. Gammon's solution to the adherence problem (which is 
essentially related to our argument of Chapter 4) is to see two separate acts in the 
judgement as it were, so that with adherent beauty there is a pure judgement of taste 
governing our response, and, separately (although it might not be experienced as 
such), a judgement conditioned by the conceptual content of the representation 
(Gammon (1999): 152). A response to an adherently beautiful object such as a picture 
frame for instance (which has a determinate function) can in part be characterised 
solely with reference to the purposiveness in its form, so that the purity in the 
judgement is pervasive. The overall assessment of course must make reference to the 
purpose of the frame, its concept, but the point is that the pure judgement can be 
abstracted from the purposivity. This way we are able to make sense of the 
phenomenon whereby we take a pleasure in an object whilst at the same time taking 
                                                          
74 Zammito has called this the 'grounding paradox of art': 'Fine art falls under artifice in general, yet it 
must not subordinate itself to a prescriptive rule. Kant has landed himself squarely in a paradox' 
(Zammito (1992): 134). 
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a dissatisfaction in the fact that the object isn't suited to its end75 (so that we can 'run' 
two separate and judgements as it were).  
With reference to our problem this account can take us some way to seeing how art 
can look like nature whilst embodying conceptual form. We might say that it is 
because there are two separate aspects to judgement (and creativity) that art can be 
said to look like nature in its freedom from arbitrary rules on the one hand, whilst at 
the same time embodying an intellectual content on the other. Insofar as the artistic 
representation embodies a formal purposiveness that can be abstracted from the 
intellectual content, then the purity of the aesthetic production can be said to come 
through, whereby the work can be said to look like nature (unconstrained by 
concepts, or rules, in its purposivity). The overall judgement however involves an 
overall recognition of the intentional content of the representation, and the extent to 
which the artwork communicates an idea. Although this takes us some way towards 
a solution, it does not translate straightforwardly towards a solution to our problem 
insofar as there is a greater complexity in Kant's account of artistic productivity 
whereby both aspects of artistic production (the formal constraint and the 
introduction of a concept) are both constitutive of what it means for art to look like 
nature, and thus components of a successful work of art. We thus need to look at 
another account in working towards a solution, whereby the aspects of form and 
content are brought closer together. 
This other position is that put forward by Henry Allison, and is that which aims to 
bring together this closeness of form and content, so that purposivity in the form of 
the object is connected with its communicating a content, or ideas. Indeed this 
proximity is such that on this account the content just is the form (and form is 
content) that is the subject matter of any representation. There is in fact a strong 
appeal to this alignment, insofar as we naturally want to say that content is only 
communicated through a form so that there is a close alignment between the formal 
configuration and content (presentation of the idea). In addition, in Kant's account of 
symbolic representation, it is only through a structural analogue in the synthesis of 
the representations that an object can stand for something for which there is no 
direct intuition, and this lends very strong support to the identity. Because the 
synthesis of the object involves a synthesis of the spatial (through the operation of 
sortal concepts on intuition), then it is through the formal aspect that the object is 
said to be communicative (symbolically). Indeed there is good reason within the text 
                                                          
75 Of course the counter-purposiveness to its end can be so overwhelming that it overrides any pure 
aesthetic judgement. 
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of the third Critique for identifying form with content and in his remarks on music 
Kant writes, 
Just as modulation is as it were a language of sensations universally 
comprehensible to every human being, the art of tone puts that language into 
practice for itself alone, in all its force, namely as a language of the affects, 
and so, in accordance with the law of association, universally communicates 
the aesthetic ideas that are naturally combined with it; however, since those 
aesthetic ideas are not concepts nor determinate thoughts, the form of the 
composition of these sensations (harmony and melody) serves only, instead 
of the form of a language, to express, by means of a proportionate disposition 
of them[...], the aesthetic ideas of a coherent whole of an unutterable fullness 
of thought, corresponding to a certain theme, which constitutes the dominant 
affect in the piece. (CJ 5:328-9 emphasis) 
Here the form of the composition, as a kind of non-discursive or linguistic language, 
serves to express aesthetic ideas, so that the form is the content, as it were. In fact 
Allison, in his concern with resolving the compatibility of Kant's account of beauty 
as the expression of aesthetic ideas with the claim of the analytic that beauty is to be 
understood in terms of the purposivity of form, appeals to the above paragraph in 
arguing that resolving this tension requires a recognition of form as content. For 
Allison, Kant is able to maintain the idea that beauty is to be understood solely in 
terms of the purposiveness of form, because purposiveness of form is expression of 
ideas, and Allison writes that, 'purposive form and the expression of aesthetic ideas 
are strictly correlative notions for Kant. Just as there can be no successful expression 
and communication of these ideas without form, so there can be no aesthetically 
pleasing form apart from the expression of aesthetic ideas' (Allison (2001): 289). This 
is a strong claim on Allison's part, especially given that in the third moment of the 
analytic Kant is explicit that certain formal arrangements (such as 'designs a la 
greque' and foliage decorations) by themselves 'signify nothing' (CJ 5:229). The real 
trouble is however, how we can really be said to keep a hold of the purposivity of 
form for cognition as such, apart from any content, as determining our response, 
when the beauty in the object gets its quality from its expressive aspect (what the 
form serves to express). When the gap is closed between form and content, and 
purposivity of form is essentially found to be the same as the communication of 
ideas, it is then difficult to see how just the purposivity of form for the faculty of 
concepts as such, at any level of response, can be the determining ground of our 
response, as seems integral to Kant's account. What does determine our response 
becomes the symbolic repertoire built into the form, and even though a non-
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determinate conceptual content is determining our response, it is nevertheless the 
purposivity of the content for delivering an intellectual content (ideas) that 
determines our response. 
In spite of our initial reservations to Allison's account however, the proximity 
between form and content is a very important feature of Kant's account, which can 
only be ignored to the detriment of some of his most important insights. Thus there 
is further textual evidence for supposing that form is only form insofar as it delivers 
a content, and it is worthwhile to probe deeper into this puzzle that is generated by 
the text itself. Within his discussion of fine art, Kant makes a surprising claim given 
the formalist conception of natural beauty that was presented in the analytic. With 
the opening of section 51, 'On the division of the beautiful arts', Kant writes that, 
Beauty (whether it be beauty of nature or of art) can in general be called the 
expression of aesthetic ideas: only in beautiful art this idea must be 
occasioned by a concept of the object, but in beautiful nature the mere 
reflection on a given intuition, without a concept of what the object ought to 
be, is sufficient for arousing and communicating the idea of which that object 
is considered as the expression. (CJ 5:320) 
Here beauty in nature isn't defined just by the intuitions being purposive for 
judgement as such, but by its expressive aspect, where the intuition expresses, or 
communicates some kind of idea (without a concept of what the object ought to be, 
so that expression is apart from any question of adherence). Because Kant has 
characterised our response to natural beauty as a purposiveness for judgement, it is 
tempting, given these later developments regarding expression, to bring these two 
accounts together so that the identity between form and content is used to expand 
Kant's initial conception regarding the form of purposiveness. Natural beauty is then 
expressive of ideas not because of any overt content that the form represents, 
through an association of ideas as it were, but because of the form itself speaking 
directly (so that form itself is like an alphabet in a language).  
Clearly however, such remarks inevitably lead to a expanded conception of the role 
of form in Kant's aesthetic. Form isn't just a formal configuration that our faculties 
find either purposive or counter-purposive for working with (bringing concepts to), 
but a whole language based upon the synthetic unity involved in each object as 
cognition. However, in order to recognise the importance of this aspect it must, in 
order to save the account of the analytic, be accommodated in such a way that the 
determining ground of our response to beauty isn't (at least solely) grounded in the 
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objects symbolic role (as representing ideas), but (at least in part) in the form of 
purposiveness for the faculty of cognition. 
 
Two Senses of 'seeming like nature' 
With reference to our initial problem - the problem as to how art can look like nature 
when looking like nature is characterised as a purposivity for cognition as such 
(apart from any end) - we can now see that making art look like nature means 
making art communicative. This is because nature itself is communicative, and so 
the genius has to make the art work speak as nature speaks. This seems to raise to 
our problem over again (looking like nature not being grounded in the form of 
purposiveness), but the beginning of our solution (for this is what we now need to 
do) is to recognise that insofar as natural beauty is communicative and thereby 
brings with it a content, then there is what we might call a symbolic-meaningful 
element in our response. Thus the natural world is replete with symbolic meaning 
by virtue of structural analogue through form. Because all beauty is communicative 
then all beauty is what we might call meaningful (it signifies). What this means is 
not that a determinate end of what the object is supposed to be governs every 
representation, but that most, if not all, objects are able to carry a symbolic meaning 
with them by virtue of their formal structure. This can be true of a pure judgement of 
taste just as much as an adherent judgement, for the judgement by no means needs 
to have a determinate end in its presentation (something the object is supposed to 
be). The object may or may not have a determinate end, but insofar as an object can 
stand for something entirely different from what it actually is, then it is what we can 
call a signifier. Thus art seems like nature just insofar as it operates as nature does, 
through intuitive symbols, where a tree, a fence and a dead leaf can all stand for 
something symbolically.  
However, something must be said for the purely formal elements in terms of the 
representations purposiveness for judgement as such, and this is where we must go 
beyond the letter of Kant and say that there must be two aspects of what it means for 
art to seem like nature. On the one hand art seems like nature just insofar as it speaks 
like nature does, through symbols, where the object speaks fluently and 
unconsciously as a sign for something else (intimations of the supersensible). On the 
other hand the representation must look like nature by respecting the purely formal 
constraint that governs the success of a representation in terms of its purposiveness 
just for cognition as such. This is to say that although a representation may speak by 
145 
 
virtue of its forms, this is not enough to secure its success as a representation, and the 
representation or object must be structured in such a way that it is readable, as it 
were, for cognition (something the faculty of concepts can seamlessly integrate 
with). A representation can be said to be purposive for cognition in the first place just 
insofar as the formal configuration before us is something that harmonises with the 
understanding as the faculty of concepts. In the second place, a representation can be 
said to be purposive for cognition just insofar as it stimulates the mind into grasping 
a content, and ugliness or inappropriateness (counter-purposiveness) of 
representation comes about just insofar as the wrong or inappropriate symbols are 
used in intimating aspects of the supersensible (which largely means the moral 
dimension of our existence). Thus just as there are two ways in which art can seem 
like nature, there are two ways in which the representation is purposive for 
judgement. Thus in being presented with a piece of nature we aren't just presented 
with a formal configuration, but with things such as trees, or buildings, and light 
effects, and each component in our representation is able to function as a symbol, as 
a kind of language, and thus communicate in some way (a change in light for 
instance, can by itself make a representation meaningful). In order for the 
representation to have a special attractiveness however, there must be something 
that appeals in the representations formal configuration by itself, where it is almost 
in abstraction from what is before us that the configuration works, as it were76.   In 
artistic production the constraint on the representation being purposive for cognition 
as such (the formal) must be in place in order for the communicative aspect to be 
possible (for an initial failure here detracts from further interest in what the work 
communicates)77. 
This reading of what it means for art to look like nature also helps to understand and 
appreciate another important aspect of Kant's account that was looked at earlier on 
in this chapter. Just as there are two elements to what it means for art to seem like 
nature, and two senses in which a representation can be purposive for cognition, 
there are, for Kant, two formative aspects to artistic creation itself, and, as we have 
seen, these are delivered through the two separate faculties of genius and taste. 
Earlier on we found that contrary to Kant's initial claim, taste is an important 
productive aspect of beauty in artistic creation, and with reference to the question 
                                                          
76 This distinction is well encapsulated in Maurice Denis's famous (formalist) remark of 1890 that 
'Remember that a picture, before being a battle horse, a nude woman, or some anecdote, is essentially 
a plane surface covered with colours assembled in a certain order'. (See Bibliography for details) 
77 This point regarding the dependency of one form of artistic expression upon another will be a 
subject for discussion in our next chapter. 
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whether in artistic production it is more important whether genius or taste is 
displayed in artistic production, Kant gave the honour to taste. Genius gives the rule 
to art through the presentation of aesthetic ideas, and in doing so makes art seem 
like nature by speaking as nature does (through its forms which are symbolic). But 
there is a constraint upon this activity of genius, which is just that the objects it uses 
for its communication in a representation of some kind, are ordered in a satisfactory 
manner. Thus in order for the work to look like nature as a purposive for 
communicating ideas, it must first look like nature as purposive for cognition as 
such, and this is what taste delivers; 
Taste, like the power of judgement in general, is the discipline (or corrective) 
of genius, clipping its wings and making it well behaved or polished; but at 
the same time it gives genius guidance as to where and how far it should 
extend itself if it is to remain purposive; and by introducing clarity and order 
into the abundance of thoughts it makes the ideas tenable, capable of an 
enduring and universal approval, of enjoying prosperity among others and 
in an ever progressing culture. (CJ 5:319) 
We can read the sense in which genius is made to remain purposive as a remaining 
purposive for communication, and this is because taste in the first place maintains 
the purposivity of the representation as such. If it wasn't for this discipline of taste 
then the representations communicative and symbolic intention would be thwarted 
so as to lose all effectiveness. In this case, although a representation, or any would be 
work of art, may be rich in ideas, it fails as a work if the constraints on the form of 
purposiveness as such are not met. This is precisely why 'if anything must be 
sacrificed in the conflict of the two properties in one product, it must rather be on the 
side of genius' (CJ 5:319-20)78. 
So the genius gives the rule by speaking through natural forms just as nature does, 
yet is only able to do this insofar as the first constraint (delivered by taste) on 
looking like nature is in place, which is that the representation be purposive for 
cognition by virtue of its form alone. Insofar as this element is governing any 
                                                          
78 Sarah Gibbons (Kant's Theory of Imagination) has emphasised what has become apparent in our 
reading, the sense in which there is a play between imagination and reason in responding to works of 
fine art, so that aesthetic judgements of beauty are not only governed by a play between imagination 
and understanding (Gibbons (1994): 111-17) . Indeed the distinction between the formalist and 
symbolic element of an art work as we have accounted for it maps well onto the difference between 
the role of the understanding and reason, and the role of taste and genius. The proximity between the 
operations of the understanding and reason are brought closer together however in recognising the 
proximity between form and content (although as we have seen, we refrain from saying that one 
collapses into the other). 
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representation, then, in accordance with Gammon's argument, there is always a 
sense in which a pure aspect of taste figures in all aesthetic response, operating as 
the determining ground of our initial response.  We have said however that there is a 
sense in which any representation signifies (has meaning) just insofar as it has a 
symbolic function so that, in accordance with Allison's suggestion, it can 
communicate through its forms so that our response to the natural world is rich with 
symbolic meaning by virtue of the richness of our intellectual and moral life. 
Allison's argument as presented, regarding the collapsing of the content into the 
formal presentation, we were unable just to accept insofar as we have shown that it 
is important for the purely formal aspect of representational presentation to remain 
as what determines our response in the first place. A purely formal constraint 
underpins the representations success or failure, so that, as far as the deduction goes, 
the form of purposivity remains dominant as what it is that allows us to recognise 
beauty, even if a more complete or profound (or artistic) beauty involves the 
communicative power of aesthetic ideas (and thus the recognition of a form/content 
identity). 
 
So as this rather complex chapter as shown, the role of concepts in Kant's account of 
aesthetic creativity turns out to be a complex one, and a one which has re-informed 
our initial account of aesthetic responsiveness. Not only does artistic production 
require an ability to order a configuration so that the faculty of intuitions are 
purposive for the faculty of concepts as such, it also requires a talent for the finding 
and presentation of aesthetic ideas. This talent turns out to require what might be 
called a certain intellectual intuitive ability, insofar as the artistic genius is someone 
engaged with reflecting upon aspects of existence which transcend what is 
phenomenally grounded. As we have discussed, this expands both Kant's account of 
the role of the imagination - as something that is able to symbolically portray that for 
which there is no discursive expression - and his account of the role of noumena. In 
the latter case, insofar as we are moral agents possessed with reason, then we most 
posit the reality of a noumenal self who is efficacious and present in the phenomenal 
realm. As the basis of our moral experience, the noumenal realm is also the basis of 
certain intimations that we are unable to fully express through discursive concepts, 
and it is the job of the genius to give symbolic form to these ideas through the use of 
symbols available in the natural world. Thus we saw that there is a kind of non-
conceptualism in Kant's account just insofar as artistic production is concerned with 
the ineffable, or that for which no language is adequate. The peculiarity of this 
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however, is that we are nevertheless talking about an intellectual content, so that it 
turns out that a content can be expressed other than discursively79. However, insofar 
as objects are able to stand for something, or speak to us, through the synthesis in 
their formation as cognitions, then concepts are active in making the representation 
possible in the first place (through the operation of the categories on intuition). Thus 
the peculiarity of this kind of non-conceptualism is in recognising the importance of 
the concept in making a representation symbolic in the first place, even if what the 
object represents is by itself incapable of conceptual articulation. In addition we have 
discussed the importance of recognising that although in his account of fine art Kant 
presents both symbolist and expressionist conceptions of artistic production, there is 
nevertheless an important formalist conception that remains insofar as the artistic 
representation must satisfy the demands of formal purposivity that govern the 
success or failure of a representation in the first place. There are important 
ramifications of this point for the role of the intuition in artistic productivity (and the 
role of space as formal intuition), and this is the subject of our next chapter. 
  
                                                          
79 Conrad Fiedler, a relatively unknown yet interesting Post-Kantian philosopher, like Kant, 
recognised the sense in which an engagement with the aesthetic is a cognitive engagement, writing in 
On Judging Works of Visual Art that, 'To remain at the stage of perception rather than to pass onward to 
the stage of abstraction [concept formation] does not mean remaining on a level which does not lead 
to the realm of cognition; on the contrary, it means to keep open other roads that also arrive at 
cognition. But if cognition attained by perceptual experience is different from cognition reached by 
abstract thinking, it can nevertheless be a true and final cognition' (Fiedler (1949): 35). Important to 
Fieldler's account is the difference between a conceptual activity such as science and a non-conceptual 
activity such as artistic creativity. In an Introduction to the 1949 text Henry Schaefer-Simmern argues 
that although Fiedler was grounded in the Kantian philosophy he developed Kant's ideas in an 
original way through applying Kant's epistemology to the domain of the visual arts (See (Fiedler 
(1949): Introduction)). 
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Chapter 7 
The Role of Intuition in Artistic Creativity 
 
 
In our last chapter we reached the conclusion that in order to retain the consistencies 
in Kant's account, there must be two ways in which beautiful art has the capacity to 
seem like nature. In the first place the artistic representation must be concerned with 
a formal purposiveness whereby the representation looks like nature because the 
representation has a purposiveness for cognition such that nature itself presents to 
us in our responses to the natural world. In the second place, insofar as the 
representation is said to look like nature through the genius giving the rule to art, 
then the representation is concerned with the presentation of a content and the 
communication of aesthetic ideas. The representation here seems like nature because 
there is no artifice governing the presentation, and the representation speaks as 
nature speaks, through natures language, as it were. What is more is that we have 
stated that it is only insofar as the representation looks like nature in the first sense 
that it is possible for the audience to engage with it in the second sense. This is 
because in order to be receptive to an artwork in terms of what it has to say, it must 
first engage in a positive way our faculty of taste, and we saw that this accords with 
Kant's distinction between the presence of taste and genius as two essential 
ingredients to artistic production. If anything is to be sacrificed in the representation 
then for Kant it must be on the side of genius, rather than on the side of taste, and 
this clearly indicates the primacy of taste in artistic creation for making the 
representation approachable, or tolerable, in the first place. 
There is more to be said for this dependence of the presentation of ideas upon an 
initial success in the representations formal purposivity for judgement, and this 
involves a recognition of the importance of the role of intuition in making art seem 
like nature (in its purposivity for judgement). Our focus here is still on the 
conditions for aesthetic creativity, although there are inevitable concerns with the 
issue of receptivity, which presupposes the possibility of aesthetic creativity in the 
first place. For the purposes of our investigation we will restrict this focus on artistic 
creativity (and responsiveness) to the visual aspect of aesthetic responsiveness, 
which means to that area of aesthetics that is concerned with shape and form on both 
a two and three dimensional level. In doing this we will be able to highlight the 
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importance of the role of intuition and the feeling for space (as intuition) in both 
aesthetic response and creativity.  
 
Intuition and Form 
With the visual in art, in making this art seem like nature in our first sense, we are, 
as seen, not saying anything more than that we are making the representation 
purposive for the faculty of judgement. What this means is that we are manipulating 
materials in such a way that we are making the intuition purposive for the faculty of 
concepts, so that the whole representation, as a successful artwork, can be said to be 
purposive for the faculty of cognition. Insofar as we are here concerned with the 
intuition, then we are thereby concerned with the form and thus the spatial aspect of 
nature. Thus visual art is concerned predominantly with the spatial, and the 
manipulation of form so that in its spatial configuration it is purposive for the 
faculty of cognition (as something that we can bring order to). This is only to be 
expected given the non-cognitive focus of Kant's aesthetic, where, as was seen in 
earlier chapters, the determining ground of aesthetic response is intuitional (formal, 
spatiotemporal) rather than conceptual. Non-cognitivism however, doesn't amount 
to a complete non-conceptualism, insofar as we have again seen in earlier chapters 
that concepts are pervasive in all perceptual experience, and that representations are 
always a representation for us just insofar as their presentational content is ordered 
and arrived at through the operation of concepts. Nevertheless, what subsequent 
analysis has shown us is that even though any configuration requires conceptual 
organisation insofar as it is perceived, there  is nevertheless an emotional component 
to perceptual recognition, and that perceptions aren't taken up emotionally 
indiscriminately, but are responded to negatively or positively just insofar as the 
faculty of cognition is able to work with this content, as it were. Thus, as was seen in 
our fourth chapter, just as any representation has a determinate conceptual content, 
there is nevertheless a relation to the faculty of concepts as such which means any 
representation is susceptible in terms of aesthetic evaluation (pleasure, displeasure 
or indifference) just insofar as it is conceptually purposive or counter purposive for 
organisation at a further level. 
Thus in terms of an ability for artistic creation, the artist must in the first place be 
competent in the manipulation of form so as to make it readable, and this involves 
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the manipulation of materials so as to render a representation formally purposive80. 
Because this manipulation involves a high level of perceptual organisation, concepts 
are inevitably productive in the organisation of the material. However, even 
granting the importance of the role of sortal-concepts in making this organisation 
possible, there remains an irredeemably intuitional-spatial element that accounts for 
the successful presentational aspect of the representation. 
 
Drawing 
With artistic creation in the visual arts, the presentational aspect in the creation of a 
representation is a essentially a concern with the drawing, as what delineates and 
generates form. Kant himself emphasises the essential role of drawing in the visual 
presentation of an idea when he writes that, 
All form of the objects of the senses (of the outer as well as, mediately, the 
inner) is either shape or play: in the latter case, either play of shapes (in 
space, mime and dance), or mere play of sensations (in time). The charm of 
colours or of the agreeable tones of instruments can be added, but drawing in 
the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the 
pure judgement of taste. (CJ 5:225) 
In assessing and in creating a work of art, as a tasteful representation, the quality of 
the drawing is key to the representations success or failure. A badly drawing figure 
or object operates as a detriment to our engaging with the art work, and is the first 
obstacle to our being able to tolerate, let alone enjoy, the representation in the first 
place. Thus in the visual arts what is required is first and foremost the ability to 
draw, so that in accordance with Kant's distinction between taste and genius, a 
failure to show taste is less tolerable than a failure in genius (the presentation of the 
                                                          
80 The exception here, within the field of visual arts, is post-modernism, which is often (although not 
necessarily) unconcerned with the aesthetics of the representation (as a pleasing or beautiful 
representation, so that the representation might be counter-purposive for judgement, i.e. 
ugly/repellent). Here the concern is with the representations significance as a symbol (as saying 
something, thus looking like nature in the second sense). The fact that the object rejects, or is 
unconcerned with, the aesthetic element is itself significant in forcing the viewer to deal with the 
object/representation at just a symbolic level, in spite of initial resistance. This however accounts for a 
certain level of apathy towards post-modern or contemporary art, since there is not the initial 
attraction to the object by virtue of its purposive form (aesthetic beauty/attractiveness). Thus the 
accusation that post-modernism is academic or overly-intellectual, since its significance rests upon its 
(often esoteric or personal) symbolic significance (what it is saying). 
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idea)81. This significance of drawing is important for our argument. At the close of 
our second chapter we argued that the talent for drawing is largely in part a talent 
for a kind of spatial orientation or sense. There our argument was supported 
through Kant's argument in the Prolegomena for the incongruence of counterparts, 
where Kant argued that in perceptual orientation there is an aspect of the cognition 
that involves an intuitive aspect only and that remains undetermined by any 
conceptual activity, even though concepts are involved in the perception as such. 
Thus the recognition of incongruence between my left and right hands isn't achieved 
through some conceptual measure, but simply through the act of seeing that there is 
a spatial incongruence of fit. This irredeemably spatial aspect of the cognition was in 
turn used to support our argument that, contra the conceptualist argument, Kant 
maintains that there is an aspect of cognition that is completely apart from the 
concept of the understanding and that yet plays a part in the structuring of this 
cognition. This in turn was supported by Kant's contention that space and time 
themselves are intuitional formal wholes that precede and make cognition possible 
in the first place. Thus because we have the formal intuition (space and time) 
generated intuitively through the imagination, as a kind of structural matrix that 
makes object placement and discernment possible, we can be said to have a 
navigational and formational aspect governing the representation producing aspect 
of our cognitive orientation. Thus the talent for drawing was in part called a talent 
that originates from this a priori intuitional aspect of cognition. It is in part a talent of 
a spatial sense, since other, more conceptually determinate aspects, contribute to and 
constitute the ability to draw; such as an awareness of what grades of pencil will 
lead to the right tone and thus the presentation of a depth affect, or the methods for 
the construction of linear perspective (or even just the knowledge that the vase we 
are drawing is round, and what it means to portray roundness). What was pointed 
out however, was that even after the conceptual mastery of drawing has been 
achieved, there is an aspect to drawing that cannot be taught, but must be felt, where 
this is essentially a feeling for the space in the image. In a two-dimensional 
representation this special intuitive talent for drawing consists in the ability to 
transcribe space convincingly on a flat surface, so that the third dimension is seen 
and felt. In the third dimension (sculpture) this talent consists in the ability to 
transcribe space in a spatially contained and dimensional unit. With reference to 
                                                          
81 Another exception here, apart from that of post-modernism, is Naive Art, where, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2 (fn. 17), an academic weakness or ignorance in the drawing is part of the quality and merit 
of the work. Nevertheless, even here, a certain quality in the drawing (it's being done with an 
absolute sincerity) is necessary. 
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drawing, it may be thought that because a knowledge of linear perspective can, 
through a formulaic conceptual application of rules, successfully represent three-
dimensional space on a two dimensional surface, then there is no need to postulate a 
separate talent responsible for the successful drawing in the representation. It is true 
that a successful representation can be constructed in this fashion, so that anyone can 
learn how to construct an image. However, we noted that this is one way of 
representing the object, but that the talented and skilled draughtsman will be able to 
represent what is before them without the aid of such devises. The further objection 
is that it is because the method for constructing linear perspective has been 
imbedded that the draughtsman is able to successfully represent what is before him 
in a spatially convincing way. However, our response here is that it simply isn't the 
case that an artist (and many of the best draughtsmen weren't trained in linear 
perspective) operates according to such rules in drawing, but instead operates 
according to the way the representation looks.  The feeling for space as I am referring 
to it needn't be engaged with the kind of representation that involves deep 
perspective, and the feeling for the space in the representation is involved in the 
drawing of objects with a shallow perspective. Although it is possible to apply the 
rules of linear perspective to the drawing of a vase of flowers, this would be a 
suspicious as an act of representation as it would indicate a lack of any competence 
at all for drawing through looking and copying. A successful drawing of this nature 
will have a depth and spatial dimension that is achieved in part through the sheer 
feeling for the space in the object, and the ability to render this through materials. 
Thus the skilled draughtsman will not only have a highly developed conceptual 
knowledge of how to manipulate their materials and how to construct form, but will 
also have a sense of what is required for convincing form (so that is a talent that 
cannot be taught solely through rules). Thus in feeling the place of the vase on the 
surface the draughtsman wants to put this feeling of place into the drawing, so that 
they literally want to draw the space into the picture. That a certain leaf comes into 
the foreground and gives a dimensionality to the representation requires not only a 
knowledge that a heavier line can dimensionally more often than not bring 
something forward, but a sense of the spatiality and form of the leaf in relation to its 
surroundings, and its standing in a proximity relative to the viewer. 
With reference to Kant's notion that beautiful art, in order to be beautiful, must seem 
like nature (in our first sense in which we understand this) we can now see the 
importance of the role of the intuition in artistic production in making this possible. 
Because the feeling for space and the possession of a spatial sense, is that aspect of 
intuition that makes drawing possible, it is an essential component of artistic 
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creation, which is firstly the ability to produce a representation such that it seems as 
though nature itself produced it (in its purposivity for judgement). What must be 
remembered however, is that any representation, qua spatial-intuitional, must 
involve our sense of space, so that just insofar as we possess the formal intuition, it 
will be governing all intuition based areas of our cognitive life. With drawing the 
point is not that some special faculty (space as intuition) finds operation where 
elsewhere it doesn't find operation, but that here the uniqueness of that faculty is 
made manifest and reveals its special non-conceptual character. All drawing, even 
that exclusively using mathematical measure depends upon a spatial sense (the 
faculty of intuition) for its activity, but as a special talent requires a certain ability in 
order to attain its excellence (i.e. its non-conceptually determinate aspect), and this is 
just the ability to feel the space in the representation and communicate this  into (put 
this space into) a representation. To make art look like nature is to be able to order 
the representation as spatial phenomenon, so that the representation is purposive for 
cognition (we can read the space in it). To fail in making the representation 
purposive for judgement is to fail in the drawing, and although there are a number 
of ways the drawing can fail (a failure to understand pencil hardness for instance), 
one of these ways is a failure in communicating a convincing sense of space.   
What our argument in this chapter is maintaining then, is that a failure in getting the 
intuitional aspect of the representation right (in visual art, the drawing) of necessity 
leads to a failure in further being able to communicate through the representation, so 
that the artwork looking like nature in the first sense must be in place so that the 
artwork can look like nature in the second sense. Looking like nature in the first 
sense is the representations being purposive for the faculty of cognition. Only when 
this is in place (the drawing is correct) is the artwork able to look like nature in 
speaking as nature does, through symbols (as a language) and not discursive 
concepts82. What this indicates is that a structural readability must be in order in the 
first place so that at a further level the art work is able to speak and present an 
intellectual content that can be read off this structural configuration. To be sure, the 
readability can be more or less difficult and a representation can be communicative 
symbolically even though the formal construction can be a failure. But when the 
                                                          
82 A good historical example of the idea that artist is concerned with the use objects as symbols (as a 
kind of language) can be found in the symbolist writings of G. Albert-Aurier where he states (1891) 
that, 'Indeed, in the eyes of the artist - that is, the one who must be the Expresser of Absolute Beings - 
objects are only relative beings, which are nothing but a translation proportionate to the relativity of 
our intellects, of Ideas, of absolute and essential beings. Objects cannot have value more than objects 
as such. They can appear to him only as signs. They are the letters of an enormous alphabet which 
only the man of genius knows how to spell'. (See bibliography for details). 
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representation is more difficult to read (so that as a representation it is not entirely 
purposive for cognition and cannot be said to facilitate a harmonious play between 
the faculties) then it is difficult to engage with in any absolute way. We cannot easily 
look at the picture but have to struggle with it, to see what the artist is trying to do, 
and thus the overall engagement with the representation suffers. Insofar as we have 
to struggle with the initial formal presentation of the artwork, then the artwork 
cannot be said to look like nature in the sense of a purposivity for judgement, so that 
it fails in our first sense of seeming like nature. The failure is such that we cannot 
read of of it, at least not with the ease that should be present in a successful 
representation, and thus we cannot respond to it as something that aims to 
communicate a content - thus the failure in our second sense of seeming like nature.  
Our thesis here has important ramifications for helping us understand how certain 
artistic activities are possible that historically were not practiced in Kant's time. 
When discussing visual art, Kant of course had in mind painting and sculpture as it 
existed in and prior to the later 18th Century. Here visual art is representational and 
presents its ideas through the use of recognised objects which are able to function as 
symbols. According to our argument, communicating at this symbolic level depends 
upon an accessibility, or readability, of the representation in the first place, so that 
the ability to make a picture work as a formal representation is essential, where this 
is a matter of getting the drawing (construction of form) right. Only then can one 
engage with the work of art, because one can read it, and see what the art work 
wants to say. What we want to suggest however, is that this dependence is not only 
true of the representational art that Kant was familiar with but is also true of more 
recent, modern forms of art.  
 
Abstract Art 
Abstract art can either be representational or non-representational. Insofar as it is 
representational, then, like representational art generally, it exploits motifs from the 
world83 (figures, buildings, light, etc.) to deliver a symbolic content. What we have 
argued has application here, viz. that the drawing (formal arranging) must be right 
for the viewer to be able to read the image so as to see what it wants to 
communicate, so that a failure in the drawing is a failure to engage the audience 
with reference to subsequent meaning (for they struggle to read the image in the first 
place). However, with non-representational abstract art there is a different concern 
                                                          
83 Fantastical objects also being based upon our experience of the world. 
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on the part of the artist. One of these key differences is that a more explicit concern 
with the formal conditions of successful (readable) representation has come to 
dominate. However, it is also true that the overall concern of the artist here is the 
aim to communicate aesthetic ideas. Indeed, without this latter aspect being a feature 
of the work then the artwork would be devoid of any deeper significance so that it 
could legitimately be a work of fine art. As Kant has shown, essential to the work in 
its success and existence as a work of fine art is not only its formal unity (the 
soundness of its construction, its being created with taste), but it's symbolic content 
in terms of its communicating aesthetic ideas. That aesthetic ideas seem only able to 
be delivered through a recognisable figurative content also in part accounts for the 
hostility to non-representational abstract art both now and when it first came to 
develop. The thought was that although the formal has been pushed to the fore, and 
makes a statement in its own right and perhaps has its own beauty because of this, 
this cannot be pursued to the detriment of a representational content of some kind (a 
recognisable symbol). The idea is that without some recognisable content there are 
no symbols that can function in the presenting of an idea (more or less 
determinate)84. The discovery of non-representational abstract art however, was 
finding that a representation can communicate exclusively through formal structures 
which are themselves non-figurative (non-representational). This is possible because 
shape and form are themselves a spatial quality, and are thereby the result, in their 
presence to perception, of a spatial synthesis. As was seen in our previous chapter, 
an object is able to act as a symbol by virtue of its structural analogue with a certain 
concept or idea. This analogue is found by virtue of a certain similarity governing 
the cognitive synthesis in the intuition of each representation. What non-
representational abstract art recognises is that the rules that govern the synthesis of 
certain shapes, forms or configurative movements, can themselves function as 
symbols for something else with which they bear analogy in the rule of synthesis. 
What this something else is however, is more or less difficult to explicate, and this is 
in accordance with the indeterminacy of the idea that is being expressed, even 
though there is a certainly an intellectual content that is being communicated. We 
can however imagine that infinity, or calm or a particular transcendent attribute can 
                                                          
84 The American essayist and art critic Clemet Greenberg (who was strongly influenced by Kant), in 
an essay titled "Abstract, Representational, and so forth,",  seen this hostility as being based on the 
assumption or prejudice that only a representational content and its concept can import meaning, 
which for Greenberg wasn't true. He seen non-representational art as offering a 'new language', 
which was not yet understood or seen just because it was new. Thus Greenberg states that 'the explicit 
content on a historical event offered in Picasso's Guernica does not make it necessarily a better or 
richer work than an utterly "nonobjective" painting by Mondrian.' (Greenberg (1961): 135). 
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be suggested through the manipulation of form.  The drawing in the case of non-
representational abstract art is the ability to configure the pictorial space so that the 
representation is able to work as a purposive arrangement in the first place, so that it 
can subsequently be read as communicating a content; and this is in agreement with 
our initial remark regarding the dependence of looking like nature in one (second) 
sense upon another (first) sense. Perhaps more than any other aspect of visual art, 
this purely abstract art, for its success, depends more upon what we have called the 
talent, or sense, for spatial configuration. This is because non-representational 
abstract art forgoes recognisable objects, which even in a failed work of 
representational art, lend the representation a kind of sturdiness or tangibility, as an 
intent on part of the artist in their aim to communicate. A failed non-representational 
work of art on the other hand, insofar as the drawing in spatial configuration fails 
(where the objects are able to speak by virtue of their synthetic unity), then the 
representation fails more dramatically, and there is little support upon which the 
representation can rely for subsequent communication.   
If the communicable content of  non-representational art were solely concerned with 
the readability of the picture plane as successful configuration, then the form would 
just become the content (in accordance with Henry Allison's views). I believe it 
correct however to maintain that non-representational abstract art aims at more than 
just this, although it is a large part of the concern of non-representational abstract art 
and in some cases may be the sole concern. What is crucial however, is what is 
represented - the structure and object in the picture. If this were different then the 
representation would be saying something else or nothing at all, yet the success of 
the picture as formal representation may to that extent be unaffected. Thus there can 
be abstract works that are successful just at the level of readability, but because they 
lack further content (or what we might call any significant, meaningful content), 
aren't significant as works of art (we might say they lack genius) 85. The rule of 
                                                          
85 A more recent aesthetic theory by Richard Eldridge has much in common with (and an 
indebtedness to) Kant's theory, insofar as Eldridge (in 'Form and Content: An Aesthetic Theory of Art' 
(1985)) has argued for a non-recursive definition of art whereby an artwork is defined by the 
'satisfying appropriateness' of its form to its content. A key feature of Eldridge's theory is that it aims 
to account for abstract painting as non-representational as a legitimate art form. Eldridge states that 
what non-representational art forms are about 'are the structures or forms which are capable of 
provoking absorption on the part of the audience. Their contents are the relations between...certain 
forms or arrangements of colours (which include hue, intensity, size, complementarities, etc.) on the 
one hand, and human experiences of absorption on the other' (Eldridge (1985): 310). 'Human 
experiences of absorption' are the relevant human experiences at a given time ('Human capacities for 
absorption evolve as sensibilities become jaded to certain forms'), so that the artwork is meaningful at 
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synthesis that governs their visual content doesn't offer itself to any deeper or 
profound symbolic significance, turning the image from a pleasing representation to 
a work of fine art. Thus although we might find that there is  a greater closeness, or 
dependence relation, here between the form and the content than with 
representational art, the separateness between art work as a formally purposive 
representation and art work as communicating aesthetic ideas is important to bear in 
mind. 
 
Intuition and Gestalt 
In affirming the importance of the act of spatial synthesis in artistic creation we 
affirm Kant's general account of the closeness and mutual dependence of intuition 
and concept. Even in the most abstract of representations, the concept of the 
understanding is present in making the perception possible, and this is just to 
reiterate what we have stated a number of times in accordance with Kant's remarks 
in the first critique, viz. that perception itself is only possible upon the operation of 
the categories upon intuitional content. In our first chapter however, we saw that 
there must be a gap between intuition and concept if the categories of the 
understanding are said to have anything to act upon i.e. a data for processing. 
Although we argued that this initial raw data is present and, as an aspect of a 
cognitive genesis, supported by the text of the first Critique itself, we saw that as far 
as cognition and our interaction with the world goes, it is fairly unimportant and 
uninteresting, hence Kant himself is not very concerned with this initial genesis. 
Nevertheless the gap between the intuition and the concept here becomes of some 
importance insofar as we are concerned with the creative act of artistic production. 
Again, it is not that some pre-conceptual content finds itself expressed in the artistic 
production. Any content is co-ordinated through the operation of concepts upon the 
sensible data. What we are arguing is that what the artist does do however is bear 
witness to the birth of the interaction between the concept and the intuition at the 
creative level, so that a part of their task and endeavour is make palpable the way in 
which perception itself is creative in bringing cognitive conceptual organisation to 
bear upon the data of intuition86. What the artist does with a successful artistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
its particular genesis (but presumably universally meaningful in the long run). it is the work of the 
abstract artist to embody this meaningfulness (content) in abstract form and structure. 
86 This element of my discussion in part takes its inspiration from aspects of Murleau-Ponty's theory 
of painting and Paul Crowther's reading of it. In Chapter 6 of Art and Embodiment: from Aesthetics to 
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production is testify to the organisational capacity of our cognitive capacities in 
generating optimal perceptual readability, or what we might call the generation of 
the gestalt. When an artistic representation is complete, it is dense with the struggle 
to find the best means of coordinating the material so that it is readable and thus 
purposive for cognition. The purposivity for cognition is the level or the result that 
the viewer engages with, just as when a perception is organised it is replete with the 
organisational activity imposed by the categories at a sortal level. We might then say 
that artistic creation acts as an analogue for perception, in showing the effort  to 
obtain the readability or gestalt that makes subsequent interaction with the world 
possible87. Just as a perceptual content found in the ordinary environment can fail in 
portraying a optimal purposivity for judgement, an artistic representation can also 
fail in presenting a gestalt where optimal purposivity is portrayed. The difference is 
of course that perception is a basic cognitive capacity (being for Kant  arrived at 
through cognitive organisation rather than merely given) that makes us acquainted 
with the world in the first place, whereas artistic activity is a supplement to human 
activity (although a basic one at that). As an imaginative activity however, artistic 
creativity mimics and learns from the perceptual act, so that it attains to provide an 
order that perception itself spontaneously arrives at. In being presented with a 
pleasing aesthetic cognition there is a stimulating of the imagination so that it finds 
before it what it itself would like to generate spontaneously. This recognition in the 
imagination is an interesting (and important for our purposes) aspect of Kant's 
account where in the Analytic of the Beautiful with reference to the harmony of the 
faculties he wrote that, 
although in the apprehension of a given object of the senses it is of course 
bound to a determinate form of this object and to this extent has no free play 
(as in invention), nevertheless it is still quite conceivable that the object can 
provide it with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the 
manifold as the imagination would design in harmony with the lawfulness 
of the understanding  in general if it were left free by itself. (CJ 5:240-1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Self-Consciousness Crowther argues that as he understands Merleau-Ponty's argument, the significance 
of Cezanne's work is that it returns us to a primitive, pre-reflective, primordial level of perception, so 
that In Merleau-Ponty's words Cezanne endeavors to 'make[] visible how the world touches us' 
(Crowther (2001): 107, see also Merleau-Ponty's 'Cezanne's Doubt' (1964)). For Crowther this account 
of painting has important phenomenological significance insofar as it discloses 'the mode of our 
insertion into the world' (Crowther (2001): 107) 
87 For an engaging account of how artistic creativity endeavors to achieve optimal readability or an 
optimal gestalt, see Rudolf Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (1954), 
and his later New Essays on the Psychology of Art (1986), especially the essay 'The Double-Edged Mind: 
Intuition and the Intellect' which has a distinctly Kantian feel to it in terms of the distinction between 
intuition and concept, and perception as construct. 
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Thus, when faced with a pleasing aesthetic phenomenon it is as though it were 
something we ourselves would have made, through the free activity of our 
imagination (in accordance with the conditions of a perceptual optimum), even 
though we are bound to its actual formal existence. The imagination is thus 
responsive to that phenomena wherein it recognises the virtue of its own 
organisational efficacy, except that with the creative impulse it does not just want to 
respond to a determinate form, but create form through itself and its own 
organisational capacity. 
There is thus an urge to creativity, brought upon by the imaginations own 
spontaneous activity, so that there is as it were, an impetus to generate 
representations that match those representations we find aesthetically pleasing (as 
bound to a determinate form). The effort to arrive at a gestalt in ordinary cognition 
however, is not a cognitively felt process, and phenomenologically there is no 
experience of an organisational activity being present in generating a perception. 
The perception is just there, and it was only until fairly recently that gestalt 
psychology discovered and investigated the mechanism at work in perceptual 
organisation88. With artistic creativity however, there is a distinctive consciousness in 
the effort to arrive at a successful representation so that it is only through much trial 
and error that a satisfactory result is obtained. This distinctive creative activity 
betrays an essential part of its own character in that it has a pleasure unique to itself 
(a pleasure distinct from the pleasure of aesthetic response). This pleasure of artistic 
creativity is a pleasure in witnessing the generation of the gestalt, so that out of 
nothing, as it were, a representation that is readable, or purposive for cognition, has 
been made. Here the organisational virtue of the imagination in perception finds 
itself spontaneously capable, so that it can create in accordance with the free 
lawfulness of the understanding when left to itself, and is just as capable of the 
generation of pleasing form as that form which is bound to a determinate existence89.  
With this reference to a distinctive creative pleasure however, it is important to point 
out that although there is a further enrichment of the artistic experience from the 
                                                          
88 Kant is seen as an important precursor to Gestalt Theory. See B. R. Hergenhahn, An Introduction to 
the History of Psychology (2009), pg.457. 
89 What needs to borne in mind however, is that although we have argued that there is an artistic 
creativity which has its own distinctive pleasure in creating representations that are purposive for 
cognition, this activity itself, even when creating a readable image, doesn't yet thereby create a work 
of fine art. This is for the reason that a work a fine art requires more than just the capacity to exercise 
taste and unify a representation so that it has pleasing form, and we remember that Kant on this 
subject stated that a representation of any kind, in order to be a work of fine art, requires in addition 
to the creative component of taste the enriching power of genius (CJ 5:312-13). 
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receptive point of view, the aesthetic pleasure found in the aesthetic response is not 
in the first place that of the recognition of an analogue between artistic productivity 
and perceptual activity. If it was this would undermine Kant's account of the 
determining ground of aesthetic response, which, as we have seen, is to be found in 
the perceived purposivity of the intuition for the faculty of concepts. What the 
further recognition in the artistic production bearing witness to the unifying 
perceptual act can enhance, is the overall level of engagement with and 
understanding of the artwork. Our relationship to art can be further informed 
through the recognition of the artistic struggle to attain a style, and when we learn of 
an artist's struggle to arrive at their manner of expression we further deepen our 
sense of artistic appreciation. This needn't be an engagement with an artists' 
biography, but just a witnessing of the actual artistic development in time. Likewise, 
with the development of a historical style, we come to see how successive 
generations have sought to attain optimal perceptual readability. Here we can see a 
style unfold and mature, and in doing so we see the artist, or style, pushing towards 
an increased aptitude for representational communication, or successful gestalt. 
Thus although the pleasure in generating a gestalt is in the first place a pleasure 
unique to artistic creativity (and we ought to recognise that there is a unique 
pleasure here), there is nevertheless an important sense in which the artistic results, 
and the attempts along the way, enrich our engagement and experience with art. 
This is just insofar as the artist, through their faculty of the imagination, has tried to 
replicate the synthetic unity found in pleasurable aesthetic experiences that are 
bound to a determinate form. Because different artists and different eras are 
responsive to or inspired by differing external phenomena (or have different external 
realities), then we get a corresponding differing response in the imagination, which 
through the free creative act seeks to attain such a level of formal readability as it 
finds in the external world. 
 
In bringing this chapter to a close what needs to be borne in mind and reiterated is 
the intuitional base upon which artistic creativity rests. We began by arguing that in 
order for art to seem like nature in the sense of being purposive for judgement in its 
formal aspect, we need to recognise that this means that there are certain conditions 
that obtain to a (visual) representations being found as satisfactory from a perceptual 
point of view. One of the key conditions here, of satisfactory formal representation, 
concerns a convincing sense of space qua two-dimensional representation which 
necessarily has spatial depth as a component of its appearance, or qua three-
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dimensional representation which is located in space and has to satisfy conditions 
regarding its own contained presentation of spatial unity90. This sense of space, 
convincingly portrayed is a condition of representational and abstract art alike. It is 
only through being able to put something into space, representationally speaking, 
that a representation can really seem like nature, and thereby satisfy the viewer, so 
that as we said, a failure in the drawing in this respect is a failure in executing the 
representation. Only when art seems like nature in this first sense, can the artwork 
go on to seem like nature in the further sense of speaking through symbols in the 
way that nature speaks to us through symbols. The sense of space is not something 
arrived at through the intuition itself (although it is spatially conditioned) but is an 
innate representation (which Kant calls a formal intuition) which makes spatial 
representation and placement possible in the first place. This space (and time) is a 
non-conceptually determined quality of the faculty if intuition and is the base of all 
conceptual representations. The next stage of our argument was to show how the 
faculty of the imagination can be said to be inspired by the aesthetic data of the 
world, so that through the creative impulse it aspires to the same level of aesthetic 
beauty therein found. Because this is firstly an aspiring to the making of art that 
seems like nature in its formal aspect (thus always indicating the primacy of the 
objective world as the condition of representational satisfaction) it has the sense of 
space and spatial congruence as its fundamental concern.  What the artist does here 
though, through the artistic creativity, is testify to the act as to how intuitions are 
generated as perceptual data through the same activity that makes perception 
possible in the first place, viz. through the application of sortal concepts to the non-
conceptual data of sense. In this way the artist bears witness to the act of perception 
itself, insofar as perception itself is a creative act that has to work upon a content 
through cognitive operations in order to arrive at a coherent perceptual 
representation. Through both the arguments of this chapter then, we have aimed to 
demonstrate how the faculty of intuition in its non-conceptually determined capacity 
constitutes a fundamental component of artistic creativity, and how art can only be 
said to seem like nature just insofar as this capacity is in place. 
                                                          
90 Gestalt psychology in general has shown how a two-dimensional arrangement, no matter how 
basic, necessarily has a figure-ground relationship. So even a few marks on a page are perceived 
(through active perceptual operations) as lying on different planes. What will be perceived as figure 
and what as ground is determined in accordance with what in gestalt psychology is called a basic law 
of visual perception, viz. that 'Any stimulus pattern tends to be seen in such a way that the resulting 
structure is as simple as the given conditions permit' (Arnheim, (1954): 63). See also Max 
Wertheimer's 'Laws of Organisation in Perceptual Forms (1923), reprinted in A Source Book of Gestalt 
Psychology (1969). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
At the close of our first chapter we asked whether the pre-apperceptive 
representational unity (synthesis of representations (A155/B194)) that Kant makes room 
for in the first Critique, in any sense makes way for a position whereby we can be 
said to have a meaningful representational content in terms of acquainting us with 
an objective world of experience. Here we said that the answer to this question was 
in a way yes and no. 'No' insofar as Kant is explicit in arguing that it is only through 
the representations having been brought under apperception that the object can be 
said to be anything for us. We said that we can answer 'yes', just insofar as Kant in 
the first Critique was primarily concerned with the a priori validity of the category in 
relation to the objects of sensibility, and thereby perhaps overlooked the possibility 
of the importance of a representational content prior to conceptualisation. Exactly 
what role this representational content would play however was left unsettled, just 
insofar as Kant did not discuss such possibilities, but we stipulated that such content 
is perhaps importantly operational at an orientational level, and with the support of 
Longuenesse, we argued that it is reasonable to suppose that there are imaginative 
processes that are synthetically engaged without yet being brought under the further 
unifying function of the understanding. In addition we argued that it is only on the 
presupposition of such a pre-cognitive content that we can perhaps make sense of 
animal and infant cognition, which is itself orientational (i.e. not 'blind'). 
Whether this account of meaningfulness could be expanded through further 
investigation was left open, and in our last chapter we have seen how making room 
for this initial representational content helps us to understand an aspect of artistic 
creativity. Because artistic creativity is concerned with generating the representation 
as gestalt, then it has to learn from perceptions own conatus, as it were, whereby the 
organisational capacity which generates the gestalt in perception is itself active in the 
endeavour to create a representation that is well ordered in its purposivity for 
cognition as such. By making room for a pre-conceptual representational content we 
allow for a position whereby some material has to come to be structurally ordered, 
and this bears analogy with artistic creativity which has to create an order out of 
certain materials which by themselves suggest no order. Thus we have said that the 
artistic creative act bears witness to the perceptual act, and further enriches our 
appreciation of the individual art work or historical style. This argument therefore 
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has suggested a further way in which a pre-conceptual content can have a 
meaningful bearing upon further areas of our cognitive life (the artistic creative 
endeavour). 
A further importance for pre-conceptual content could have been argued for if it had 
turned out (with regard to an analysis of Kant's account of the harmony of the 
faculties as presented in the third Critique) that either the pre-cognitive position or 
the multi-cognitive position as Paul Guyer has characterised these positions, were 
tenable. This is because a pre-conceptual unity belonging to the imagination would 
have been what engaged the faculty of concepts in stimulating the free play in the 
imagination that itself determines our aesthetic response. Through our analysis 
however, we have seen that because perceptual content always has a conceptual 
unity through the categories, there was no way in which we could talk about an 
apperceptive perceptual representational content as being pre-conceptual. We 
argued that the perception that determines the aesthetic response, by being focused, 
always has a determinate content (although as was discussed, not necessarily at the 
level of determination Guyer argues for), so that in being purposive for cognition the 
representation is not purposive for any particular concept(s), but is purposive just 
for the faculty of concepts as such91. 
So although we have argued that there is room for developing an account of the 
importance, or meaningfulness, of a pre-apperceptive content, it nevertheless turns 
out that there are limits to this development, which stops just insofar as perceptual 
cognitive cognition requires the operation of concepts in being presented with an 
objective world of experience. However, through the analysis of our second chapter 
we have seen that although conceptualisation begins at an early stage of the 
cognitive process, there is nevertheless a sense in which this does not undermine a 
non-conceptualist position within conceptually cognitive experience. Here we 
discounted the tendency to view Kant's account of cognition as a stop/start process, 
where once concepts are in play, a non-conceptualist position becomes untenable92. 
                                                          
91 With Kant's account of the sublime however (Chapter 5), we faced the opposite risk - that what 
determined our response to the sublime was too conceptually loaded to allow for an aesthetic, rather 
than a morally or theoretically determining, response. Our response to this however was that because 
there is a relevant level of indeterminacy in what determines our response, the response is not a 
cognitive one, but a felt (aesthetic) one. In this sense the imaginative content was purposive for the 
faculty of reason, 'in order to correspond subjectively with its ideas (though which is undetermined)'. 
(CJ 5:256) 
92 Credit here must be given to Robert Hanna however, who as we have seen (Chapter 4), argues for 
various degrees of conceptualism within the various human cognitive operations as Kant accounts for 
them throughout his philosophy. 
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A further non-conceptualist position was thus argued for, where in following the 
lead of Wayne Waxman and Béatrice Longuenesse, we argued that space and time as 
formal intuitions are generated as formal unified wholes through the understanding, 
but not through the concept of the understanding. These formally unified intuitions 
through an original apperceptive synthetic unity, formed the base and possibility of 
any experience whatsoever, making even discursive representation possible. What 
was especially important for our purposes was that this feature of our cognition 
could account for certain phenomena that were themselves undetermined by 
concepts. It was not that concepts were not operative in making the perception itself 
possible (which they must be qua Kant's definition of perception as cognition) but 
that there is an element of the experience that cannot be accounted for through the 
operation of concepts. Kant's examples (in the Prolegomena) of the incongruence of 
counterparts served to demonstrate this, and we applied this aspect of Kant's theory 
to the possibility of drawing. This in turn had important ramifications to Kant's 
account of artistic creativity and the sense of what it means for art to be created so 
that it seems like nature. Because, in accordance with Kant's account, the drawing is 
what is essential in generating successful form (form that is purposive for cognition), 
the ability to generate a spatial congruence (fittedness/appropriateness) in drawing 
is crucial to the (visual) artistic creation insofar as it looks like nature in its success.  
In addition to the importance of the unity of space, as spatial framework that makes 
placement in space possible in the first place, we have also seen that there is a kind 
of non-conceptualism within Kant's account of aesthetic ideas93. Here was a merging 
of our conceptual faculty with our intuitive faculty in making an kind of intellectual 
expression possible that transcended what was possible through conceptual 
articulation. This was Kant's account of symbolic representation, where an object or 
group of objects were capable of signifying something else through an analogue in 
the rule that governs the synthesis of the representations. The central concept or idea 
of reason that was being expressed may be more or less determinate (present to 
consciousness with artist and audience), but the expression of this idea, insofar as it 
is intuitive-symbolic, adds to this idea a richness and meaningfulness that 
transcends what can be expressed through concepts (the faculty of the 
understanding).  
                                                          
93 The term 'metacognitivism' would perhaps be more appropriate, insofar as we are talking of 
transcending what is discursively expressible, but because of Guyer's specific use of this term and the 
way we have employed it I have stuck with 'a kind of non-conceptualism'. 
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So where the worry was that there may be no interesting sense in which a non-
conceptual content is importantly involved in human engagement, through our 
analysis we have shown that are a various levels in which aesthetic experience, both 
in receptivity and creativity, is non-conceptually involved. By beginning with an 
analysis of Kant's theory of cognition as outlined in the first Critique, we have been 
able trace Kant's account of the genesis of experience, and the sense in which the 
emergence of perception became not just a orientational activity, but also became 
aesthetically involved. This analysis helped us to engage more thoroughly with 
Kant's account of reflective judgement (Chapters 3 and 4) and his account of the 
harmony of the faculties (with both the beautiful and the sublime), so that we could 
explore the sense in which aesthetic judgement could be said to be non-cognitive. 
This further allowed us to move on to Kant's creative aesthetic (Chapters 6 and 7) so 
that we could understand the sense in which art, in order to be art, must seem like 
nature. By adopting this method of exploration, we have been able to locate the 
relevant non-conceptuality that has enabled us to defend a form of Kantian non-
conceptualism whilst at the same time recognising the highly conceptual nature of 
human experience. 
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